The essys in this collection explore and analyze how to reduce the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. Contributors work to introduce the theory and methodology of nuclear risk reduction, to provide specific measures that might work best in the region, and to consider the consequences of missile defense options for stability in Asia. Much work is needed to recduce nuclear dangers between India and Pakistan. While the fact that both countries possess nuclear weapons may prevent a full-blown conventional or nuclear war, the presence of these weapons in the region may also encourage the use of violence at lower levels expecting escalation to be contained by a mutual desire to avoid the nuclear threshold. One only needs to look at the Kashmir conflict for confirmation of this paradox, with serious crises coming more frequently with more severity since the nuclear tests of 1998. Sustained efforts along the line suggested by the contributors of this volume are a crucial step toward reducing nuclear risk on the Subcontinent.

The Prospect Of A Nuclear War In South Asia Has Drawn Global Attention And Concern. This Book Studies Nuclear Risks In The Indo-Pakistani And Sino-Indian Contexts And Suggests A Wide Range Of Measures By Which India, Pakistan And China Could Reduce Nuclear Dangers In South Asia. The Only Full-Length Study And A Timely Epilogue Of Latest Nuclear Dialogues Between India And Pakistan. Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures In South Asia Will Be A Standard Reference Not Only For Political Scientists And Strategic Analysts, But Also For Policy Makers, Diplomats, Journalists, Defence Personnel And The Informed General Reader.

This book while comprehending the contemporary global security environment, offers a new roadmap for nuclear disarmament by creating a balance between deterrence supporters and disarmament advocators. The author identifies the divide between competing approaches such as traditional security-centric aspects and humanity-centered disarmament perspectives, tackling the complex question of how to balance some states’ requirements for effective nuclear deterrence with other states’ long-term desire for a nuclear-free world. The book explores how new technologies such as cyber and Artificial Intelligence advances are available to more countries than nuclear technology, and could level the playing field for weaker nuclear weapons states. It also looks into the issues which continue to be obstacles in the way of convincing the nuclear weapon states on nuclear disarmament presented in this volume. The author argues that the gap between states' security needs and disarmament aspirations can be bridged by building a new roadmap and creating new security environment. This volume will be of great interest to students and scholars, researchers, policymakers, NGOs and members of the diplomatic community, in the fields of security studies, strategic studies and nuclear policy.

This Book Is A Most Timely And Welcome Addition To The Growing Body Of Literature On Cbms In South Asia. It Provides Reasons For Hope As There Are Many Reasons To Be Dispirited About The Absence Of Proper Confidence Building Measures In South Asia.

In this book, the leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. Basrur shows that the country's nuclear culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence but sometimes drifts into a more open-ended view.

South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region’s nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia’s nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.

Changing Patterns of Warfare between India and Pakistan analyzes how advanced nuclear technologies and the advent of disruptive technologies have affected the evolving conflict between India and Pakistan. Advanced nuclear technologies such as nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, ballistic missile defence systems (BMDs), multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), anti-satellite weapons (ASAT); and disruptive technologies such as hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence (AI), lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) / drones and space-based and cyber technologies have all complicated crisis dynamics and the domain of warfare in the region. Further, the employment of India’s compellence strategy is an indication of a change in its stance that demonstrates smart/surgical strikes are now more likely. The phenomenon of surgical strikes raises the question of how disruptive technologies will be used to gain direct/indirect military control and hence challenge the existing status quo and deterrence stability. Against this backdrop, the authors predict how this conflict may develop in the future and evaluate the ways to stabilize deterrence and regulate the militarization of artificial intelligence and disruptive technologies between India and Pakistan. This book will be of interest to all those researching and working in the fields of security studies, strategic studies, nuclear policy, deterrence thinking and proliferation/non-proliferation aspects of the nuclear weapons programme within South Asia and beyond. It will also be relevant for the academic community, policy-makers, diplomats, members of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), professional research institutes and organizations working on India–Pakistan relations.

A considerable amount of work has been conducted in the field of peace studies, conflict management, peace science in economics, sociology, anthropology and management. This title presents research with an emphasis on theoretical and mathematical constructs in the area of peace economics & peace science.

Mario Carranza studies in depth the linkages between Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations and the International Nuclear Order. He critically analyzes the de facto recognition by the United States of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states and looks at the impact of that recognition on the International Nuclear Order and its linchpin, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The book provides a critical analysis of the New International Nuclear Order sponsored by the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the place of India and Pakistan in that order. The author considers the survival of India and Pakistan in relation to a strategy of nuclear deterrence and debates the possibility of establishing a robust nuclear arms control regime in South Asia as part of a broader effort to revive global nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations.