This volume is a serious attempt to open up the subject of European philosophy of science to real thought, and provide the structural basis for the interdisciplinary development of its specialist fields, but also to provoke reflection on the idea of ‘European philosophy of science’. This efforts should foster a contemporaneous reflection on what might be meant by philosophy of science in Europe and European philosophy of science, and how in fact awareness of it could assist philosophers interpret and motivate their research through a stronger collective identity. The overarching aim is to set the background for a collaborative project organising, systematising, and ultimately forging an identity for, European philosophy of science by creating research structures and developing research networks across Europe to promote its development.

This book seeks to provide new perspectives, to broaden the field of philosophy of science, or to renew themes that have had a great impact on the profession. Thus, after an initial chapter to situate the current trends in philosophy of science and the prospective of the near future, it offers contributions in five thematic blocks: I) Philosophy of Medicine and Climate Change; II) Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence and the Internet; III) New Analyses of Probability and the Use of Mathematics in Practice; IV) Scientific Progress Revisited; and V) Scientific Realism and the Instrumentalist Alternative. Within this framework, the volume addresses such relevant issues as the methodological validity of medical evidence or decision making in situations of uncertainty; recent advances in Artificial Intelligence and the future of the Internet; current forms of empirically based methodological pluralism and new ways of understanding mathematics with scientific practice; and the revision of the approaches to scientific progress based on the experiences accumulated in recent decades.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is an indispensable reference source and guide to the major themes, debates, problems and topics in philosophy of science. It contains sixty-two specially commissioned entries by a leading team of international contributors. Organized into four parts it covers: historical and philosophical context debates concepts the individual sciences. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science addresses all of the essential topics that students of philosophy of science need to know - from empiricism, explanation and experiment to causation, observation, prediction and more - and contains many helpful features including chapters on individual sciences (such as biology, chemistry, physics and psychology), further reading and cross-referencing at the end of each chapter. Expanded and revised throughout, this second edition includes new chapters on Conventionalism, Social Epistemology, Computer Simulation, Thought Experiments, Pseudoscience, Species and Taxonomy, and Cosmology.

This book is invaluable for teachers and students in high school and junior college who struggle to understand the principles of modern physics and incorporate scientific methods in their lessons. It provides interactive and multidisciplinary approaches that will help prepare present and future generations to face the technological and social challenges they will face. Rather than using a unidirectional didactic approach, the authors - scientists, philosophers, communication experts, science historians and science education innovators - divide the book into two parts; the first part, “Communicating Contemporary Physics”, examines how new physics developments affect modern culture, while the second part, “Digital Challenges for Physics Learning”, covers physics education research using ICT, plus the experiences of classroom teachers and a range of ideas and projects to innovate physics and STEM teaching.

This book develops a philosophico-methodological analysis of prediction and its role in economics. Prediction plays a key role in economics in various ways. It can be seen as a basic science, as an applied science and in the application of this science. First, it is used by economic theory in order to test the available knowledge. In this regard, prediction has been presented as the scientific test for economics as a science. Second, prediction provides a content regarding the possible future that can be used for prescription in applied economics. Thus, it can be used as a guide for economic policy, i.e., as knowledge concerning the future to be employed for the resolution of specific problems. Third, prediction also has a role in the application of this science in the public arena. This is through the decision-making of the agents — individuals or organizations — in quite different settings, both in the realm of microeconomics and macroeconomics. Within this context, the research is organized in five parts, which discuss relevant aspects of the role of prediction in economics: I) The problem of prediction as a test for a science; II) The general orientation in methodology of science and the problem of prediction as a scientific test; III) The methodological framework of social sciences and economics: Incidence for prediction as a test; IV) Epistemology and methodology of economic prediction: Rationality and empirical approaches and V) Methodological aspects of economic prediction: From description to prescription. Thus, the book is of interest for philosophers and economists as well as policy-makers seeking to ascertain the roots of their performance. The style used lends itself to a wide audience.

Includes section: "Some Michigan books."

Dramatic and controversial changes in the funding of science over the past two decades, towards its increasing commercialization, have stimulated a huge literature trying to set out an "economics of science". Whether broadly in favour or against these changes, the vast majority of these frameworks employ ahistorical analyses that cannot conceptualise, let alone address, the questions of "why have these changes occurred?" and "why now?" Nor, therefore, can they offer much insight into the crucial question of future trends. Given the growing importance of science and innovation in an age of both a globalizing knowledge-based economy (itself in crisis) and enormous challenges that demand scientific and technological responses, these are significant gaps in our understanding of important contemporary social processes. This book argues that the fundamental underlying problem in all cases is the ontological shallowness of these theories, which can only be remedied by attention to ontological presuppositions. Conversely, a critical realist approach affords the integration of a realist political economy into the analysis of the economics of science that does afford explicit attention to these crucial questions; a ‘cultural political economy of research and innovation’ (CPERI). Accordingly, the book sets out an introduction to the existing literature on the economics of science together with novel discussion of the field from a critical realist perspective. In arguing thus across levels of abstraction, however, the book also explores how concerted engagement with substantive social enquiry and theoretical debate develops and strengthens critical realism as a philosophical project, rather than simply ‘applying’ it. Divided into two volumes, in this first volume the book explores the ‘top’ and ‘tail’ of the argument, regarding substantive and philosophical aspects. Starting with substantive illustrations, we explore the social challenges associated with the contemporary commercialization of science and the movement towards a knowledge-based bio-economy. Having shown the explanatory benefits of assuming a realist political economy perspective, the book then turns to the task of reconstructing and justifying that theoretical perspective. True to the overall argument regarding attention to ontological presuppositions, this starts with critical realism’s critique of mainstream economics but also develops critical realism itself towards what may be called a ‘transcendental constructivism’.

In the 1980s, philosophical, historical and social studies of science underwent a change which later evolved into a turn to practice. Analysts of science were asked to pay attention to scientific practices in meticulous detail and along multiple dimensions, including the material, social and psychological. Following this turn, the interest in scientific practices continued to increase and had an indelible influence in the various fields of science studies. No doubt, the practice turn changed our conceptions and approaches of science, but what did it really teach us? What does it mean to study scientific practices? What are the general lessons, implications, and new challenges? This volume explores questions about the practice turn using both case studies and theoretical analysis. The case studies examine empirical and mathematical sciences, including the engineering sciences. The volume promotes interactions between acknowledged experts from different, often thought of as conflicting, orientations. It presents contributions in conjunction with critical commentaries that put the theses and assumptions of the former in perspective. Overall, the book offers a unique and diverse range of perspectives on the meanings, methods, lessons, and challenges associated with the practice turn.

Exploring the connections between cognitive science and psychoanalysis, the authors indicate that a potentially fruitful relationship can exist between the two fields. The book examines this relationship, concluding that psychoanalysis can contribute to a science of the mind when it flows into a more effective science and technology such as cognitive science. As viewed by the authors, cognitive science is "a new, lively field, full of novel concepts and methods about the mind." This is sharply contrasted with their opinion of psychoanalysis as a discipline which must change and consider such important problems in the study of the mind such as fantasies and feelings. Colby and Stoller do not specify how psychoanalysis must evolve, but they do make suggestions for future research. They believe that they are "exercising the prerogative of tribal elders, pass(ing) the task along to the next generation."

Christian Hugo Hoffmann undermines the citadel of risk assessment and management, arguing that classical probability theory is not an adequate foundation for modeling systemic and extreme risk in complex financial systems. He proposes a new class of models which focus on the knowledge dimension by precisely describing market participants’ own positions and their propensity to react to outside changes. The author closes his thesis by a synthetical reflection on methods and elaborates on the meaning of decision-making competency in a risk management context in banking. By choosing this poly-dimensional approach, the purpose of his work is to explore shortcomings of risk management approaches of financial institutions and to point out how they might be overcome.