The IMF Working Papers series is designed to make IMF staff research available to a wide audience. Almost 300 Working Papers are released each year, covering a wide range of theoretical and analytical topics, including balance of payments, monetary and fiscal issues, global liquidity, and national and international economic developments.

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A generation ago not a single country had laws to counter money laundering; now, more countries have standardized anti–money laundering (AML) policies than have armed forces. In The Money Laundry, J. C. Sharman investigates whether AML policy works, and why it has spread so rapidly to so many states with so little in common. Sharman asserts that there are few benefits to such policies but high costs, which fall especially heavily on poor countries. Sharman tests the effectiveness of AML laws by soliciting offers for just the kind of untraceable shell companies that are expressly forbidden by global standards. In practice these are readily available, and the author had no difficulty in buying the services of such companies. After dealing with providers in countries ranging from the Seychelles and Somalia to the United States and Britain, Sharman demonstrates that it is easier to form untraceable companies in large rich states than in small poor ones; the United States is the worst offender. Despite its ineffectiveness, AML policy has spread via three paths. The Financial Action Task Force, the key standard-setter and enforcer in this area, has successfully implemented a strategy of blacklisting to promote compliance. Publicly identified as noncompliant, targeted states suffered damage to their reputation. Subsequently, officials from poor countries became socialized within transnational policy networks. Finally, international banks began using the presence of AML policy as a proxy for general country risk. Developing states have responded by adopting this policy as a functionally useless but symbolically valuable way of reassuring powerful outsiders. Since the financial crisis of 2008, the G20 has used the successful methods of coercive policy diffusion pioneered in the AML realm as a model for other global governance initiatives.

The Legal Department and the Institute of the IMF held their eighth biennial seminar for legal advisers of central banks of member countries on May 7-17,2000. The papers presented in this volume are based on presentations made by the seminar participants. The seminar covered a broad range of topics, including activities of the IMF and other international financial institutions, sovereign debt restructuring, the architecture of the international financial system, and money laundering and the financing of terrorism. In addition, participants addressed the role of central banks, payment systems, securities, technology in the financial sector, and monetary arrangements.

Economics of the International Financial System offers an illuminating, engaging and lucid account of the working of 21st-century global political economy. From a macroeconomic perspective, it explores how major capitalist economies are closely integrated with each other in that none can remain unaffected by economic events around the globe. The book is one of the first in its genre to examine: the origin and relevance of international money as a concept and phenomenon; the structure of various money markets; the nature and functioning of major international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); and the dynamics of the new world financial system that emerged after the demise of Bretton Woods system. This will form an essential reading for students and scholars of international monetary economics, international corporate finance, researchers, policymakers, bankers and financial executives.

This note provides guidance on the inclusion of AML/CFT issues in surveillance and financial stability assessments (FSAs). Specifically, it provides a framework for the treatment of cases where money laundering or terrorist financing (ML/TF) and related underlying crimes (i.e., “predicate crimes” or “predicate offenses”) are so serious as to threaten domestic stability, balance of payments stability, the effective operation of the International Monetary System—IMS— (in the case of Article IV surveillance), or the stability of the domestic financial system (in the case of FSAs).

The money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks associated with conventional finance are generally well identified and understood by the relevant national authorities. There is, however, no common understanding of ML/TF risks associated with Islamic finance. Some are likely to be the same as in conventional finance, but there may also be different risks. This is notably due to: (i) the complexity of some Islamic finance products; and (ii) the nature of the relationship between the institutions and their clients. The limited capacity and experience in the supervision of Islamic finance, especially in jurisdictions that face higher ML/TF risk factors represents an additional vulnerability. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards are implemented without any form of tailoring to the specificities of Islamic finance. The FATF, the Islamic finance standard-setters, and the national regulators should seek a greater understanding of the specific ML/TF risks that may arise in Islamic finance and develop an appropriate response.

The level of domestically generated proceeds of serious crime in San Marino is low. However, San Marino is vulnerable to money laundering (ML) of proceeds of crimes committed abroad. The Sammarinese financial sector, until recently, was characterized by a number of features that have created a favorable environment to ML. San Marino has made considerable progress in bringing its legal and institutional framework in line with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. Banks and financial institutions have started implementing the new Antimoney Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements, with mixed results.

Over the past decade and beyond, the need for a modern anti-money-laundering strategy has become widely accepted internationally. Depriving criminal elements of the proceeds of their crimes has increasingly been seen as an important tool to combat drug trafficking and, more recently, as a critical element in fighting organized crime, corruption, and the financing of terrorism, and maintaining the integrity of financial markets. The first few financial intelligence units (FIUs) were established in the early 1990s in response to the need for countries to have a central agency to receive, analyze, and disseminate financial information to combat money laundering. Over the ensuing period, the number of FIUs has continued to increase, reaching 84 in 2003. This handbook responds to the need for information on FIUs. It provides references to the appropriate Financial ActionTask Force (FATF) standards wherever appropriate.