The clearest explanation yet of how the financial crisis of 2008 developed and why it could happen again In the wake of the financial meltdown in 2008, many claimed that it had been inevitable, that no one saw it coming, and that subprime borrowers were to blame. This accessible, thoroughly researched book is Jennifer Taub’s response to such unfounded claims. Drawing on wide-ranging experience as a corporate lawyer, investment firm counsel, and scholar of business law and financial market regulation, Taub chronicles how government officials helped bankers inflate the toxic-mortgage-backed housing bubble, then after the bubble burst ignored the plight of millions of homeowners suddenly facing foreclosure. Focusing new light on the similarities between the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s and the financial crisis in 2008, Taub reveals that in both cases the same reckless banks, operating under different names, received government bailouts, while the same lax regulators overlooked fraud and abuse. Furthermore, in 2013 the situation is essentially unchanged. The author asserts that the 2008 crisis was not just similar to the S&L scandal, it was a severe relapse of the same underlying disease. And despite modest regulatory reforms, the disease remains uncured: top banks remain too big to manage, too big to regulate, and too big to fail.

In light of the periodic malfunctions in important sectors of the finan cial services industry in recent years, such as commercial banking, thrift institutions, and the securities market, numerous proposals have been developed for restructuring the financial system to improve both its safety and efficiency. Among the groups analyzing the performance of the financial system and recommending changes where necessary, has been the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee. This Committee, which is described in greater detail in Chapter 1, consists of 12 independent banking experts from the academic and practitioner worlds that meet quarterly to analyze current developments in the financial services indus try and to make recommendations for improvements that would be in the public interest. The purpose of the Committee, its members, and a listing of policy statements are included in the Appendix. All but one of the chapters in this volume represent essays by indi vidual members of the Committee on issues discussed by the Committee at recent meetings and that, for the most part, resulted in policy state ments. They basically discuss the reasons for the policy statement adopted and place the issue in perspective. Where appropriate, the rele vant section of the respective policy statement is presented at the begin ning of each chapter. Each essay, however, reflects only the views of the individual author and not necessarily those of other members of the Committee or of the Committee as a whole.

Robert L. Bartley Editor Emeritus, The Wall Street Journal As this collection of essays is published, markets, regulators and society generally are sorting through the wreckage of the collapse in tech stocks at the turn of the millennium. All the more reason for an exhaustive look at our last “bubble,” if that is what we choose to call them. We haven’t had time to digest the lesson of the tech stocks and the recession that started in March 2001. After a decade, though, we’re ready to understand the savings and loan “bubble” that popped in 1989, preceding the recession that started in July 1990. For more than a half-century, we can now see clearly enough, the savings and loans were an accident waiting to happen. The best insurance for financial institutions is diversification, but the savings and loans were concentrated solely in residential financing. What’s more, they were in the business of borrowing short and lending long, accepting deposits that could be withdrawn quickly and making 20-year loans. They were further protected by Regulation Q, allowing them to pay a bit more for savings deposits than commercial banks were allowed to. In normal times, they could ride the yield curve, booking profits because long-term interest rates are generally higher than short-term ones. This world was recorded in Jimmy Stewart’s 1946 film, It’s a Wonderful Life.

This annotated bibliography includes more than 360 titles on the savings and loan crisis and, by extension, savings and loan viability or profitability. The volume covers works published from 1980 to 1992, including both scholarly and popular titles. Most of the titles included are books or research papers. Dissertations are included only when the author or title are of particular note. The book includes both author and subject indexes.