This book applies the concept of mediatization to the contemporary dynamic between war, media and society, with a focus on the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Since the beginning of the 21st century the IDF has undergone an intensive process of mediatization that has transformed the media into an interpretative grid for many of its military activities and increasingly utilized media to garner public support and construct civilian perceptions of conflict and security through media activity and strategy. This process can be divided into four distinct chronological phases in accordance with the operational challenges confronted by the IDF during this period, from the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, through Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, and the second Lebanon war of 2006, to the series of Gaza confrontations of 2008-2014. The work shows how the IDF’s media policy evolved from a narrow perception of its role, and separation between operational and media actions to a cohesive and coherently articulated media strategy that is increasingly intertwined with military action and operational strategy and a vital component of strategic military aims and objectives. This strategic stance has led the IDF to adopt a global media perspective using the most advanced new media platforms, designed to influence public opinion and improve national narratives, both in Israel and the international community. By applying the concept of mediatization to the Israeli case, this book fills a research lacuna and offers a new prism for the study of media-military relations in contemporary conflicts. The book will be of much interest to students of civil-military relations, strategic studies, Middle Eastern Studies, media and communication studies, sociology and IR, in general.

This book applies the concept of mediatization to the contemporary dynamic between war, media and society, with a focus on the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Since the beginning of the 21st century the IDF has undergone an intensive process of mediatization that has transformed the media into an interpretative grid for many of its military activities and increasingly utilized media to garner public support and construct civilian perceptions of conflict and security through media activity and strategy. This process can be divided into four distinct chronological phases in accordance with the operational challenges confronted by the IDF during this period, from the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, through Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, and the second Lebanon war of 2006, to the series of Gaza confrontations of 2008-2014. The work shows how the IDF’s media policy evolved from a narrow perception of its role, and separation between operational and media actions to a cohesive and coherently articulated media strategy that is increasingly intertwined with military action and operational strategy and a vital component of strategic military aims and objectives. This strategic stance has led the IDF to adopt a global media perspective using the most advanced new media platforms, designed to influence public opinion and improve national narratives, both in Israel and the international community. By applying the concept of mediatization to the Israeli case, this book fills a research lacuna and offers a new prism for the study of media-military relations in contemporary conflicts. The book will be of much interest to students of civil-military relations, strategic studies, Middle Eastern Studies, media and communication studies, sociology and IR, in general.

"This book, written by members of the Chief of Staff of the Army's Strategic Studies Group, takes an innovative approach to determining how the United States can counter extremist groups and engage in great power competition in the twenty first century. After proposing that the answer lies in switching the focus of current US strategy from the physical domain on which conflict occurs to the social, political, and cultural networks that comprise the human domain in which it occurs, it develops a new operating concept for conducting operations within that domain. This is an important book for those in security studies and international relations."--Provided by publisher.

Surveys the US Army's approach to media relations from the Spanish-American War to the first Gulf War. The relationship between the Army and the media is considered in the broader context of the US Government's approach to information management. Given the growing importance of information operations in 21st century warfare, this study provides a succinct overview of how the US Army has approached its relations with the media over the previous century. The study highlights the recurrent tension that exists in both the Army and the US Government's information management writ large. This tension arises from the need for operational security and effective deception and psychological operations and the need to provide transparency to secure public acceptance and support for military operations. The long-running debate over how the Government's information management should be organized and operated reflects this tension. Thus, since World War I a number of bureaucratic manifestations of information management have been tried in wartime, including the Committee on Public Information, the Office of War Information, the Psychological Strategy Board, the United States Information Agency, and, most recently, the Office of Global Communications. With the exception of the United States Information Agency, whose tenure spanned the period from 1953 to 1999, all the other manifestations of bureaucratic information management rose and fell during the wars in which they were created. The growing pains of these organizations sometimes colored the Army's relationship with the media. The need for units in the field to participate in information management is a major challenge for future operations. This study reminds us that those commanders who have gone out of their way to engage the media have, in many cases, had the greatest success with information management.

This book examines the key dimensions of 21st century war, and shows that orthodox thinking about war, particularly what it is and how it is fought, needs to be updated. Accelerating societal, economic, political and technological change affects how we prepare, equip and organise for war, as well as how we conduct war – both in its low-tech and high-tech forms, and whether it is with high intensity or low intensity. The volume examines changes in warfare by investigating the key features of the conduct of war during the first decades of the 21st century. Conceptually centred around the terms ‘kinetic’, ‘connected’ and ‘synthetic’, the analysis delves into a wide range of topics. The contributions discuss hybrid warfare, cyber and influence activities, machine learning and artificial intelligence, the use of armed drones and air power, the implications of the counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, as well as the consequences for law(fare) and decision making. This work will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, security studies and International Relations. Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 19 of this book are freely available as downloadable Open Access PDFs at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.

The word "strategy" pervades American conversation and our news media and is most often used as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a "vision" of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental--local, state, or federal--levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than "what we would like to do next" is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. This "little book" talks about big strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides a framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentioned above. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects of strategy that appear to have universal application. The theory also may have application to the strategy of nonstate actors, institutions, and businesses, but the explicit purpose and perspective offered herein focus on the nation-state.

The word "strategy" pervades American conversation and our news media and is most often used as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a "vision" of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental--local, state, or federal--levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than "what we would like to do next" is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. This "little book" talks about big strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides a framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentioned above. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects of strategy that appear to have universal application. The theory also may have application to the strategy of nonstate actors, institutions, and businesses, but the explicit purpose and perspective offered herein focus on the nation-state.

Over the course of the next six months, the Strategic Studies Institute will examine the impact of the media's technological advances on strategic and operational level planning and policymaking, first in an overseas theater, and subsequently on decisions made at the national level. The first of these two studies recognizes the complexity of executing military operations under the scrutiny of a very responsive, high technology world news media. Given the volatile, unstable, and ambiguous environment in which armed forces can find themselves, the actions of field forces have a greater chance than ever before of affecting subsequent strategic decisions made at higher levels. The pressure on field commanders to "get it right the first time" is demonstrably greater than ever. The author intends that these thoughts provide commanders with an understanding of the high technology and competitive news media environment they can expect to experience and offers specific suggestions for successfully communicating with reporters.

This book seeks to critically review and evaluate the changes and consistencies in how warfare is interpreted and represented by academics, mass media outlets and political actors in the 21st century. The authors suggest that it is essential to understand the evolution and transformation of contemporary warfare's conceptualisation and practice in order to make sense of the current global geopolitical transformations that are in process, from a unipolar to multipolar global order. They therefore examine the various key actors in international relations from conceptual, theoretical and empirical perspectives through thematic chapters that demonstrate the increasingly central role played by intangible factors in the representation and management of contemporary armed conflict. The book stresses the need to reflect and rethink the potentially highly problematic trajectory of the global community within the framework of 21st century warfare's political and informational influence and effects.

This is the first book to analyze how the technology to alter images and rapidly distribute them can be used for propaganda and to support deception operations. In the past, propagandists and those seeking to conduct deception operations used crude methods to alter images of real people, events and objects, which could usually be detected relatively easily. Today, however, computers allow propagandists to create any imaginable image, still or moving, with appropriate accompanying audio. Furthermore, it is becoming extremely difficult to detect that an image has been manipulated, and the Internet, television and global media make it possible to disseminate altered images around the world almost instantaneously. Given that the United States is the sole superpower, few, if any, adversaries will attempt to fight the US military conventionally on the battlefield. Therefore, adversaries will use propaganda and deception, especially altered images, in an attempt to level the battlefield or to win a war against the United States without even having to fight militarily. Propaganda and Information Warfare in the 21st Century will be of great interest to students of information war, propaganda, public diplomacy and security studies in general.