This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.

A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.

The fast-paced nature of the design business means that you probably spend most of your time, energy and resources looking after your clients' needs, not your own. In our current, increasingly competitive marketplace where supply far outstrips demand, no design business will survive for long - let alone grow and develop - without a really effective marketing programme. It is no longer enough for you to provide a good product and simply hope for the best. Potential clients need to know exactly what you can do for them and what makes you different from your competitors. Existing clients need to know exactly why they should develop and continue their business with you. Quite simply, you need to convince design buyers that you are unequivocally the right consultancy for them, time and time again. This second, fully revised and updated, edition of Shan Preddy's popular book will help you to improve your marketing skills, no matter how large or small your design company, or which of the many disciplines you specialise in. Packed full of accessible, practical advice and information, this book is indispensable for all design consultancies.

The rich, multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary field of matching-based market design is an active and important one due to its highly successful applications with economic and sociological impact. Its home is economics, but with intimate connections to algorithm design and operations research. With chapters contributed by over fifty top researchers from all three disciplines, this volume is unique in its breadth and depth, while still being a cohesive and unified picture of the field, suitable for the uninitiated as well as the expert. It explains the dominant ideas from computer science and economics underlying the most important results on market design and introduces the main algorithmic questions and combinatorial structures. Methodologies and applications from both the pre-Internet and post-Internet eras are covered in detail. Key chapters discuss the basic notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives, and the way market design seeks solutions guided by normative criteria borrowed from social choice theory.

Do current electricity market designs ensure a sufficient electricity supply at all times? This topic is currently the subject of intense debate across Europe, and several major countries such as Germany, the UK, France and Italy have decided that additional measures – so-called capacity remuneration mechanisms - are needed to supplement current market designs. This report describes and analyses the advantages and disadvantages of a range of measures proposed or currently implemented across Europe, and includes both best estimates of how the implementation of these measures will impact Nordic electricity prices as well as recommendations to the Nordic countries regarding a cost-efficient path to ensuring the Nordic security of supply.

I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.

Containing rigorous hard evidence, this book is of immense practical use to postgraduates, researchers and business communities affected by or working in environmental regulation. The author, a leading name in the environmental economics community, examines the problem of urban smog in cityscapes and the difficulty of achieving cost-effective controls. Analyzing the key areas of urban smog, low-level ozone and volatile organic compound emissions and their impact on health and welfare of communities this text assesses and evaluates the performance of emissions trading systems and suggests alternative market designs for incentive control of pollution. Taking a well-reasoned approach to the contentious area of the use of market incentives to achieve environmental goals, it provides a study of the pioneering cap-and-trade market, particularly focusing on its poor performance in Chicago. A perfect supplementary text postgraduates and researchers, this is also an essential read for all those interested in environmental economics.

Global warming reveals that world energy consumption is on an unsustainable path. This updated second edition of The New Energy Crisis examines the impact of climate change on energy economics and geopolitics, exploring key issues such as energy poverty, renewable and nuclear energy, and focusing on the implications of the Fukushima crisis.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.5 International Conference on Electronic Participation, ePart 2016, held in Guimarães, Portugal, in September 5-8, 2016. The 14 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 31 submissions. The papers reflect completed multi-disciplinary research ranging from policy analysis and conceptual modeling to programming and visualization of simulation models. They are organized in four topical threads: theoretical foundations; critical reflections; implementations; policy formulation and modeling.