This second edition of Military Strategy, Joint Operations, and Airpower introduces contemporary strategy at the operational level of war. Developed as foundational reading for all US Air Force Academy cadets, this textbook is designed to close the gap between military theory and practice.

The stage is set for the emergence of a "new American way of war," in which U.S. forces are able to bring military power to bear against an enemy state quickly, comprehensively, decisively, and with minimal risk of heavy casualties. But some obstacles remain. These obstacles seem more budgetary and political than technical or operational. Some key programs are being abandoned or delayed because of the press of limited resources and competing demands. In this environment, it is imperative that the Air Force articulate in clear and compelling terms the potential contributions of airpower to joint operations. This is distinct from claiming "Air Force roles and missions." The approach offered here begins with a consideration of the basic characteristics of air forces and space forces, identifies the operational capabilities of these forces, and lists the missions and operational objectives to which these forces can contribute. By insisting that these missions and objectives be defined from the perspective of joint operations, this approach to doctrine positions the Air Force favorably to advance the role of its forces in the competition for roles within missions.

The stage is set for the emergence of a "new American way of war," in which U.S. forces are able to bring military power to bear against an enemy state quickly, comprehensively, decisively, and with minimal risk of heavy casualties. Arguably, such a transformation in U.S. military capabilities and strategy has been conceivable since the emergence of aircraft with large payloads around the time of World War II. But it has taken the emergence of new technologies and the development of new concepts for all weather day/night surveillance and engagement, battle management, precision attack, low observables, and other capabilities to make this new approach to warfare a reality. Or a near reality. Today, the primary obstacles to realizing this revolution seem more budgetary and political than technical or operational. Some programs key to making this new approach a reality are being abandoned or delayed because of the press of limited resources and competing demands. In this environment, it is critical that the Air Force more clearly define the potential contributions of airpower to joint operations and the role of airpower in this emerging strategy the "new American way of war."

Contributed papers presented at a seminar organized by the Centre for Air Power Studies and held Nov. 24-25, 2002.

militaries learn in war by developing and testing a theory of wartime military learning in the joint operational context. In doing so, the dissertation makes three related arguments. First, it examines not just whether militaries learn in war, but how militaries learn in war. Specifically, it defines learning as a process that includes two distinct but related phases: first, identifying a problem and, second, implementing a solution. From this conceptual standpoint, the dissertation then proposes a theory of wartime military learning that can explain and predict both whether and how a military is likely to learn the lessons of war, which I call Military Filtration Theory (MFT). MFT argues that wartime military learning is best explained by examining the interaction of two key variables: first, the state's national military strategy and, second, the military's resource endowments. These two variables act as a filter on the information that is identified and absorbed by military organizations throughout the learning process. Finally, the dissertation tests MFT against several alternative explanations in the novel and challenging empirical setting of joint operations. Specifically, I examine the different experiences of the British, American, and German militaries in successfully learning to execute tactical airpower operations during World War II. In addition to demonstrating variation in the learning process, these three cases allow me to focus on a subset of joint operations that sets a high bar for existing theories of military learning in ways that the extant literature does not. The findings of this study provide new theoretical and empirical insights for students of military learning, as well as several practical lessons for policymakers and warfighters.

The U.S. has long suffered from a serious strategy deficit. In short, there is a general crisis of strategic comprehension, a lack of agreement on the most effective organizing ideas. Airpower is by no means lonely in suffering from strategic theoretical uncertainty. The study argues that the United States needs a theory of war and warfare. It claims that future warfare will be diverse and that the tactical, operational, and strategic value of airpower must always be situational. A coherent theory of employment for all of airpower's capabilities, not only the kinetic, is needed. Airpower's potential utility lies within a spectrum of possibilities and is dependent on context. The study advises frank recognition of airpower's situational limitations. (Dr. Colin S. Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading in England. Originally published by the Airpower Research Institute)

The role of the Air Force is to defend the US and protect its interests through airpower, guided by the principles of joint operations and the tenets of airpower. Airpower is the ability to project military power or infl uence through the control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Airpower exploits the third dimension of the operational environment, the electromagnetic spectrum, and time to leverage speed, range, flexibility, precision tempo, and lethality to create effects from and within the air, space, and cyberspace domains. From this multi-dimensional perspective, Airmen can apply military power against an enemy`s entire array of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power, at long ranges and on short notice. The Air Force Operations & Planning SMARTbook covers the fundamentals, principles and tenets of airpower; airpower operations (Air Force missions, roles & functions); command and control (AOC, AFFOR & JFACC); planning for operations (AFOPE, JOPPA, joint air tasking cycle, OODA); targeting and assessment; and agile combat support (ACS)! *** Find the latest edition of this book and the rest of our series of military reference SMARTbooks at the publishers website: www.TheLightningPress.com ***

This report focuses on means of improving airpower's capabilities in the context of joint operations in future major regional conflicts. The authors examined future U.S. national military strategy and a range of potential military threats to U.S. interests.

The relative roles of U.S. ground and air power have shifted since the end of the Cold War. At the level of major operations and campaigns, the Air Force has proved capable of and committed to performing deep strike operations, which the Army long had believed the Air Force could not reliably accomplish. If air power can largely supplant Army systems in deep operations, the implications for both joint doctrine and service capabilities would be significant. To assess the shift of these roles, the author of this report analyzed post?Cold War conflicts in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Because joint doctrine frequently reflects a consensus view rather than a truly integrated joint perspective, the author recommends that joint doctrine-and the processes by which it is derived and promulgated-be overhauled. The author also recommends reform for the services beyond major operations and campaigns to ensure that the United States attains its strategic objectives. This revised edition includes updates and an index.