Desire is a central concept in Aristotle's ethical and psychological works, but he does not provide us with a systematic treatment of the notion itself. This book reconstructs the account of desire latent in his various scattered remarks on the subject and analyses its role in his moral psychology. Topics include: the range of states that Aristotle counts as desires (orexeis); objects of desire (orekta) and the relation between desires and envisaging prospects; desire and the good; Aristotle's three species of desire: epithumia (pleasure-based desire), thumos (retaliatory desire) and boulêsis (good-based desire - in a narrower notion of 'good' than that which connects desire more generally to the good); Aristotle's division of desires into rational and non-rational; Aristotle and some current views on desire; and the role of desire in Aristotle's moral psychology. The book will be of relevance to anyone interested in Aristotle's ethics or psychology.

This is a celebration of falling in love and partaking of the Wine of the Beloved. It is both a meditation on the Song of Solomon, the Song of Songs and a celebration, a rumination on the love of the ancient Persian poet and Sufi mystic Rumi for the Divine in ways that bridge divides between faiths as the realization of the desire of nations.

In medieval culture, the consideration of language is deeply connected to other aspects of the system of knowledge. One interesting connection takes place between theories of language and theories of larger concepts such as love and desire. The Syntax of Desire is an interdisciplinary examination of the interlacing operation of syntax and desire in three medieval 'grammars:' theological, linguistic, and poetic. Exploring three representative aspects of medieval language theory, Elena Lombardi uncovers the ways in which syntax and desire were interrelated in the Middle Ages. She suggests that, in Augustine's theology, the creative act of God in the universe emerges as a syntax that the human individual must interpret by means of desire; in the linguistic theory of the Modistae, she sees the syntax of language as parallel to a syntax of reality, one organized by the desiring interplay of matter and form; in Dante's poetry, she argues that the language of the fallen human is bound together by the syntax of poetry, an act of desire that restores language to its primitive innocence. In addition to detailed analyses of medieval texts, The Syntax of Desire examines some aspects of the same relationship in light of contemporary linguistics, philosophy of language, and psychoanalysis.

This book is a cumulation of a research program that began in the sum mer of 1978, when I was a doctoral student at the University of Missouri. What started as a graduate student' s curiosity about individual differ ences in need for personal control led to a personality scale, a few pub lications, some additional questions, and additional research. For reasons I no longer recall, I named this personality trait desire for control. One study led to another, and questions by students and colleagues often spurred me to apply desire for control to new areas and new questions. At the same time, researchers around the globe began using the scale and sending me reprints of articles and copies of papers describing work they had done on desire for contro!. In the past decade or so, I have talked or corresponded with dozens of students who have used the scale in their doctoral dissertation and master's thesis research. I have heard of or seen translations of the Desirability of Control Scale into German, Polish, Japanese, and French. There is also a children's version of the scale. I estirnate that there have now been more than a hundred studies conducted on desire for contro!.

Most people have wondered whether anything really matters, some have temporarily thought that nothing really matters, and some philosophers have defended the view that nothing really matters. However, if someone thinks that nothing matters--if they are a "nihilist about value"--then it seems that it is irrational for them to care about anything. It seems that nihilism about value mandates total indifference. This is the "problem of nihilism" Allan Hazlett addresses in The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism. Hazlett argues that the problem of nihilism arises because desire--and thus caring--is a species of evaluation that admits of irrationality. This contradicts the influential Humean view that desire does not admit of irrationality, which has a ready solution to the problem of nihilism: since desire does not admit of irrationality, it cannot be irrational to care about something that you believe does not matter. However, following G.E. Anscombe, Hazlett argues that desire has the same relationship to goodness as belief has to truth: just as truth is the accuracy condition for belief, goodness is the accuracy condition for desire. This reveals desire as an appropriate target of epistemological inquiry, in the same way that belief is an appropriate target of epistemological inquiry. Desires can amount to knowledge (in the same way that beliefs can amount to knowledge) and, crucially for the problem of nihilism, desire admits of irrationality (in the same way that belief admits of irrationality). Nevertheless, although it is obviously irrational to believe something that you believe is not true, Hazlett argues that it is not irrational to desire something you believe is not good, despite the fact that goodness is the accuracy condition for desire. This provides a solution to the problem of nihilism, and shows that nihilism about value can coherently be combined with the anti-Humean view that desire is a species of evaluation.

Praised as “a work of wild, vaulting ambition and achievement” by Entertainment Weekly, Jamie O’Neill’s first novel invites comparison to such literary greats as James Joyce, Samuel Beckett and Charles Dickens. Jim Mack is a naïve young scholar and the son of a foolish, aspiring shopkeeper. Doyler Doyle is the rough-diamond son—revolutionary and blasphemous—of Mr. Mack’s old army pal. Out at the Forty Foot, that great jut of rock where gentlemen bathe in the nude, the two boys make a pact: Doyler will teach Jim to swim, and in a year, on Easter of 1916, they will swim to the distant beacon of Muglins Rock and claim that island for themselves. All the while Mr. Mack, who has grand plans for a corner shop empire, remains unaware of the depth of the boys’ burgeoning friendship and of the changing landscape of a nation. Set during the year preceding the Easter Uprising of 1916—Ireland’s brave but fractured revolt against British rule—At Swim, Two Boys is a tender, tragic love story and a brilliant depiction of people caught in the tide of history. Powerful and artful, and ten years in the writing, it is a masterwork from Jamie O’Neill.

A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science. In The Feeling Body, Giovanna Colombetti takes ideas from the enactive approach developed over the last twenty years in cognitive science and philosophy of mind and applies them for the first time to affective science—the study of emotions, moods, and feelings. She argues that enactivism entails a view of cognition as not just embodied but also intrinsically affective, and she elaborates on the implications of this claim for the study of emotion in psychology and neuroscience. In the course of her discussion, Colombetti focuses on long-debated issues in affective science, including the notion of basic emotions, the nature of appraisal and its relationship to bodily arousal, the place of bodily feelings in emotion experience, the neurophysiological study of emotion experience, and the bodily nature of our encounters with others. Drawing on enactivist tools such as dynamical systems theory, the notion of the lived body, neurophenomenology, and phenomenological accounts of empathy, Colombetti advances a novel approach to these traditional issues that does justice to their complexity. Doing so, she also expands the enactive approach into a further domain of inquiry, one that has more generally been neglected by the embodied-embedded approach in the philosophy of cognitive science.

Irvine looks at what modern science can tell about desire--what happens in the brain when one desires something and how animals evolved particular desires. He suggests that people who can convince themselves to want what they already have dramatically enhance their happiness.