The need for security and the institutionalization of that security in national strategy and its associated documents is becoming a significant concern for nations in the 21st century international system. This need requires the development of national-level strategies that are designed with objectives; the attainment of which can ensure that the conditions necessary for security for a given actor in the international system can be met. The intent of this monograph is to explore the actual processes that nation-states employ to craft their national security strategy-related documents. The study aligned individual case studies of nation-states conducting their national strategy document formulation processes. These case studies were selected based upon a determination of two primary factors: 1) the nation-states in question had developed national security strategy documents that involved participation in the drafting process from more than one department or agency from the executive branch of government; and, 2) individual participants that were involved in the actual drafting process would be willing to respond to the questions delineated above, either in person or by written response. In addition, subject to travel resource availability, an effort was made to have as many different regions of the world as possible represented in the review. Ultimately, five countries and their national strategy documents were selected for assessment: Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Once the data was gathered, the monograph written so as to compare and contrast the various processes employed by each nation in their strategy document development. The last portion of the analysis evaluates the lessons learned from all five cases and identifies specific lessons that could be applicable to strategy document formulation for any future actor engaged in the process.

This report notes mounting concern that UK Armed Forces may be falling below the minimum utility required to deliver the commitments that they are currently being tasked to carry out let alone the tasks they are likely to face between 2015 to 2020 when it is acknowledged that there will be capability gaps. The Committee is concerned that UK Armed Forces will be continually operating at the maximum level envisaged by the Defence Planning Assumptions. The Committee is not convinced that this aspiration can be achieved by co-operation with our allies given the challenges of aligning political with operational needs. The SDSR identified seven military tasks and the Defence Planning Assumptions that underpin them. However the Review fails to show how decisions such as those on the Aircraft Carriers and Nimrod MRA4 will lead to the Armed Forces being able to undertake those military tasks. The Committee has serious concerns over the realisation of what is called "Future Force 2020", the Government's intended shape of the Armed Forces from 2020, particularly as the provision of the necessary resources is only a Government aspiration, not Government policy. The MoD must reform, and ensure substantially improved transparency and control over, its finance and budgetary practices. When committing to undertake new operations the Government should state from the outset where that operation fits in the Defence Planning Assumptions and which of the military tasks it is meeting. The Committee is concerned that the Government seems to have postponed the sensible aspiration of bringing commitments and resources into line, in that it has taken on the new commitment of Libya while reducing the resources available to MoD.

In this report the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy finds that the National Security Strategy should address more fundamental questions about the UK's role in the world and its relationship with the USA and other allies. The Strategy also needs to be subject to a much wider public debate. The Committee says that: there is no evidence that the NSS has influenced decisions made since the Strategic Defence and Security Review; there should be an "overarching strategy", a document designed to guide government decision-making and crisis management both at home and on the international stage; the Government's assertion that there will be no reduction in the UK's influence on the world stage is wholly unrealistic in the medium to long term and the UK needs to plan for a changing, and more partnership-dependent, role in the world. The Government's unwillingness to provide the Committee with all the information it has asked for about the National Security Risk Assessment means that it is unable to give Parliament any assurances about its adequacy. The report also notes concern that the National Security Council's oversight of security issues is not sufficiently broad and strategic, given that it was deeply involved in operations in Libya and failed to discuss the national security implications of the Eurozone crisis or the possibility of Scottish independence.

The post-cold war era presented security challenges that at one level are a continuation of the cold war era; at another level, these phenomena manifested in new forms. Whether the issues of economics and trade, transfer of technologies, challenges of intervention, or humanitarian crisis, the countries of the South (previously pejoratively labelled “Third World” or “developing” countries) have continued to address these challenges within the framework of their capabilities and concerns. The volume explores defence diplomacies, national security challenges and strategies, dynamics of diplomatic manoeuvers and strategic resource management of Latin American, southern African and Asian countries.

Since airlift was first used as a tool of national security during the Berlin Airlift, it has grown to deliver passengers, cargo, and fuel to operations worldwide in support of national security. However, Air Mobility Command is the single organization that performs for air mobility for the United States. Cm%Currently, the Air Force has structured Air Mobility Command for war, yet this command performs operations during times when the US is at peace. Air Mobility Command performs missions to support US military operations in hostile environments as well as humanitarian operations in non-hostile environments. The number of operations requiring mobility air forces has been on the rise since the Cold War ended 10 years ago. These steady-state operations seem to over task mobility air forces. This study centers on the question: Can Air Mobility Command's force structure, organized for two major-theater wars, fulfill that requirement and perform the steady-state operations in today's strategic environment? This study finds that Air Mobility Command's force structure cannot meet its requirements for two major-theater wars and that the current force structure is inefficient in meeting the requirements for steady-state operations. First, this thesis presents a primer to acclimate the reader to the complex environment and multifaceted requirements of mobility air forces. Next, this thesis examines Air Mobility Command's current force structure as determined by Department of Defense requirements for war. Then this thesis also describes the various types of missions that Air Mobility Command performs on a steady-state basis and evaluates the importance of these operations in fulfilling US National Security Strategy. Finally, this thesis recommends action that the Air Force and the Department of Defense should investigate in order to improve their air mobility capabilities in.

The Work Of The Joint Committee On The National Security Strategy In 2013-14 (HC 169, HL 1257) covers the work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which was established with a broad role; to consider the National Security Strategy. In practice, the Committee has considered not only the National Security Strategy (NSS) document 'A Strong Britain In An Age Of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy' published by the Government in 2010 (see below), but also the wider strategy that underlies government decision making on matters affecting national security. The report gives an account of activities over the past year, highlighting in particular the evidence session with the Prime Minister in January 2014; draws attention to areas of continuing concern; and outlines objectives for the remainder of the Parliament.