This paper provides background to the Board paper on Macro Policy Lessons for a Sound Design of Fiscal Decentralization. It summarizes the findings and recommendations of the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) for ten countries to which it provided advice on fiscal decentralization. The selected countries (Bolivia, People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Kosovo, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, and Nigeria) represent different regions, varying institutional arrangements, and diverse stages of the decentralization process.

Fiscal decentralization has been, and remains high on the policy agenda of many countries. It is mainly driven by political pressures, which tend to be especially evident in countries with multiple ethnicities, and/or wide regional disparities in incomes or resource endowments. More generally, decentralization pressures frequently reflect a desire for more participatory government and greater voice of local constituents in the allocation of budgetary resources. Regardless of its motivation, fiscal decentralization can have important macroeconomic implications. Therefore, Fund advice to member countries (whether in the context of surveillance, program design, or technical assistance) has often focused on the design and implementation of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. This paper distills the main lessons from the Fund’s engagement with member countries in this area, drawing in particular, (but not exclusively) on technical assistance (TA) provided by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) to ten countries which are broadly representative of the range of members that have requested assistance in this area.

Fiscal decentralization is becoming a pressing issue in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting demands for a greater local voice in spending decisions and efforts to strengthen social cohesion. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to distill the lessons for an effective fiscal decentralization reform, focusing on the macroeconomic aspects. The main findings for sub-Saharan African countries that have decentralized, based on an empirical analysis and four case studies (Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda), are as follows: • Determinants and effectiveness: Empirical results suggest that (1) the major driving forces behind fiscal decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa include efforts to defuse ethnic conflicts, the initial level of income, and the urban-ization rate, whereas strength of democracy is not an important determi-nant for decentralization; and (2) decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa is associated with higher growth in the presence of stronger institutions. • Spending assignments: The allocation of spending across levels of gov-ernment in the four case studies is broadly consistent with best practice. However, in Uganda, unlike in the other three case studies, subnational governments have little flexibility to make spending decisions as a result of a deconcentrated rather than a devolved system of government. • Own revenue: The assignment of taxing powers is broadly in line with best practice in the four case studies, with the bulk of subnational revenue coming from property taxes and from fees for local services. However, own revenues are a very small fraction of subnational spending, reflecting weak cadaster systems and a high level of informality in the economy.

This paper discusses how decentralized countries can achieve sound fiscal relations between the central government and lower government levels. The concepts of “vertical gap” and “vertical balance” provide an analytical framework for identifying and addressing key challenges. These concepts can help policymakers ensure that the financing of subnational governments (composed of transfers received from the center, own revenues, and borrowing) is both efficient and adequate given the allocation of spending responsibilities. More generally, the paper offers some perspectives about the optimal design of decentralization systems by examining the sequencing and economic principles underlying revenue and expenditure assignments, the use of transfers, and borrowing.

Does the European Union need closer fiscal integration, and in particular a stronger fiscal centre, to become more resilient to economic shocks? This book looks at the experience of 13 federal states to help inform the heated debate on this issue. It analyses in detail their practices in devolving responsibilities from the subnational to the central level, compares them to those of the European Union, and draws lessons for a possible future fiscal union in Europe. More specifically, this book tries to answer three sets of questions: What is the role of centralized fiscal policies in federations, and hence the size, features and functions of the central budget? What institutional arrangements are used to coordinate fiscal policy between the federal and subnational levels? What are the links between federal and subnational debt, and how have subnational financing crises been handled, when they occurred? These policy questions are critical in many federations, and central to the current discussions about future paths for the European Union. This book brings to the table new, practical insights through a systematic and comprehensive comparison of the EU fiscal framework with that of federal states. It also departs from the decentralization perspective that has been prominent in the literature by focusing on the role of the centre (which responsibilities are centralized at the federal level and how they are handled, rather than which functions belong to the local level). Such an approach is particularly relevant for the European Union, where a fiscal union would imply granting new powers to the centre.

This paper explores the impact of fiscal decentralization on fiscal policy performance in a large sample of advanced and developing economies. The findings suggest that a larger share of decentralized expenditure is associated with a stronger fiscal balance; however, fiscal decentralization can lead to more pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Thus, the design and pace of fiscal decentralization need to be tailored to the specificities of the economy. Countries that have already established strong accountablity and budget management capacity at the local level can benefit from fiscal decentralization. In contrast, in economies prone to large volatility from internal and external shocks, the central government may need to retain a sufficient share of expenditure and revenue to conduct counter-cyclical policies. Finally, the pace of expenditure and revenue decentralization should be aligned.

Morocco’s sound economic performance has been challenged by domestic and external shocks. The Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) program is on track, and its design remains adequate. The fiscal consolidation and efforts to rebuild buffers and address medium-term challenges taken up by the government has been commended. Reforms of both the subsidy system and the pension system are required. There is a need to strengthen competitiveness and better equip the economy to respond to external shocks. Efforts are under way to continue strengthening regulation and supervision while fostering the development of the financial sector.

This Selected Issues paper discusses benefits of boosting quality public infrastructure spending in Romania. Since the financial crisis, fiscal and current account deficits have been tackled, but the infrastructure deficit has widened. Quality public investment in infrastructure can boost domestic demand and potential GDP growth, particularly in low growth environments. The IMF staff simulations employing the European Union’s production function methodology show significant growth benefits from higher quality infrastructure spending. As a result of higher investment, real GDP would increase by about 1 percent initially with the impact peaking in 2025.

This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.

December 2008: IMF research summaries on global herding in financial markets (by Marco Cipriani) and on fiscal decentralization (by Lusine Lusinyan); article on the experiences of IMF staff at the Nobel Laureate Meetings in Lindau, Germany (by Chris Crowe); listing of visiting scholars at the IMF during August–December 2008; listing of contents of Vol. 55 No. 4 of IMF Staff Papers; listing of recent IMF Working Papers; listing of recent external publications by IMF staff; and a Call for Papers for an upcoming conference on structural reforms.