This text presents a survey and evaluation of Kant's theory of mind. It focuses on Kant's discussion of the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason, and examines how the themes raised there are treated in the rest of Kant's writings.

A comprehensive overview of Kant's discoveries about the mind for non-specialists.

This text presents a survey and evaluation of Kant's theory of mind. It focuses on Kant's discussion of the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason, and examines how the themes raised there are treated in the rest of Kant's writings.

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant's writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant's critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant's account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role does self-consciousness play in our judgments? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe? These essays showcase the depth of Kant's writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant's writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self.

This book argues that Kant's transcendental idealism has been misinterpreted: it denies not simply the super-sensory reality of space, time, and appearances, but their reality outside imagination as well. After adducing extensive and explicit textual evidence in its favor, Waxman shows this interpretation to be essential to the Transcendental Deduction, the affirmation of things in themselves, and the attempt to surmount Hume's scepticism. He further argues that Kant's much-neglected claim that, besides himself, "no psychologist has so much as even thought that the imagination might be a necessary constituent of perception," should be construed so that even our consciousness of sensation itself (visual, tactile, etc.) is impossible without imagination. A compelling and original contribution to Kantian scholarship, Kant's Model of the Mind will also bear close examination by students and scholars of Hume, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science.

The thought of Immanuel Kant is fundamental to understanding Western philosophy. Spanning epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and religion, the sheer scope and originality of Kant’s ideas have decisively shaped the history of modern philosophy. The Kantian Mind is an outstanding guide and reference source to Kant's thought and a major new publication in Kant scholarship. Comprising forty-five chapters by a stellar team of contributors, the collection is divided into four clear parts: Background to the Critical Philosophy Transcendental Philosophy (Critique and Doctrine) Posthumous Writings and Lectures Kant and Contemporary Kantians. In addition to coverage of Kant's main works, the volume contains chapters on a broad range of topics including Kant's views on logic, mathematics, the natural sciences, anthropology, religion, politics, and education. The concluding chapters cover the influence of Kant's thought on contemporary analytic and continental philosophy. Including suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter, The Kantian Mind is essential reading for all students and scholars of Kant and contemporary Kantian thought. It will also be extremely helpful to those in related humanities and social sciences disciplines such as religion, history, politics, and literature.

In a 2005 editorial in the British newspaper The Guardian, Kant was declared "the undefeated heavyweight philosophy champion of the world" because he had the "insight ... to remove psychology from epistemology, arguing that knowledge is inevitably mediated by space, time and forms within our minds." This is an accurate reflection of the consensus view of philosophers and scientists that Kant's accounts of space, time, nature, mathematics, and logic in the Critique of Pure Reason are rationalist, normativist, and nativist. Here, Wayne Waxman argues that this is untrue. Kant neither asserted nor implied that Euclid and Newton are the final word in their respective sciences. Rather than supposing that the psyche derives its fundamental forms from epistemology, he traced the first principles of ordinary, scientific, mathematical, and even logical knowledge to the psyche. Aristotelean logic, in particular, exhausts the sphere of the logical for Kant precisely because he deduced it entirely from psychological principles of the unity of consciousness, resulting in a demarcation of logic from mathematics that would set virtually everything regarded as logic today on the mathematical side of the ledger. Although Kant derived his conception of the unity of consciousness from Descartes, he gave it new life by eliminating its epistemological and metaphysical baggage, reducing it to its logical essence, and grounding what remained on a wholly original conception of the a priori unity of sensibility. Thus, far from departing from the course charted by British Empiricism, Kant's anatomy of the understanding is continuous with, indeed the culmination of, the psychologization of philosophy initiated by Locke, advanced by Berkeley, and developed to its empirical outrance by Hume.

Corey W. Dyck presents a new account of Kant's criticism of the rational investigation of the soul in the 'Critique of Pure Reason', in light of its 18th-century German context. He reinterprets the aims and results of the Paralogisms, and illuminates Kant's discussion of the soul's substantiality, simplicity, personality, and existence.

The Third International Kant Congress met in Rochester, New York, March 30 to April 4, 1970. The Proceedings, published by D. Reidel Publishing Company in 1972, contained 76 complete papers and 30 ab stracts in three languages. Since this large volume covered many phases of Kant's philosophy from a wide variety of standpoints, it is unlikely that the entire contents of it will be of interest to anyone philosopher. I have therefore selected from that volume the 20 papers that seem to me to be most likely to be of interest to English-speaking philosophers who are, to use a fairly vague description, in the 'analytical tradition'. The topics treated here are those which are most relevant to current philosoph ical debate in the theory of knowledge, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science. The division of papers under the seven principal topics, however, is in some respects a little arbitrary. I hope this little volume, published 250 years after Kant's birth, will show philosophers who are not already convinced that Kant is one of the most contemporary of the great philosophers of the past. I believe that the efforts of the authors of the papers will show that there can be genuine Kantian contributions towards the solution of problems that have fre quently been handled in opposition to, or obliviousness of, the eighteenth century philosopher who did more than anyone else to formulate the problems which still worry philosophers in the analytic tradition.