This volume illustrates to the public, and legal experts, the basic principles of the field of neuroscience, that commonly goes under the name of Neurolaw. First, it illustrates the relationship between neuroscience, natural sciences and social sciences. Furthermore, it highlights numerous problems concerning the fundamental philosophical concepts used by Neurolaw and evaluates the validity of the method and the limits of a neuroscientific approach to the problems of law and justice.The volume explores the possibility of application of these concepts on the fundamentals of the general theory of law and legal dogmatics. It also examines the main problems of Neurolaw in relation to public, private, criminal and procedural law. In conclusion, the book follows a systematic method that makes it an thorough manual for the introduction to Neurolaw.

There have been extraordinary developments in the field of neuroscience in recent years, sparking a number of discussions within the legal field. This book studies the various interactions between neuroscience and the world of law, and explores how neuroscientific findings could affect some fundamental legal categories and how the law should be implemented in such cases. The book is divided into three main parts. Starting with a general overview of the convergence of neuroscience and law, the first part outlines the importance of their continuous interaction, the challenges that neuroscience poses for the concepts of free will and responsibility, and the peculiar characteristics of a “new” cognitive liberty. In turn, the second part addresses the phenomenon of cognitive and moral enhancement, as well as the uses of neurotechnology and their impacts on health, self-determination and the concept of being human. The third and last part investigates the use of neuroscientific findings in both criminal and civil cases, and seeks to determine whether they can provide valuable evidence and facilitate the assessment of personal responsibility, helping to resolve cases. The book is the result of an interdisciplinary dialogue involving jurists, philosophers, neuroscientists, forensic medicine specialists, and scholars in the humanities; further, it is intended for a broad readership interested in understanding the impacts of scientific and technological developments on people’s lives and on our social systems.

This book discusses two of the oldest and hardest problems in both science and philosophy: What is matter?, and What is mind? A reason for tackling both problems in a single book is that two of the most influential views in modern philosophy are that the universe is mental (idealism), and that the everything real is material (materialism). Most of the thinkers who espouse a materialist view of mind have obsolete ideas about matter, whereas those who claim that science supports idealism have not explained how the universe could have existed before humans emerged. Besides, both groups tend to ignore the other levels of existence—chemical, biological, social, and technological. If such levels and the concomitant emergence processes are ignored, the physicalism/spiritualism dilemma remains unsolved, whereas if they are included, the alleged mysteries are shown to be problems that science is treating successfully.

How often is the defense of insanity or temporary insanity for accused criminals valid—or is it ever legitimate? This unique work presents multidisciplinary viewpoints that explain, support, and critique the insanity defense as it stands. What is the role of "the insanity defense" as a legal excuse? How does U.S. law handle criminal trials where the defendant pleads insanity, and how does our legal system's treatment differ from those of other countries or cultures? How are insanity defenses used, and how successful are these defenses for the accused? What are the costs of incarceration versus psychiatric treatment and confinement? This book presents a range of expert viewpoints on the insanity defense, exposing common myths; investigating its effectiveness and place in our legal system through history, case studies, and comparative analysis; and supplying perspectives from the disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and neuroscience. The content also addresses the ramifications of declaring citizens insane or incapacitated and examines trials that involved pleas of insanity and temporary insanity.

The intersection between law and neuroscience has been a focus of intense research for the past decade, as an unprecedented amount of attention has been triggered by the increased use of neuroscientific evidence in courts. While the majority of this attention is currently devoted to criminal law, including capital cases, the wide-ranging proposals for how neuroscience may inform issues of law and public policy extend to virtually every substantive area in law. Bringing together the latest work from leading scholars in the field, this volume examines the philosophical issues that inform this emerging and vibrant subfield of law. From discussions featuring the philosophy of the mind to neuroscience-based lie detection, each chapter addresses foundational questions that arise in the application of neuroscientific technology in the legal sphere.

Does neuroscience show that all our ideas about law and ethics are false? David Opderbeck answers this question with a broad and deep survey of the relationship between theology, science, and ethics. He proposes that Christian theology, which narrates the humanity and divinity of Christ, in conversation with the new Aristotelianism in the philosophy of science, provides a path through secular and religious fundamentalisms alike.

This volume makes a contribution to the field of neurolaw by investigating issues raised by the development, use, and regulation of neurointerventions. The broad range of topics covered in these chapters reflects neurolaw's growing social import, and its rapid expansion as an academic field of inquiry. Some authors investigate the criminal justice system's use of neurointerventions to make accused defendants fit for trial, to help reform convicted offenders, or to make condemned inmates sane enough for execution, while others interrogate the use, regulation, and social impact of cognitive enhancement medications and devices. Issues raised by neurointervention-based gay conversion "therapy", efficacy and safety of specific neurointervention methods, legitimacy of their use and regulation, and their implications for authenticity, identity, and responsibility are among the other topics investigated. Dwelling on neurointerventions also highlights tacit assumptions about human nature that have important implications for jurisprudence. For all we know, at present such things as people's capacity to feel pain, their sexuality, and the dictates of their conscience, are unalterable. But neurointerventions could hypothetically turn such constants into variables. The increasing malleability of human nature means that analytic jurisprudential claims (true in virtue of meanings of jurisprudential concepts) must be distinguished from synthetic jurisprudential claims (contingent on what humans are actually like). Looking at the law through the lens of neurointerventions thus also highlights the growing need for a new distinction between analytic jurisprudence and synthetic jurisprudence to tackle issues that increasingly malleable humans will face when they encounter novel opportunities and challenges.

This book examines core issues related to legal insanity, integrating perspectives from psychiatry, law, and ethics. Various criteria for insanity are analyzed and recommendations for forensic psychiatric and legal practice are offered. Many legal systems have an insanity defense, in one form or another. Still, it remains unclear exactly when and why mental disorders affect a person’s moral or criminal responsibility. Questions addressed in this book include: Why should insanity be a component of our legal system? What should be the criteria for an insanity defense? What would be the reasons for abolishing it? Who should bear the burden of proof? Furthermore, the book discusses the impact neurosciences may have on psychiatric and psychological evaluations of defendants as well as on legal decisions about insanity.