Judges sometimes hear cases in which the law, as they honestly understand it, requires results that they consider morally objectionable. Most people assume that, nevertheless, judges have an ethical obligation to apply the law correctly, at least in reasonably just legal systems. This is the view of most lawyers, legal scholars, and private citizens, but the arguments for it have received surprisingly little attention from philosophers. Combiming ethical theory with discussions of caselaw, Jeffrey Brand-Ballard challenges arguments for the traditional view, including arguments from the fact that judges swear oaths to uphold the law, and arguments from our duty to obey the law, among others. He then develops an alternative argument based on ways in which the rule of law promotes the good. Patterns of excessive judicial lawlessness, even when morally motivated, can damage the rule of law. Brand-Ballard explores the conditions under which individual judges are morally responsible for participating in destructive patterns of lawless judging. These arguments build upon recent theories of collective intentionality and presuppose an agent-neutral framework, rather than the agent-relative framework favored by many moral philosophers. Defying the conventional wisdom, Brand-Ballard argues that judges are not always morally obligated to apply the law correctly. Although they have an obligation not to participate in patterns of excessive judicial lawlessness, an individual departure from the law so as to avoid an unjust result is rarely a moral mistake if the rule of law is otherwise healthy. Limits of Legality will interest philosophers, legal scholars, lawyers, and anyone concerned with the ethics of judging.

This collection brings together well-established scholars to examine the limits of law, a topic that has been of broad interest since the events of 9/11 and the responses of U.S. law and policy to those events. The limiting conditions explored in this volume include marking law’s relationship to acts of terror, states of emergency, gestures of surrender, payments of reparations, offers of amnesty, and invocations of retroactivity. These essays explore how law is challenged, frayed, and constituted out of contact with conditions that lie at the farthest reaches of its empirical and normative force.

Moving beyond the question of whether an area of scholarly investigation can truly be characterized as 'legal', Exploiting the Limits of Law combats the often unhelpful constraints of law's subject-matter and formal processes. Through a process of reflection on the limits of law and repeated efforts to redraw them, this book challenges the general sense of pessimism among feminists and others about the usefulness of law as an instrument of change. The work combines theoretical analysis of the law's boundaries with investigation of the practical settings for changing legal and policy environments. Both the empirical focus of this volume, and its underlying theoretical concern with the limits of the law and its gender implications, render it of interest to legal scholars throughout the world, whether of EU law, feminism, social policy or philosophy.

Gerard Conway explains how judges of the ECJ should be understood as sharing the same interpretative perspective as the law-maker.

Law is an increasingly pervasive force in our society. At the same time, however, the obstacles to law’s effectiveness are also growing. In The limits of Law, Yale law professor Peter H, Schuck draws on law, social science, and history to explore this momentous clash between law’s compelling promise of ordered liberty and the realistic limits of its capacity to deliver on this promise. Schuck first discusses the constraints within which law must work–law’s own complexity, the cultural chasms it must bridge, and the social diversity it must accommodate–and proceeds to consider the ways law uses regulatory, legislative, and adjudicatory processes to influence social behavior. He shows how politics shapes regulation, how regulation might incorporate individualized equity, and how it can best be reformed. Turning to legislation, he justifies a strong role for special interest groups, dissects purely symbolic statutes, and defends broad delegations of legislative power to regulatory agencies. Concerning adjudication, Schuck analyzes the courts’ efforts to advance social justice by controlling federal agencies, constitutionalizing politics, managing mass toxic tort disputes, and reforming public services and institutions. His concluding chapter draws together some general lessons about law’s limits and possibilities for improving democratic governance.

The increase in the European Union's executive powers in the areas of economic and financial governance has thrown into sharp relief the challenges of EU law in constituting, framing, and constraining the decision-making processes and political choices that have hitherto supported European integration. The constitutional implications of crisis-induced transformations have been much debated but have largely overlooked the tension between law and discretion that the post-2010 reforms have brought to the fore. This book focuses on this tension and explores the ways in which legal norms may (or may not) constrain and structure the discretion of the EU executive. The developments in the EU's post-crisis financial and economic governance act as a reference point from which to analyze the normative problems pertaining to the law's relationship to the exercise of discretion. Structured in three parts, the book starts by analyzing the challenges to the maxim that the law both grounds and constrains EU executive and administrative discretion, setting out the concepts, problems and approaches to the relation between law and discretion both in general public law and in EU law. It progresses to analyze how these problems and approaches have unfolded in EU's financial, economic and monetary governance. Finally, it moves on from these specific developments to assess how existing legal principles and means of judicial review contribute to ensuring the rationality and legality of EU's discretionary powers.

Despite some significant advances in the creation and protection of rights affecting women’s health, these do not always translate into actual health benefits for women. This collection asks: 'What is an effective law and what influences law’s effectiveness or ineffectiveness? What dynamics, elements, and conditions come together to limit law’s capacity to achieve instrumental goals for women’s health and the advancement of women’s health rights?' The book presents an integrated, co-referential and sustained critical discussion of the normative and constitutive reasons for law’s limited effectiveness in the field of women’s health. It offers comprehensive and cohesive explanatory accounts of law’s limits and for the first time in the field, introduces a distinction between formal and substantive effectiveness of laws. Its approach is trans-systemic, multi-jurisdictional and comparative, with a focus on six countries in North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa and international human rights case law based on matters arising from Hungary, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Peru and Bolivia. The book will be a valuable resource for educators, students, lawyers, rights advocates and policymakers working in women’s health, socio-legal studies, human rights, feminist legal studies, and legal philosophy more broadly.

An analysis of the development of US water pollution laws, showing how legal processes and social relations interact as the state struggles to reconcile contradictory responsibilities.

NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia was justified. NATO violated the United Nations Charter - but nations have used armed force so often that the ban on non-defensive use of force has been cast into doubt. Dangerous cracks in the international legal order have surfaced - widened, ironically, by the UN Security Council itself, which has ridden roughshod over the Charter's ban on intervention. Yet nations remain hopelessly divided on what the rules should be. An unplanned geopolitical order has thus emerged - posing serious dilemmas for American policy-makers in a world where intervention will be judged more by wisdom than by law.

Many legal experts no longer share an unbounded trust in the potential of law to govern society efficiently and responsibly. They often experience the 'limits of the law', as they are confronted with striking inadequacies in their legal toolbox, with inner inconsistencies of the law, with problems of enforcement and obedience, and with undesired side-effects, and so on. The contributors to this book engage in the challenging task of making sense of this experience. Against the background of broader cultural transformations (such as globalisation, new technologies, individualism and cultural diversity), they revisit a wide range of areas of the law and map different types of limits in relation to some basic functions and characteristics of the law. Additionally, they offer a set of strategies to manage justifiably law's limits, such as dedramatising law's limits, conceptual refinement ('constructivism'), striking the right balance between different functions of the law, seeking for complementarity between law and other social practices.