Presents a risk-management process would help senior Air Force leaders to (1) focus planning on the most salient threats, (2) gain greater clarity on the risks associated with alternative courses of action across multiple futures, (3) maintain a sense of the persistent uncertainties associated with any policy choice, and (4) effectively communicate their judgments about risk to key audiences.

This book examines the role of risk management in the recent financial crisis and applies lessons from there to the national security realm. It rethinks the way risk contributes to strategy, with insights relevant to practitioners and scholars in national security as well as business. Over the past few years, the concept of risk has become one of the most commonly discussed issues in national security planning. And yet the experiences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis demonstrated critical limitations in institutional efforts to control risk. The most elaborate and complex risk procedures could not cure skewed incentives, cognitive biases, groupthink, and a dozen other human factors that led companies to take excessive risk. By embracing risk management, the national security enterprise may be turning to a discipline just as it has been discredited.

The U.S. Department of Defense is currently shifting funding from future investment programs to cover urgent war needs, accepting some increase in future risk in order to reduce risk in the near term, and this tension between current and future operational priorities is likely to worsen. To effectively manage risk across possible missions and between today and tomorrow, senior Air Force leaders must make difficult decisions. This monograph seeks to provide the Air Force with a framework to structure their deliberations, connect them to supporting staff and expert inputs, and communicate their decisions to a broader audience. It describes a risk-management process that would help senior Air Force leaders to (1) focus planning on the most salient threats, (2) gain greater clarity on the risks associated with alternative courses of action across multiple futures, (3) maintain a sense of the persistent uncertainties associated with any policy choice, and (4) effectively communicate their judgments about risk to key audiences.

Defense planning faces significant uncertainties. This report applies robust decision making (RDM) to the munitions mix challenge, to demonstrate how RDM could help defense planners make plans more robust to a wide range of hard-to-predict futures.

Provides a list of open recommendations to help solve problems in areas GAO designated as major management challenges in its Jan. 1999 Performance and Accountability Report Series. It focuses on the areas that are most important to solving the problem (generally 10-12 per management challenge), and briefly summarizes the other recommendations. The report addresses the Depts. of Agriculture, Commerce, DoD, Education, Energy, HHS, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury, and VA; Agency for International Development; EPA; NASA.; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Social Security Admin.; and USPS. Includes dozens of tables.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities have expanded situation awareness for U.S. forces, provided for more precise combat effects, and enabled better decision making both during conflicts and in peacetime, and reliance on ISR capabilities is expected to increase in the future. ISR capabilities are critical to 3 of the 12 Service Core Functions of the U.S. Air Force: namely, Global Integrated ISR (GIISR) and the ISR components of Cyberspace Superiority and Space Superiority, and contribute to all others. In response to a request from the Air Force for ISR and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, the National Research Council formed the Committee on Examination of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability Planning and Analysis (CP&A) Process. In this report, the committee reviews the current approach to the Air Force corporate planning and programming process for ISR capability generation; examines carious analytical methods, processes, and models for large-scale, complex domains like ISR; and identifies the best practices for the Air Force. In Capability Planning and Analysis to Optimize Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Investments, the current approach is analyzed and the best practices for the Air Force corporate planning and programming processed for ISR are recommended. This report also recommends improvements and changes to existing analytical tools, methods, roles and responsibilities, and organization and management that would be required to ensure the Air Force corporate planning and programming process for ISR is successful in addressing all Joint, National, and Coalition partner's needs.

As the United States creates the Space Force as a service within the Department of the Air Force, RAND assessed which units to bring into the Space Force, analyzed career field sustainability, and drew lessons from other defense organizations. The report focuses on implications for effectiveness, efficiency, independence, and sense of identity for the new service.