Reviews the sales practices for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and structured notes. Analyzes fed. sales practice requirements applicable to these products and the dealers marketing them. Reports on the extent of end-user satisfaction with sales practices, product use and related disputes and the costs of these disputes. Includes the views of end-users and dealers on the nature of their relationship and responsibilities and the actions dealers and end-users have taken to reduce the potential for sales practice disputes, and the actions regulators have taken to address sales practice issues.

Recent regulatory efforts, especially in the U.S. and Europe, are aimed at reducing moral hazard so that the next financial crisis is not bailed out by tax payers. This paper looks at the possibility that central counterparties (CCPs) may be too-big-to-fail entities in the making. The present regulatory and reform efforts may not remove the systemic risk from OTC derivatives but rather shift them from banks to CCPs. Under the present regulatory overhaul, the OTC derivative market could become more fragmented. Furthermore, another taxpayer bailout cannot be ruled out. A reexamination of the two key issues of (i) the interoperability of CCPs, and (ii) the cost of moving to CCPs with access to central bank funding, indicates that the proposed changes may not provide the best solution. The paper suggests that a tax on derivative liabilities could make the OTC derivatives market safer, particularly in the transition to a stable clearing infrastructure. It also suggests reconsideration of a "public utility" model for the OTC market infrastructure.

The over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market has captured the attention of regulators after the Global Financial Crisis due to the risk it poses to financial stability. Under the post-crisis regulatory reform the concentration of business, and risks, among a few major players is changed by the concentration of a large portion of transactions in the new market infrastructures, the Central Counterparties (CCPs). This book, for the first time, analyses the regulatory response of the United Kingdom and the United States, the two largest centres of OTC derivatives transactions, and highlights their shortcomings. The book uses a normative risk-based approach to regulation as a methodological lens to analyse the UK regime of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market. It specifically focuses on prudential supervision and conduct of business rules governing OTC derivatives transactions and the move towards enhancing the use of central clearing. The resulting analysis, from a normative risk based approach, suggests that the UK regime for CCPs does not fulfil what would be expected if a coherent risk based approach was taken. Our comments on the Dodd-Frank Act highlight that the incoherent adoption of risk-based approach to regulation affects the effectiveness of the US regime for CCPs. Such a regime does not follow the pace of events of ‘innovation risk’; in particular, the foreseeable changes FinTech will bring to the OTCDM and central clearing services. The second inadequacy of the US regime concerns the dual regulatory structure of the CFTC and the SEC, and the inadequate adoption of different and not well-coordinated regulatory strategies. We also analyse the cross-border implications of the US regime for non-US CCPs that provide clearing services to US market participants. Finally, we study the negative effects of the absence of a clearly defined resolution regime for CCPs.

To mitigate systemic risk, some regulators have advocated the greater use of centralized counterparties (CCPs) to clear Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives trades. Regulators should be cognizant that large banks active in the OTC derivatives market do not hold collateral against all the positions in their trading book and the paper proves an estimate of this under-collateralization. Whatever collateral is held by banks is allowed to be rehypothecated (or re-used) to others. Since CCPs would require all positions to have collateral against them, off-loading a significant portion of OTC derivatives transactions to central counterparties (CCPs) would require large increases in posted collateral, possibly requiring large banks to raise more capital. These costs suggest that most large banks will be reluctant to offload their positions to CCPs, and the paper proposes an appropriate capital levy on remaining positions to encourage the transition.

This book takes the ISDA Master Agreement (including the Credit Support Annex) as the benchmark for any OTC Derivatives documentation negotiation and explains the relevant "DOs and DON'Ts" when it comes to the most commonly negotiated terms, providing sufficient background to help the reader make an informed decision in relation to important elections. Particular focus is on a number of areas that include but are not limited to: the ISDA modular structure: 1992 and 2002 versions, the ISDA Credit Support Annex (Title Transfer - English Law and Pledge - New York and Japanese Law), practical insights about negotiating the ISDA and CSA, the ISDA protocols and other documentation initiatives linked to EMIR and Dodd-Frank, OTC Clearing, FATCA, Asia-Pacific Regulatory overview, Give-up trading models and documentation. There is no pretention to provide the basis for the perfect negotiation strategy or approach, but there are enough negotiation tips, sample provisions and case law references to help the readers understand what is important, permissible and sensible so as to drive the negotiation effectively. The sample provisions and documentation presented in this book are for reference only and serve the sole purpose of explaining the inherent impact and significance of the underlying topics, risks and issues calling for the inclusion of certain terms. By no means this book should be read or seen as a collection of provisions or templates for general use.

The financial crisis of 2007–2009 exposed the weaknesses of the global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market such as limited transparency regarding risk exposures, poor counterparty risk management practices, and the risk of contagion arising from interconnectedness in this market. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators introduced worldwide legislative and regulatory changes aimed at increasing the transparency and stability of the financial markets. In this book, Dr. Olga Lewandowska explores those novel regulatory solutions and their impact. The main focus is on central counterparty (CCP) clearing that became mandatory for OTC derivatives under the new regulatory paradigm. In four research papers, she analyzes CCP from different risk perspectives and based on four diverse research methods. Her book offers a comprehensive assessment of the risk-reduction potential of the CCPs, their implications for the financial markets, and the practical challenges in the implementation of the recent financial market reforms.

After the credit crisis, supervisors enacted a range of financial reforms. In particular, they radically changed the nature of the OTC derivatives market via a number of measures, notably mandatory central clearing. This book discusses the market before the crisis, explains what central clearing is, and outlines the consequences of the new rules.