During the Polish crisis of 1980-1981, the Western world was uncertain of the Soviet response to turmoil in Poland, and speculation about an invasion was rife. The timing of the Polish declaration of martial law came "without forewarning to the United States, according to then Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. In retrospect, Dr. Ploss point

Solidarity, Arthur Rachwald concludes, was the weight that tipped the scales toward democracy as Poland balanced precariously between democracy and Marxist-Leninst totalitarianism. An international event, that appearance in Poland of Solidarity--the first independent and self-governing labor union in the Soviet bloc--met strong reactions in the East and West. Moscow perceived Solidarity as the most destablizing challenge to its imperial order in Eastern Europe since Titoism in 1948. Professor Rachwald's timely book details the extraordinary events that led to the June 1989 semifree elections, which placed the government of Poland in the hands of a Solidarity-led coalition, and culminated in the self-dissolution of the Polish Communist party. Using documents and reports in Polish, Russian, and English, Arthur Rachwald compares U.S. Soviet, and Polish authorities' reactions to events in Poland during the 1980s as well as analyzes U.S.-Polish relations and their effect on the Polish government's domestic and foreign policies. The author gives careful attention to the complex relations among the political players, particularly the communist authorities and the Roman Catholic church. Exploring one of the most critical political developments of our time, he discusses the pivotal position, politically and geographically, that Poland occupies in Eastern Europe.

This book examines Soviet Foreign Policy towards East Germany in the late 1980s. By focusing on the complex interaction between domestic political thought and developments in the international system, the author illustrates the hierarchical relationship between the GDR and the USSR and offers different perspectives for understanding Soviet foreign policy. The books demonstrates that shifts in Soviet policy towards the GDR stemmed, on the one hand, from the international level, in that Soviet security was legitimated by the existence of two full-fledged German states, and, on the other, may be best explained in terms of ideas and Gorbachev’s new political philosophy.​

The CIA and the Culture of Failure follows the CIA through a series of crises from the Soviet collapse to the war in Iraq and explains the political pressures that helped lead to the greatest failures in U.S. intelligence history.

When the United States and the Soviet Union signed the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks accords in 1972 it was generally seen as the point at which the USSR achieved parity with the United States. Less than twenty years later the Soviet Union had collapsed, confounding experts who never expected it to happen during their lifetimes. In From Washington to Moscow veteran US Foreign Service officer Louis Sell traces the history of US–Soviet relations between 1972 and 1991 and explains why the Cold War came to an abrupt end. Drawing heavily on archival sources and memoirs—many in Russian—as well as his own experiences, Sell vividly describes events from the perspectives of American and Soviet participants. He attributes the USSR's fall not to one specific cause but to a combination of the Soviet system's inherent weaknesses, mistakes by Mikhail Gorbachev, and challenges by Ronald Reagan and other US leaders. He shows how the USSR's rapid and humiliating collapse and the inability of the West and Russia to find a way to cooperate respectfully and collegially helped set the foundation for Vladimir Putin’s rise.

In Disruption, Michael De Groot argues that the global economic upheaval of the 1970s was decisive in ending the Cold War. Both the West and the Soviet bloc struggled with the slowdown of economic growth; chaos in the international monetary system; inflation; shocks in the commodities markets; and the emergence of offshore financial markets. The superpowers had previously disseminated resources to their allies to enhance their own national security, but the disappearance of postwar conditions during the 1970s forced Washington and Moscow to choose between promoting their own economic interests and supporting their partners in Europe and Asia. De Groot shows that new unexpected macroeconomic imbalances in global capitalism sustained the West during the following decade. Rather than a creditor nation and net exporter, as it had been during the postwar period, the United States became a net importer of capital and goods during the 1980s that helped fund public spending, stimulated economic activity, and lubricated the private sector. The United States could now live beyond its means and continue waging the Cold War, and its allies benefited from access to the booming US market and the strengthened US military umbrella. As Disruption demonstrates, a new symbiotic economic architecture powered the West, but the Eastern European regimes increasingly became a burden to the Soviet Union. They were drowning in debt, and the Kremlin no longer had the resources to rescue them.