A comparative analysis of Maoist or "people's wars" since the American defeat and departure from Vietnam in 1975. It combines academic research with eye-witness accounts to examine similar prolonged, post- Vietnam insurgencies, including Thailand, the Philippines, Peru, and Sri Lanka. Unlike Vietnam, however, these insurgencies failed, and Marks is particularly interested in how the world's strongest power failed where Third World governments have succeeded. Distributed by ISBS. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

This is an analysis of revolutions based on the Maoist Mode. These insurgencies failed, having been successfully contained by their governments. How did the world's strongest power - America - fail where Third World governments have succeeded?

The book deals with the dynamics and growth of a violent 21st century communist rebellion initiated by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), explaining the different causes, factors that contributed to its growth, strategies employed by the rebels and the state, and the consequences of the insurgency.

Tackling one of the most prevalent myths about insurgencies, this book examines and rebuts the popular belief that Mao Zedong created a fundamentally new form of warfare that transformed the nature of modern insurgency. The labeling of an insurgent enemy as using “Maoist Warfare” has been a common phenomenon since Mao’s victory over the Guomindang in 1949, from Malaya and Vietnam during the Cold War to Afghanistan and Syria today. Yet, this practice is heavily flawed. This book argues that Mao did not invent a new breed of insurgency, failed to produce a coherent vision of how insurgencies should be fought, and was not influential in his impact upon subsequent insurgencies. Consequently, Mao’s writings cannot be used to generate meaningful insights for understanding those insurgencies that came after him. This means that scholars and policymakers should stop using Mao as a tool for understanding insurgencies and as a straw man against whom to target counterinsurgency strategies.

This book explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed governments, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to contemporary urban terrorism. The tactics of guerrilla leaders such as Lawrence, Mao, Guevara and Marighela are examined and the works of counter-insurgency theorists such as Galleni, Callwell, Thompson and Kitson are analysed.

This book argues that the root of effective special operations lies in understanding the relationship between moral and material attrition - this is achieved by examining both strategic theory and real-life case studies.