It is the aim of the present study to introduce the reader to the ways of thinking of those contemporary philosophers who apply the tools of symbolic logic to classical philosophical problems. Unlike the "conti nental" reader for whom this work was originally written, the English speaking reader will be more familiar with most of the philosophers dis cussed in this book, and he will in general not be tempted to dismiss them indiscriminately as "positivists" and "nominalists". But the English version of this study may help to redress the balance in another respect. In view of the present emphasis on ordinary language and the wide spread tendency to leave the mathematical logicians alone with their technicalities, it seems not without merit to revive the interest in formal ontology and the construction of formal systems. A closer look at the historical account which will be given here, may convince the reader that there are several points in the historical develop ment whose consequences have not yet been fully assessed: I mention, e. g. , the shift from the traditional three-level semantics of sense and deno tation to the contemporary two-level semantics of representation; the relation of extensional structure and intensional content in the extensional systems of Wittgenstein and Carnap; the confusing changes in labelling the different kinds of analytic and apriori true sentences; etc. Among the philosophically interesting tools of symbolic logic Lesniewski's calculus of names deserves special attention.

Things are particulars and their qualities are universals, but do universals have an existence distinct from the particular things describable by those terms? And what must be their nature if they do? This book provides a careful and assured survey of the central issues of debate surrounding universals, in particular those issues that have been a crucial part of the emergence of contemporary analytic ontology. The book begins with a taxonomy of extreme nominalist, moderate nominalist, and realist positions on properties, and outlines the way each handles the phenomena of predication, resemblance, and abstract reference. The debate about properties and philosophical naturalism is also examined. Different forms of extreme nominalism, moderate nominalism, and minimalist realism are critiqued. Later chapters defend a traditional realist view of universals and examine the objections to realism from various infinite regresses, the difficulties in stating identity conditions for properties, and problems with realist accounts of knowledge of abstract objects. In addition, the debate between Platonists and Aristotelians is examined alongside a discussion of the relationship between properties and an adequate theory of existence. The book's final chapter explores the problem of individuating particulars. The book makes accessible a difficult topic without blunting the sophistication of argument required by a more advanced readership.

Between the two world wars, Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939), created the famous and important system of foundations of mathematics that comprises three deductive theories: Protothetic, Ontology, and Mereology. His research started in 1914 with studies on the general theory of sets (later named `Mereology'). Ontology followed between 1919 and 1921, and was the next step towards an integrated system. In order to combine these two systematically he constructed Protothetic - the system of `first principles'. Together they amount to what Z. Jordan called `... most thorough, original, and philosophically significant attempt to provide a logically secure foundation for the whole of mathematics'. The volume collects many of the most significant commentaries on, and contributions to, Protothetic. A Protothetic Bibliography is included.

"The idea that prompted the conferenee for which many of these papers were written, and that inspired this book, is stated in the Editorial Introduction reprinted below from Volume 21 of Synthese. The present volume contains the artieles in Synthese 21, Numbers 3-4 and Synthese 22, Numbers 1-2. In addition, it ineludes new papers by Saul Kripke, James McCawley, John R. Ross, and Paul Ziff, and reprints 'Grammar and Philosophy' by P. F. Strawson. Strawson's artiele first appeared in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, and is reprinted with the kind permission of the author and the Aristotelian Society. We also repeat our thanks to the Olivetti Companyand Edizione di Comunita of Milan for permission to inelude the paper by Dana Scott; it also appeared in Synthese 21. DONALO DAVIDSON GILBERT HARMAN EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION The success of linguistics in treating naturallanguages as formal syntactic systems has aroused the interest of a number of linguists in a paralleI or related development of semantics. For the most part quite independ ently, many philosophers and logicians have reeently been applying formai semantic methods to structures increasingly like naturallanguages. While differenees in training, method and vocabulary tend to veil the fact, philosophers and linguists are converging, it seerns, on a common set of interrelated probiems. Sinee philosophers and linguists are working on the same, or very similar, probiems, it would obviously be instructive to compare notes." --

Philosophers of science work not only with the methods of the sciences but with their contents as well. Substantive issues concerning the relation between mind and matter, between the material basis and the functions of cognition, have been central within the entire history of philosophy. We recall such philosophers as Aristotle, Descartes, the early Kant, Ernst Mach, and the early William James as directly inquiring of the organs and structures of thinking. Science and its philosophical self-criticism are especially and deeply united in the effort to understand the biological brain and human behavior, and so it requires no apology to include this collection of clinical studies among Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. The work of Dr. Norman Geschwind, well represented in this selection, explores the relation between structure and function, between the anatomy of the brain and the 'higher' behavior of men and women. As a clinical neurologist, Geschwind was led to these studies particularly by his in terest in those pathologies which have to do with human perception and language. His research into the anatomical substrates of specific dis orders-and strikingly the aphasias -present a fascinating and provocative examination of fundamental questions which will concern not neurologists alone but also psychologists, physicians, linguists, speech pathologists, educators, anthropologists, historians of medicine, and philosophers, among others, namely all those interested in the characteristic modes of human activity, in speech, in perception, and in the learning process generally.

In the book If Tropes, the author attempts to approach and then deal with some of the most basic problems for a theory of tropes. The investigation proceeds from three basic assumptions: (i) tropes (i.e. particular properties) exist, (ii) only tropes exist (that is, tropes are the only basic or fundamental kind of entities), and (iii) the main-function for tropes is to serve as truth-makers for atomic propositions. Provided that one accepts these assumptions the author finds that the trope-theorist will have to deal with two important matters. Some atomic propositions seem to require universal truth-makers and others seem to require concrete truth-makers. This means that universals and concrete particulars will need to be constructed from the material of tropes. Such constructions are attempted and it is argued that it is possible to deal at least with these basic issues while staying squarely within the boundaries of a purely trope-theoretical framework. The book is written in an untechnical language but requires some prior understanding of basic metaphysics.

This book has arisen out of lectures I gave in recent years at the Uni versities of Munich and Regensburg, and it is intended to serve as a textbook for courses in the Philosophy of Language. In my lectures I was able to presuppose that the students had taken an introductory course in logic. Some knowledge of logic will also be helpful in studying this book - as it is almost everywhere else in philosophy -, especially in Section 3. 2, but it is no prerequisite. I would like to give my sincere thanks to Prof. Terrell for his excellent translation of the book, which is based on the second, revised and en larged German edition. Regensburg, May 1975 FRANZ VON KUTSCHERA INTRODUCTION Language has become one of philosophy's most important and pressing themes during this century. This preoccupation with language has its ori gins in the most diverse areas of philosophical inquiry.

The relationship between thought and language has been of central importance to philosophy ever since Plato characterised thinking as 'a dialogue the soul has with itself'. In this volume, several major twentieth-century philosophers of mind and language make further contributions to the debate. Among the questions addressed are: is language conceptually prior to thought, or vice versa? Must thought take place 'in' a medium? To what extent can creatures without language be credited with thoughts? Do we have to suppose that thinking involves the use of concepts? What does it mean to have and deploy a concept? How do recent psychological experiments bear on these issues? Are beliefs, desires, hopes and fears rightly construed as 'attitudes towards propositions'? Should twentieth-century philosophy be conceived of in terms of Michael Dummett's distinction between 'analytical philosophy' and the 'philosophy of thought'?

It is not inacurate to say that from 1928 to 1936 Carnap was a member of the Vienna Circle, even though during this period he was not always present in Vienna. During this years, which spanned roughly the period from the Aufbau to Testability and Meaning, he worked or at least discussed frequently with the members of the group. However, traditionally it has been difficult to form a proper view of the development of Carnap's ideas throughout this period, mainly because of three errors which have persisted in the commonly accepted historical interpretation of Carnap and the Vienna Circle: emphasis on the Circle as a unit rather than a collective of individuals; insistence on verificationism as the defining characteristic of Logical Positivism; and the systematic abstraction of the work of the Circle from its historical context. As against this historically distorted image, this book argues for an alternative reading, evaluating the different influences on Carnap of Schlick, Wittgenstein, Neurath and Popper, and making sense of Carnap's evolution from physicalism to phenomenalism and the syntactic point of view.