Future historians are very likely to see nuclear proliferation—or the averting of nuclear proliferation—as one of the central determinants of international politics in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Certainly the development of an independent nuclear deterrent by the People's Republic of China and the possibility that Taiwan, Korea, Jap

While specifically defining many of the technical terms that have made this subject so inaccessible, Michael Mandelbaum discusses the weapons systems and nuclear doctrine of both the United States and the Soviet Union along with their predicted impact on the future of the arms race.

As Iran?'s nuclear program evolves, U.S. decisionmakers will confront a series of critical policy choices involving complex considerations and policy trade-offs. These policy choices could involve dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons; deterring Iran from using its nuclear weapons, if it were to acquire them; and reassuring U.S. regional partners. The U.S. Air Force will need to prepare to carry out whatever policies are chosen.

In this book, Michael Krepon analyzes nuclear issues such as missile defenses, space warfare, and treaties, and argues that the United States is on a dangerous course. During the Cold War, Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, facilitated strategic arms control. Now that the Cold War has been replaced by asymmetric warfare, treaties based on nuclear overkill and national vulnerability are outdated and must be adapted to a far different world. A new strategic concept of Cooperative Threat Reduction is needed to replace MAD. A balance is needed that combines military might with strengthened treaty regimes.

Turkey, with a robust modern economy and growing energy needs, is pursuing a switch to nuclear power. But that shift is occurring in an environment fraught with security challenges: Turkey borders Iraq, Syria, and Iran—all states with nuclear or WMD ambitions or capabilities. As a NATO member, Turkey also hosts U.S. nuclear bombs on its territory, although some question the durability of this relationship. This dynamic has naturally led to speculation that Turkish leaders might someday consider moving beyond a civilian course to develop nuclear weapons. Yet there has been remarkably little informed analysis and debate on Turkey's nuclear future, either within the country or in broader international society. This volume explores the current status and trajectory of Turkey's nuclear program, adding historical perspective, analytical rigor, and strategic insight.

Unfortunately, a nuclear terrorist act is only one-- and hardly the most probable-- of several frightening security threats Pakistan now faces or poses. We know that traditional acts of terrorism and conventional military crises in Southwest Asia have nearly escalated into wars and, more recently, even threatened Indian and Pakistani nuclear use. Certainly, the war jitters that attended the recent terrorist attacks against Mumbai highlighted the nexus between conventional terrorism and war. For several weeks, the key worry in Washington was that India and Pakistan might not be able to avoid war. Similar concerns were raised during the Kargil crisis in 1999, and the Indo-Pakistani conventional military tensions that arose in 2001 and 2002-- crises that most analysts (including those who contributed to this volume) believe could have escalated into nuclear conflicts. The intent of this book is to conduct a significant evaluation of these threats. Its companion volume, Worries Beyond War, published in 2008, focused on the challenges of Pakistani nuclear terrorism. These analyses offer a window into what is possible and why Pakistani nuclear terrorism is best seen as a lesser included threat to war, and terrorism more generally. Could the United States do more with Pakistan to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons holdings against possible seizure? It is unclear. This book argues that rather than distracting our policy leaders from taking the steps needed to reduce the threats of nuclear war, we would do well to view our worst terrorist nightmares for what they are: subordinate threats that will be limited best if the risk of nuclear war is reduced and contained.

Unfortunately, a nuclear terrorist act is only one-- and hardly the most probable-- of several frightening security threats Pakistan now faces or poses. We know that traditional acts of terrorism and conventional military crises in Southwest Asia have nearly escalated into wars and, more recently, even threatened Indian and Pakistani nuclear use. Certainly, the war jitters that attended the recent terrorist attacks against Mumbai highlighted the nexus between conventional terrorism and war. For several weeks, the key worry in Washington was that India and Pakistan might not be able to avoid war. Similar concerns were raised during the Kargil crisis in 1999 and during the Indo-Pakistani conventional military tensions that arose in 2001 and 2002-- crises that most analysts (including those who contributed to this volume) believe could have escalated into nuclear conflicts. The intent of this book is to conduct a significant evaluation of these threats. Its companion volume, Worries Beyond War, published in 2008, focused on the challenges of Pakistani nuclear terrorism. These analyses offer a window into what is possible and why Pakistani nuclear terrorism is best seen as a lesser included threat to war, and terrorism more generally. Could the United States do more with Pakistan to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons holdings against possible seizure? It is unclear. This book argues that rather than distracting our policy leaders from taking the steps needed to reduce the threats of nuclear war, we would do well to view our worst terrorist nightmares for what they are: subordinate threats that will be limited best if the risk of nuclear war is reduced and contained.--

The editors would like to express their thanks to a number of colleagues whose insights and comments contributed to the development of the book. Among those who were particularly helpful were Robert Nurick, Vic Utgoff, Mike Clarke, Jorg Baldouf, Jean Chabaud, John Roper, Edwina Moreton, Lawrence Freedman, Francois Heisbourg, and Harley Balzer. We are particularly grateful to General William Y. Smith, President of the Institute for Defense Analyses, for his intellectual encouragement.