The United States’ current strategic environment is increasingly complex, with security, economic, and humanitarian interests around the world. Consequently, the United States’ military may be called upon at any time to perform missions ranging from peacekeeping to total war, in environments ranging from the desserts of South West Asia to the jungles of Central America, against enemies ranging from Somali warlords to Chinese divisions. This uncertainty prevents the United States’ military from organizing, equipping, and training for any specific situation. Therefore, to be successful the United States military must be capable of quickly adapting to the particulars of its mission when called. In the late 1800’s England found itself in much the same position, with its military engaged around the world protecting its diverse and widely-dispersed interests. In 1899 when it went to war against the Boers it found its military unsuited for the South African terrain, the effects of modern weaponry, and the unconventional Boer tactics. This paper examines the British military’s strategy and tactics, and how they changed throughout the war. Ultimately it determines that the British failed to adapt their strategy and tactics effectively throughout the war. Although their performance varied from commander to commander, and from unit to unit, the British typically resisted change, for various reasons, even when the need for change was pressing.

Impressed with the tactical lessons of the Boer War, the British Army reformed its doctrine and training from 1899 to 1914, deploying a combat ready force, the “Old Contemptibles” of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1914. Because of these changes, the BEF played a crucial role in Belgium and France in 1914. The lessons of the Boer War guided the British Army and its interwar reforms. The doctrine and training developed from 1902-1914 was a significant improvement over the pre-Boer War British colonial warfare tactics. With Haldane’s organizational reforms and Robert’s new doctrine, the British Army built the Old Contemptibles of the BEF. The battles of 1914 showed the BEF was the equal of any European contemporary in quality of its tactics and doctrine. The comparison of the BEF to the other combatants in 1914 does not stand in stark contrast. The BEF performed well but no better or worse than comparable German or French units did. What does stand in stark contrast is the BEF in 1914 when compared with the expedition to South Africa in 1899. The years of reform between these two expeditions were truly a crucible that built the Old Contemptibles.

Military historical case studies provide insight for military planners. Military planners cannot afford to ignore history when planning in today’s complex environment. This thesis analyzes military doctrinal changes and adaptation during Britain’s Boer War and the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria. The Boer War serves as an example of doctrinal change during a counterinsurgency campaign. The French experience demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who uses terrorism as its primary tactic. A counterinsurgency comparison and analysis focuses on three issues present in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. The conclusion offers solutions to the military situation today based on the British and French counterinsurgency. This thesis argues history provides US military planners with the background to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy for today’s environment.

From U. S. Government Bookstore Website: Presents fifteen papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians. Examines irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras.

PRINT FORMAT ONLY NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE-- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last Presents fifteen papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians. Examines irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras. The papers selected for this publication are not only the best of those presented, but they also examine irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras. Together, they demonstrate how extremism was intimately connected to this type of warfare and how Americans have, at different times in their history, found themselves acting as insurgents, counterinsurgents, or both. The titles of the papers themselves reflect how often the U.S. Army has engaged in such irregular operations despite a formal focus on conventional warfare. Using imperial British and Italian examples, several presentations also underline how the ease of conquering lands is often no indication of the level of effort required to pacify them and integrate them into a larger whole. Historians, especially military historians, strategic military analysts, and students pursuing introduction to defense history or military science classes may be interested in this volume.

On 11 October 1899 the Second Boer War between the British and the Boers began. The war saw the most powerful professional army in the world pitted against the unconventional tactics of the undisciplined Boers. Although the Boers were finally forced to surrender in May 1902 the war had taken its toll on their opponents who lost some 8,000 troops killed in action with a further 13,000 dying from disease. This book covers the organisation, uniforms and very different tactics involved in the conflict, from guerrilla warfare to a final war of attrition that the Boers could not hope to win.

The British Expeditionary Force at the start of World War I was tiny by the standards of the other belligerent powers. Yet, when deployed to France in 1914, it prevailed against the German army because of its professionalism and tactical skill, strengths developed through hard lessons learned a dozen years earlier. In October 1899, the British went to war against the South African Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State, expecting little resistance. A string of early defeats in the Boer War shook the military’s confidence. Historian Spencer Jones focuses on this bitter combat experience in From Boer War to World War, showing how it crucially shaped the British Army’s tactical development in the years that followed. Before the British Army faced the Boer republics, an aura of complacency had settled over the military. The Victorian era had been marked by years of easy defeats of crudely armed foes. The Boer War, however, brought the British face to face with what would become modern warfare. The sweeping, open terrain and advent of smokeless powder meant soldiers were picked off before they knew where shots had been fired from. The infantry’s standard close-order formations spelled disaster against the well-armed, entrenched Boers. Although the British Army ultimately adapted its strategy and overcame the Boers in 1902, the duration and cost of the war led to public outcry and introspection within the military. Jones draws on previously underutilized sources as he explores the key tactical lessons derived from the war, such as maximizing firepower and using natural cover, and he shows how these new ideas were incorporated in training and used to effect a thorough overhaul of the British Army. The first book to address specific connections between the Boer War and the opening months of World War I, Jones’s fresh interpretation adds to the historiography of both wars by emphasizing the continuity between them.