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Philosophical Investigations New editions of the Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations from Wiley-Blackwell Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations Part I: Essays G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker Second, extensively revised edition by P. M. S. Hacker Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations Part II: Exegesis §§1–184 G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker Second, extensively revised edition by P. M. S. Hacker Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volume 2 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations Essays and Exegesis of §§185–242 G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker Second, extensively revised edition by P. M. S. Hacker Immediately upon its posthumous publication in 1953, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations was hailed as a masterpiece, and the ensuing years have confirmed this initial assessment. Today it is widely acknowledged to be the single most important philosophical work of the twentieth century. In this definitive new en face German-English edition, Wittgenstein experts Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte have incorporated significant editorial changes to earlier editions of Philosophical Investigations in order to reflect more closely Wittgenstein’s original intentions. Notable revisions include the placement of Wittgenstein’s notes – Randbemerkungen – into their designated positions in the text, some corrections to the originally published German text, and the numbering of all the remarks in what was called Part 2 and is now named Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment. Extensive modifications and corrections have also been made to G. E. M. Anscombe’s original English translation. Detailed editorial endnotes have been added to illuminate difficult translation decisions and to identify references and allusions in Wittgenstein’s original text.

One of the first things to strike the reader of Wittgenstein's writings is the unique power of his style. One immediately notices the intriguing and arrangement of the paragraphs in Philosophical Investi composition gations, or the stark assertiveness of the sentences in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. A sense of the singular style being employed is unavoidable, even before the reader understands anything of what is happening philos ophically. Perhaps precisely for this reason it is too often assumed that coming to understand either work has little or nothing to do with re sponding to its form. The unusual style is a mere curiousity decorating the vehicle of Wittgenstein's ideas. Form is assigned a purely incidental import, there is a coincidence of this or that rhetorical flair with the yet to be determined content of the thoughts. The remarkableness of the style is perhaps registered in a tidy obiter dictum standing beside the more arduous task of discovering the substance of the ideas being presented. our interest, or at Wittgenstein's peculiar way of writing ably captures least our attention, but it bears only minor philosophical import. Though not unprecedented as a form of philosophical composition, it does not conform to the currently acceptable conventions; hence Wittgenstein's style is often thought to stand in the way of understanding his meaning. Such assumptions can be harmless for certain types of writing; however it does not appear as though Wittgenstein's is one of these.

First published in 1992. Although there is a vast amount of secondary literature on the Philosophical Investigations, very little exists which considers the exegesis of this important text. The apparently disjointed structure of the book has often been taken as a licence for interpreting passages out of context. This collection shows how important it is to consider the arguments which specify or authorise particular readings of certain passages. The essays are by distinguished Wittgenstein scholars. All approach the Investigations with the conviction that prior to pronouncements of the relevance or tenability of certain remarks one must always carefully consider Wittgenstein's text itself and locate the puzzling passages in their (immediate or original) contexts. Diverse exegetical approaches are represented; while some believe that the Investigations can be read as an independent text, others find it essential to look at the context of a particular remark, or of variations on it, in Wittgenstein's other texts. A lively debate emerges as authors differ in their assessment of the philosophical value of their material; some try to show that careful interpretations reveal valuable insights into prima facie untenable passages, others conclude that certain remarks fail to resolve the issues they address. This is the first strictly exegetical collection of papers on the Investigations. It is a major contribution to the study of not only this work, but of Wittgenstein's thought and an important strand of twentieth century philosophy.

This is a new edition of the first volume of G.P.Baker and P.M.S. Hacker’s definitive reference work on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Takes into account much material that was unavailable when the first edition was written. Following Baker’s death in 2002, P.M.S. Hacker has thoroughly revised the first volume, rewriting many essays and sections of exegesis completely. Part One – the Essays – now includes two completely new essays: 'Meaning and Use' and 'The Recantation of a Metaphysician'. Part Two – Exegesis §§1–184 – has been thoroughly revised in the light of the electronic publication of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, and includes many new interpretations of the remarks, a history of the composition of the book, and an overview of its structure. The revisions will ensure that this remains the definitive reference work on Wittgenstein’s masterpiece for the foreseeable future.

Drawing on ten years of research on the unpublished Wittgenstein papers, Stern investigates what motivated Wittgenstein's philosophical writing and casts new light on the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. The book is an exposition of Wittgenstein's early conception of the nature of representation and how his later revision and criticism of that work led to a radically different way of looking at mind and language. It also explains how the unpublished manuscripts and typescripts were put together and why they often provide better evidence of the development of his ideas than can be found in his published writing. In doing so, the book traces the development of a number of central themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy, including his conception of philosophical method, the picture theory of meaning, the limits of language, the application of language to experience, his treatment of private language, and what he called the "flow of life." Arguing that Wittgenstein's views are often much more simple (and more radical) than we have been led to believe, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language provides an overview of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy and brings to light aspects of his philosophy that have been almost universally neglected.

Thought's Footing is an enquiry into the relationship between the ways things are and the way we think and talk about them. It is also a study of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Charles Travis develops his account of certain key themes into a unified view of the work as a whole. His methodological starting-point is to see Wittgenstein's work as a response to Frege's. The central question is: how does thought get its footing? How can the thought that things are a certain way be connected to things being that way? Wittgenstein departs from Frege in holding that there are indefinitely many ways of filling out (giving content to) the notion of truth.. The truth of a thought or utterance is connected with the consequences of thinking or saying it. That is the point of Wittgenstein's introduction of the notion of a language game. The second key theme is this: a representation of things as being a certain way cannot take the right form for truth-bearing without a background of agreement in judgements: its form must belong to thinkers of a given kind. The third key theme is that the proprietary perceptions of a given sort of thinker as to what would be a case of judging when there is a particular way for things to be is not subject to criticism from outside it. Along the way Travis gives his own distinctive take on such topics as the problem of singular thought, the notion of a proposition, rule-following, sense and nonsense, the possibility of private language, and the representational content of experience. The result is an original and stimulating demonstration of the continuing value of Wittgenstein's work for central debates in philosophy today.

This title was first published in 2000: What was Wittgenstein's relation to "theory of meaning" in his post-1937 writings and what was his characterization of "philosophy" ? How does "philosophy" in Wittgenstein's later writings differ from what is usually accepted in modern academic 'analytic' philosophy? This book discusses problems encountered in looking at Wittgenstein's texts after-1937, focusing particularly on whether the problem of philosophy amounts to a systematic or a theoretical activity. Arguing that philosophy can be characterized as a form of conceptual investigation, Gefwert aims to demonstrate that a theoretical view does not correspond to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. For example, philosophy is not transcendental as he thought it was before 1929. Neither is philosophical language universal as Wittgenstein 1929-1936 thought it was. Proposing that a philosophical conceptual investigation is analogous to a psychotherapeutical session of Freud, with the common aim to dissolve the conceptual problems in language that haunt us in our everyday life, Gefwert's examination of the post-1937 writings of Wittgenstein concludes that "philosophical investigation" is a very different activity than that assumed by the Logical Positives and others adhering to a theoretical view.

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is arguably one of the most influential books of the 20th century. It threw a new light on the workings of language and mind, contributing significantly to the understanding of human knowledge. Featuring essays by internationally renowned scholars, this book explores the development of Wittgenstein's ideas in the direction of the Investigations. It offers a comprehensive view of some of the most disputable issues in the study of Wittgenstein's masterpiece and reassesses its relevance within contemporary philosophical debate. Contributors: Alberto Arruda (New University of Lisbon), João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter (University of S. Paulo), P. M. S. Hacker (University of Oxford), Nathan Hauthaler (University of London), Emiliano La Licata (University of Palermo), Constantine Sandis (Oxford Brookes University), Nikolay Milkov (University of Paderborn), Maria Filomena Molder (New University of Lisbon), Jesús Padilla Gálvez (University of Castilla-La Mancha, Toledo) and Rui Sampaio da Silva (University of the Azores).