The Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philos ophy of Science was held in Bucharest, Romania, on August 29-September 4, 1971. The Congress was organized, under the auspices of the Inter national Union for History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, by the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Academy of Social and Political Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and the Ministry of Education of Romania. With more than eight hundred participating scholars from thirty-four countries, the Congress was one of the major scientific events of the year 1971. The dedicated efforts of the organizers, the rich and carefully planned program, and the warm and friendly atmosphere contributed to making the Congress a successful and fruitful forum of exchange of scientific ideas. The work of the Congress consisted of invited one hour and half-hour addresses, symposia, and contributed papers. The proceedings were organized into twelve sections of Mathematical Logic, Foundations of Mathematical Theories, Automata and Programming Languages, Philos ophy of Logic and Mathematics, General Problems of Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Foundations of Probability and Induction, Methodology and Philosophy of Physical Sciences, Methodology and Philosophy of Biological Sciences, Methodology and Philosophy of Psychological Sciences, Methodology and Philosophy of Historical and Social Sciences, Methodology and Philosophy of Linguistics, and History of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

The present study is an extension of the topic introduced in Dr. Hailperin's Sentential Probability Logic, where the usual true-false semantics for logic is replaced with one based more on probability, and where values ranging from 0 to 1 are subject to probability axioms. Moreover, as the word "sentential" in the title of that work indicates, the language there under consideration was limited to sentences constructed from atomic (not inner logical components) sentences, by use of sentential connectives ("no," "and," "or," etc.) but not including quantifiers ("for all," "there is"). An initial introduction presents an overview of the book. In chapter one, Halperin presents a summary of results from his earlier book, some of which extends into this work. It also contains a novel treatment of the problem of combining evidence: how does one combine two items of interest for a conclusion-each of which separately impart a probability for the conclusion-so as to have a probability for the conclusion basedon taking both of the two items of interest as evidence? Chapter two enlarges the Probability Logic from the first chapter in two respects: the language now includes quantifiers ("for all," and "there is") whose variables range over atomic sentences, notentities as with standard quantifier logic. (Hence its designation: ontological neutral logic.) A set of axioms for this logic is presented. A new sentential notion-the suppositional-in essence due to Thomas Bayes, is adjoined to this logic that later becomes the basis for creating a conditional probability logic. Chapter three opens with a set of four postulates for probability on ontologically neutral quantifier language. Many properties are derived and a fundamental theorem is proved, namely, for anyprobability model (assignment of probability values to all atomic sentences of the language) there will be a unique extension of the probability values to all closed sentences of the language. The chapter concludes by showing the Borel's early denumerableprobability concept (1909) can be justified by its being, in essence, close to Hailperin's probability result applied to denumerable language. The final chapter introduces the notion of conditional-probability to a language having quantifiers of the kind

As a survey of many technical results in probability theory and probability logic, this monograph by two widely respected scholars offers a valuable compendium of the principal aspects of the formal study of probability. Hugues Leblanc and Peter Roeper explore probability functions appropriate for propositional, quantificational, intuitionistic, and infinitary logic and investigate the connections among probability functions, semantics, and logical consequence. They offer a systematic justification of constraints for various types of probability functions, in particular, an exhaustive account of probability functions adequate for first-order quantificational logic. The relationship between absolute and relative probability functions is fully explored and the book offers a complete account of the representation of relative functions by absolute ones. The volume is designed to review familiar results, to place these results within a broad context, and to extend the discussions in new and interesting ways. Authoritative, articulate, and accessible, it will interest mathematicians and philosophers at both professional and post-graduate levels.

Twenty-nine collected essays represent a critical history of Shakespeare's play as text and as theater, beginning with Samuel Johnson in 1765, and ending with a review of the Royal Shakespeare Company production in 1991. The criticism centers on three aspects of the play: the love/friendship debate.

The aim of this book is to provide an introduction to probability logic-based formalization of uncertain reasoning. The authors' primary interest is mathematical techniques for infinitary probability logics used to obtain results about proof-theoretical and model-theoretical issues such as axiomatizations, completeness, compactness, and decidability, including solutions of some problems from the literature. An extensive bibliography is provided to point to related work, and this book may serve as a basis for further research projects, as a reference for researchers using probability logic, and also as a textbook for graduate courses in logic.

This study presents a logic in which probability values play a semantic role comparable to that of truth values in conventional logic. The difference comes in with the semantic definition of logical consequence. It will be of interest to logicians, both philosophical and mathematical, and to investigators making use of logical inference under uncertainty, such as in operations research, risk analysis, artificial intelligence, and expert systems.

This self-contained book provides three fundamental and generic approaches (logical, probabilistic, and modal) to representing and reasoning with agent epistemic states, specifically in the context of decision making. Each of these approaches can be applied to the construction of intelligent software agents for making decisions, thereby creating computational foundations for decision-making agents. In addition, the book introduces a formal integration of the three approaches into a single unified approach that combines the advantages of all the approaches. Finally, the symbolic argumentation approach to decision making developed in this book, combining logic and probability, offers several advantages over the traditional approach to decision making which is based on simple rule-based expert systems or expected utility theory.

Edited in collaboration with FoLLI, the Association of Logic, Language and Information this book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 21st Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Communication, WoLLIC 2014, held in Valparaiso, Chile, in September 2014. The 15 contributed papers presented together with 6 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected from 29 submissions. The focus of the workshop was on the following subjects Inter-Disciplinary Research involving Formal Logic, Computing and Programming Theory, and Natural Language and Reasoning.

Logic is a field studied mainly by researchers and students of philosophy, mathematics and computing. Inductive logic seeks to determine the extent to which the premisses of an argument entail its conclusion, aiming to provide a theory of how one should reason in the face of uncertainty. It has applications to decision making and artificial intelligence, as well as how scientists should reason when not in possession of the full facts. In this book, Jon Williamson embarks on a quest to find a general, reasonable, applicable inductive logic (GRAIL), all the while examining why pioneers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap did not entirely succeed in this task. Along the way he presents a general framework for the field, and reaches a new inductive logic, which builds upon recent developments in Bayesian epistemology (a theory about how strongly one should believe the various propositions that one can express). The book explores this logic in detail, discusses some key criticisms, and considers how it might be justified. Is this truly the GRAIL? Although the book presents new research, this material is well suited to being delivered as a series of lectures to students of philosophy, mathematics, or computing and doubles as an introduction to the field of inductive logic