This book explores the process by which defence policy is made in contemporary Britain and the institutions, actors and conflicting interests which interact in its inception and continuous reformulation. Rather than dealing with the substance of defence policy, this study focuses upon the institutional actors involved in this process. This is a subject which has commanded far more interest from public, Parliament, government and the armed forces since the protracted, bloody and ultimately unsuccessful British military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The work begins with a discussion of two contextual factors shaping policy. The first relates to the impact of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States over defence and intelligence matters, while the second considers the impact of Britain’s relatively disappointing economic performance upon the funding of British defence since 1945. It then goes on to explore the role and impact of all the key policy actors, from the Prime Minister, Cabinet and core executive, to the Ministry of Defence and its relations with the broader ‘Whitehall village’, and the Foreign Office and Treasury in particular. The work concludes by examining the increasing influence of external policy actors and forces, such as Parliament, the courts, political parties, pressure groups and public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of British defence policy, security studies, and contemporary military history.

Britain's military forces have rarely been busier. It is therefore crucial to understand the developing trends and underlying assumptions of British Defence Policy, in regard to both foreign policy and international security. This volume, which covers both the Blair and Brown eras in defence policy making, places developments post 11 September in a wider context, assessing the impact of key personalities and events on a range of issues, notably the perennial concern of military overstretch. By critically appraising contemporary developments, and examining the driving policy in specific cases, this volume provides a relevant and up-to-date assessment of this vital policy area. As well as being contemporary in its analysis, the work is also comprehensive in scope, embracing both policy objectives - such as the expeditionary strategy and the desire to be a bridge between the US and EU - and the instruments that underpin such policy.

This study of British defence policy argues that a "one-off" defence review is not enough but a regular process of defece reviews every five years provide a long-term strategic direction which, the author maintains, is lacking at present.

The phenomenon of Europeanization has become a topic that is constantly under debate. This critical volume examines Europeanization through examples of British defence policy, the European Security and Defence Policy, the legal arms trade and the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003. Drawing on examples from Austria and France, as well as unveiling the role of the Prime Minister and his close confidants in driving through this controversial defence policy, Robert Dover provides an original and engaging contemporaneous account of Europeanization. Academics, post-graduate researchers and analysts concerned with British foreign and defence policy and those interested in European defence policy more generally, will all find this study a must read.

Foreign policy has dominated successive governments' time in office and cast a consistently long shadow over British politics in the period since 1945. Robert Self provides a readable and incisive assessment of the key issues and events from the retreat from empire through the cold war period to Humanitarian Intervention and the debacle in Iraq.

Based on excerpts from original sources, this book provides an introduction to the controversies and dilemmas that have confronted those making and implementing British defence policy since the end of World War II. Ovendale explores the policy dilemmas caused by Britain's parallel commitments to continental Europe and to a global foreign policy, the legacy of her imperial past. He also examines the decision in 1957 to rely on the nuclear deterrent, abolish conscription and move away from a maritime strategy; and the role of the Treasury in dictating the limits of British defence policy.

Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: Is Great Britain really a desperate European? This was the question in mind whilst writing this essay. Would Britain go to war against Iraq with the United States of America, or would it search for a peaceful solution together with old Europe within the United Nations. The answer to this question is well known today. The UK decided to wage war on Iraq together with America. Once again Britain gave its continental European partners the feeling to be more the fifty-first state of America than a member of the European Union, trying to find a common European position in foreign and security policy. Why does the UK behave the way it does? Is it really taking a reluctant position against an ever increasing importance of the EU in foreign and security affairs? What is it about its relationship to the US, and which role does the Commonwealth play in this area traditionally the domain of sovereign national politics? The essay examining these questions will come to an astonishing conclusion. At the moment Britain is celebrating its 30th anniversary of EU membership. This should be an occasion to find out more about its foreign and defence policy. At the time of writing, Britain was the only European power coupled with the US in preparing for a war against Iraq. The question has to be asked as to why Britain has adopted such a pro-American stance? Since Blair's election to power in 1997, time and time again he has emphasized that Britain's future is in Europe. However, certainly with regard to foreign and defence policy, such a statement appears hollow. What happened with those honourable aims of European integration like a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was established as a 'pillar' of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Finding an agreed European Common and Foreign Policy certainly has not been obtained and could even be said to be in its worst state ever. Nothing illustrated this better than the diversity of opinion within the EU concerning the possible war with Iraq. Italy and Spain tended towards the position of the US and Britain. France wanted to formulate a new UN resolution before deciding the course of action they wish to take. Germany stood against the use of any force. At present, it would seem that the CFSP remains an objective to be realised at a later date. Past and present, none of the other EU members act as closely with the US as Britain. Is Britain's policy influenced by American interests [...]

First published in 1977, British Defence Policy in a Changing World provides an analysis of the changes which have taken place in Britain’s security policies since the Second World War. Domestic political, economic, and social factors are discussed as well as the range of international circumstances which have influenced policy. The approach is essentially a thematic one, isolating several key issues and examining them in detail. The authors use their skills to study a comprehensive range of affairs relating to Britain’s security policy since 1945. The book may be divided into four main sections. The first looks at the relationship between foreign policy and defence policy in general and more specifically at the three circles of British policy: East of Suez, the ‘special relationship’, and Europe. The second section looks at the place of nuclear weapons in defence policy. The third section is concerned with defence economics, national priorities, and the recurring dilemmas of decision-making, while the final section concentrates on issues of civil military relations and discuss public attitudes towards defence in terms of their political implications. This is a must read for scholars and researchers of international politics, British politics, defence and strategic studies.

This book offers new perspectives on British nuclear policy-making at the height of the Cold War, arguing that the decisions taken by the British government during the 1950s and 1960s in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions cannot be properly understood without close reference to Duncan Sandys, and in particular the policy preferences that emerged from his experiences of the Second World War and his efforts leading Britain's campaign against the V-1 and V-2. Immersing himself in this campaign against unmanned weaponry, Sandys came to see ballistic missiles as the only guarantor of nuclear credibility in the post-war world, placing them at the centre of his strategic thinking and developing a sincerely-held and logically-consistent belief system which he carried with him through a succession of ministerial roles, allowing him to exert a previously undocumented level of influence on the nature of Britain's nuclear capabilities and its approach to the Cold War. This book shows the profound influence Sandys' personal belief system had on Britain's attempts to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent.