Conventional wisdom has it that the sciences, properly pursued, constitute a pure, value-free method of obtaining knowledge about the natural world. In light of the social and normative dimensions of many scientific debates, Helen Longino finds that general accounts of scientific methodology cannot support this common belief. Focusing on the notion of evidence, the author argues that a methodology powerful enough to account for theories of any scope and depth is incapable of ruling out the influence of social and cultural values in the very structuring of knowledge. The objectivity of scientific inquiry can nevertheless be maintained, she proposes, by understanding scientific inquiry as a social rather than an individual process. Seeking to open a dialogue between methodologists and social critics of the sciences, Longino develops this concept of "contextual empiricism" in an analysis of research programs that have drawn criticism from feminists. Examining theories of human evolution and of prenatal hormonal determination of "gender-role" behavior, of sex differences in cognition, and of sexual orientation, the author shows how assumptions laden with social values affect the description, presentation, and interpretation of data. In particular, Longino argues that research on the hormonal basis of "sex-differentiated behavior" involves assumptions not only about gender relations but also about human action and agency. She concludes with a discussion of the relation between science, values, and ideology, based on the work of Habermas, Foucault, Keller, and Haraway.

Objectivity and subjectivity are key concepts in social research. This book, written by leading authors in the field, takes a completely new approach to objectivity and subjectivity, no longer treating them as opposed - as many existing texts do - but as logically and methodologically related in social research. The book debates: - the philosophical bases of objectivity and relativity - relationism and dynamic synthesis - situated objectivity - theorised subjectivity - social objects and realism - objectivity and subjectivity in practice The authors explain complex arguments with great clarity for social science students, while also providing the detail and comprehensiveness required to meet the needs of practising researchers and scholars.

He has tried - in his career and, specifically, in this volume - to understand science without accepting the culture of science uncritically.

Three essays, two of which were first published in Archiv für Sozialwissenshcft und Sozialpolitik in 1904 and 1905, and the third in Logos in 1917. The meaning of "ethical neutrality" in sociology and economics.--"Objectivity" in social science and social policy.--Critical studies in the logic of the cultural sciences.

Issues important to the philosophy of social science are widely discussed in the American academy today. Some social scientists resist the very idea of a debate on general issues. They continue to focus on behaviorist and positivist criteria, and the concepts, methods, and theories appropriate to a particular and narrow form of scientific inquiry. McCarthy argues that a new and valuable perspective may be gained on these questions through a return to philosophical debates surrounding the origins and development of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German sociology. In Objectivity and the Silence of Reason he focuses on two key figures, Max Weber and Jurrgen Habermas, reopening the vibrant and rich intellectual dispute about knowledge and truth in epistemology and concept formation, logic of analysis, and methodology in the social sciences. He uses this debate to explore the forms of objectivity in everyday experience and science, and the relations between science, ethics, and politics. McCarthy analyzes the tension in Weber's work between his early methodological writings with their emphasis on interpretive science, subjective intentionality, cultural and historical meaning and the later works that emphasize issues of explanatory science, natural causality, social prediction, and nomological law. While arguing for a value-free science, Weber was highly critical of the disenchanted and meaningless world of technical reason and rejected positivist objectivity. McCarthy shows how Habermas attempted to resolve tensions in Weber's work by clarifying the relationship between the methods of subjective interpretation and objective causality. Habermas believes that social science cannot be silent in the face of alienation, false consciousness, and the oppression of technological and administrative rationality and must adopt methodologies connected to the broader ethical and political questions of the day. Drawing deeply on the Kantian and neo-Kantian tradition that contributed to the development of Weber's method, Objectivity and the Silence of Reason demonstrates the crucial integration of philosophy and sociology in German intellectual culture. It elucidates the complexities of the development of modern social science. The book will be of interest to sociologists, philosophers, and intellectual historians.