Based on German and Soviet military archival material, this book provides an insight into the tactics and planning for combat in a winter climate. It also studies the mechanisms for change in an army during the course of battle. The first part of the book looks at the tactical pamphlet 'People's Commissar for Defence Order No. 109', as passed by Red Army units on 4 March 1941, which provided regulations for combat in Winter. The second part of the book, using material from the Soviet military archives, reveals Red Army General Staff supplements to the winter regulation.

1992 manual from the United States Marine Corps.One of the great recurring failures in modern European warfare has been unpreparedness for winter warfare. Men, horses, and machine all have special needs if they are to operate effectively in conditions of cold, snow, and ice yet, particularly after the heyday of the warrior kings of Sweden, army commanders and political leaders seemed gradually to abandon the idea that a specific type of war needs to be waged. Napoleon, World War I generals, Stalin, and Hitler all paid a grim price for this strategic amnesia. In "On Winter Warfare," the U.S. Marine Corps Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory provides both a brief history of war in winter and an analysis of the art of warfare in cold climates. It makes the key point that, rather than the Russian winter defeating Napoleon, it was his generally ill-conceived campaign, probably generated by a series of successes under predictable conditions. Similarly, Hitler 's overweening reliance on his own will and intuition simply brushed aside the practical difficulties of a winter campaign in Russia under the assumption that the initial German assault would cause a total collapse of Russian resistance. When this failed to occur, the Wehrmacht 's lack of preparedness for a winter campaign rapidly became manifest. In dealing with the general principles of cold weather war, "On Winter Warfare" highlights the importance of wintertime obstacle construction, the many variables presented by the military properties of snow including grain size, density, hardness, crusts, and temperature and the technical problems surrounding cold weather ballistics. It also provides an in-depth discussion of the key strategic principles in winter war mobility, initiative, flexibility, superiority, and surprise and the requirements that must be met to achieve them. Military professionals, historians of modern warfare, and anyone interested in the uniquely stressful conditions of cold weather war will find this book both a key reference work and compelling reading.

Graphically describes the appalling hardships faced by German troops on the Eastern Front 1941-1945. Hitler’s shock decision to launch the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 was arguably the turning point of the Second World War. Spectacular early victories saw the Nazis close in on Moscow but the Soviet 1941/42 winter counter offensive changed the odds entirely. Without doubt Russian winter conditions were a major factor compounded by the Germans’ woeful lack of preparedness. As this fascinating book reveals, Wehrmacht and SS units only began to be issued with winter clothing in late 1941 and many had to improvise well into 1942. In an attempt to restore morale adversely affected by the harsh conditions and military reversals ‘The Winter Warfare Handbook’ (Winter Buch) was produced in 1942 and extracts are quoted in this work. Commanders had to adapt to the snow, freezing conditions and, almost worse, the impassable roads during the melt. With customary thoroughness and drastic measures the Germans largely mastered the climatic challenges but nothing could mask the reality of the ruthless and numerically superior enemy that they faced.

Sandwiched between Nazi Germany and the "Russian Bear," Sweden walked a diplomatic tightrope on if and how it should support Finland during the Russo-Finnish Winter War. Social and political forces motivated the Swedish leadership to promote neutrality and avoid official military engagement, while at the same time the Swedish Volunteer Corps comprised the largest volunteer combat force (more than 8,200 strong) in any modern war. This book discusses the political background of the 1939-1940 Winter War; setbacks the volunteers suffered due to weather and terrain; and the ever-present fear that war would come to the Scandinavian Peninsula.

This book analyzes the multi-faceted phenomenon of Finnish military effectiveness in the Winter War (1939–40). Drawing on a wide array of primary and secondary sources, Pasi Tuunainen shows how by focusing on their own strengths and pitting these against the weaknesses of their adversary, the Finns were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Red Army whilst minimizing their own losses. The Finns were able to use their resources for effective operational purposes, and perform almost to their full potential. The Finnish small-unit tactics utilized the terrain and Arctic conditions for which they had prepared themselves, as well as forming cohesive units of well-motivated and qualitatively better professional leaders and citizen soldiers who could innovate and adapt. The Finnish Army had highly effective logistics, support and supply systems that kept the troops fighting.