Paradoxes provide a vehicle for exposing misinterpretations and misapplications of accepted principles. This book discusses seven paradoxes surrounding probability theory. Some remain the focus of controversy; others have allegedly been solved, however the accepted solutions are demonstrably incorrect. Each paradox is shown to rest on one or more fallacies. Instead of the esoteric, idiosyncratic, and untested methods that have been brought to bear on these problems, the book invokes uncontroversial probability principles, acceptable both to frequentists and subjectivists. The philosophical disputation inspired by these paradoxes is shown to be misguided and unnecessary; for instance, startling claims concerning human destiny and the nature of reality are directly related to fallacious reasoning in a betting paradox, and a problem analyzed in philosophy journals is resolved by means of a computer program.​

It isn't that they can't see the solution. Approach your problems from the right end and begin with the answers. It is that they can't see the problem. Then one day, perhaps you will find G. K. Chesterton. The Scandal of the final question. Father Brown 'The point of a Pin'. 'The Hermit Clad in Crane Feathers' in R. van Gulik's The Chinese Maze Murders. Growing specialization and diversification have brought a host of mono graphs and textbooks on increasingly specialized topics. However, the "tree" of knowledge of mathematics and related fields does not grow only by putting forth new branches. It also happens, quite often in fact, that branches which were thought to be completely disparate are suddenly seen to be related. Further, the kind and level of sophistication of mathematics applied in various sciences has changed drastically in recent years: measure theory is used (nontrivially) in regional and theoretical economics; algebraic geometry interacts with physics; the Minkowski lemma, coding theory and the structure of water meet one another in packing and covering theory; quantum fields, crystal defects and mathematical programming profit from homotopy theory; Lie algebras are relevant to filtering; and prediction and electrical engineering can use Stein spaces. And in addition to this there are such new emerging subdisciplines as "experi mental mathematics", "CFD", "completely integrable systems", "chaos, synergetics and large-scale order", which are almost impossible to fit into the existing classification schemes.

"This is a valuable reference guide for readers interested in gaining a basic understanding of probability theory or its applications in problem solving in the other disciplines." —CHOICE Providing cutting-edge perspectives and real-world insights into the greater utility of probability and its applications, the Handbook of Probability offers an equal balance of theory and direct applications in a non-technical, yet comprehensive, format. Editor Tamás Rudas and the internationally-known contributors present the material in a manner so that researchers of various backgrounds can use the reference either as a primer for understanding basic probability theory or as a more advanced research tool for specific projects requiring a deeper understanding. The wide-ranging applications of probability presented make it useful for scholars who need to make interdisciplinary connections in their work. Key Features Contains contributions from the international who's-who of probability across several disciplines Offers an equal balance of theory and applications Explains the most important concepts of probability theory in a non-technical yet comprehensive way Provides in-depth examples of recent applications in the social and behavioral sciences as well as education, business, and law Intended Audience This Handbook makes an ideal library purchase. In addition, this volume should also be of interest to individual scholars in the social and behavioral sciences.

Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability brings together fifteen original essays by experts in philosophy and linguistics. These specially written chapters draw on themes from the work of Dorothy Edgington, the first woman to hold a chair in philosophy at the University of Oxford. The contributors to this volume focus on the key topics to which Edgington has made many important contributions, including conditionals, vagueness, the paradox of knowability, and probability. Their insights will be of interest to philosophers, linguists, and psychologists working in philosophical logic, natural language semantics, and reasoning.

The standard rules of probability can be interpreted as uniquely valid principles in logic. In this book, E. T. Jaynes dispels the imaginary distinction between 'probability theory' and 'statistical inference', leaving a logical unity and simplicity, which provides greater technical power and flexibility in applications. This book goes beyond the conventional mathematics of probability theory, viewing the subject in a wider context. New results are discussed, along with applications of probability theory to a wide variety of problems in physics, mathematics, economics, chemistry and biology. It contains many exercises and problems, and is suitable for use as a textbook on graduate level courses involving data analysis. The material is aimed at readers who are already familiar with applied mathematics at an advanced undergraduate level or higher. The book will be of interest to scientists working in any area where inference from incomplete information is necessary.

Philosophical Approaches to the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics consists of eleven articles addressing various aspects of the "roots" of logic and mathematics, their basic concepts and the mechanisms that work in the practice of their use.

Unlike mathematics, statistics deals with real-world data and involves a higher degree of subjectivity due to the role of interpretation. Interpretation is shaped by context as well as the knowledge, preferences, assumptions and preconceptions of the interpreter, leading to a variety of interpretations of concepts as well as results. Philosophies, Puzzles and Paradoxes: A Statistician’s Search for Truth thoroughly examines the distinct philosophical approaches to statistics – Bayesian, frequentist and likelihood – arising from different interpretations of probability and uncertainty. These differences are highlighted through numerous puzzles and paradoxes and illuminated by extensive discussions of the background philosophy of science. Features: Exploration of the philosophy of knowledge and truth and how they relate to deductive and inductive reasoning, and ultimately scientific and statistical thinking Discussion of the philosophical theories of probability that are wider than the standard Bayesian and frequentist views Exposition and examination of Savage’s axioms as the basis of subjective probability and Bayesian statistics Explanation of likelihood and likelihood-based inference, including the controversy surrounding the likelihood principle Discussion of fiducial probability and its evolution to confidence procedure Introduction of extended and hierarchical likelihood for random parameters, with the recognition of confidence as extended likelihood, leading to epistemic confidence as an objective measure of uncertainty for single events Detailed analyses and new variations of classic paradoxes, such as the Monty Hall puzzle, the paradox of the ravens, the exchange paradox, and more Substantive yet non-technical, catering to readers with only introductory exposure to the theory of probability and statistics This book primarily targets statisticians in general, including both undergraduate and graduate students, as well as researchers interested in the philosophical basis of probability and statistics. It is also suitable for philosophers of science and general readers intrigued by puzzles and paradoxes.

Paradoxes provide a vehicle for exposing misinterpretations and misapplications of accepted principles. This book discusses seven paradoxes surrounding probability theory. Some remain the focus of controversy; others have allegedly been solved, however the accepted solutions are demonstrably incorrect. Each paradox is shown to rest on one or more fallacies. Instead of the esoteric, idiosyncratic, and untested methods that have been brought to bear on these problems, the book invokes uncontroversial probability principles, acceptable both to frequentists and subjectivists. The philosophical disputation inspired by these paradoxes is shown to be misguided and unnecessary; for instance, startling claims concerning human destiny and the nature of reality are directly related to fallacious reasoning in a betting paradox, and a problem analyzed in philosophy journals is resolved by means of a computer program.​

N atur non facit saltus? This book is devoted to the fundamental problem which arises contin uously in the process of the human investigation of reality: the role of a mathematical apparatus in a description of reality. We pay our main attention to the role of number systems which are used, or may be used, in this process. We shall show that the picture of reality based on the standard (since the works of Galileo and Newton) methods of real analysis is not the unique possible way of presenting reality in a human brain. There exist other pictures of reality where other num ber fields are used as basic elements of a mathematical description. In this book we try to build a p-adic picture of reality based on the fields of p-adic numbers Qp and corresponding analysis (a particular case of so called non-Archimedean analysis). However, this book must not be considered as only a book on p-adic analysis and its applications. We study a much more extended range of problems. Our philosophical and physical ideas can be realized in other mathematical frameworks which are not obliged to be based on p-adic analysis. We shall show that many problems of the description of reality with the aid of real numbers are induced by unlimited applications of the so called Archimedean axiom.