This book explores how nuclear weapons influence conventional warfighting, through three case studies of countries not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Pakistan, India, and Israel. The author examines how decision makers choose a preferred pattern of war management, as well as how these choices affect conflicts, suggesting that nuclear weaponization constitutes a clear change in the relative power of countries. This distribution of power within the international system expands or reduces the selection of strategies or war management patterns available to members of the international community. However, historic traumatic events like military defeats, countries’ self-images, and images of enemies form the perceptions of decision makers regarding material power and change thereof, suggesting that choices of decision makers are not affected directly by changes in relative power relations, but rather through an intermediate level of strategic culture parameter.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), often referred to as “battlefield”, “sub-strategic”, or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, usually have a plutonium core and are typically distinct from strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, they warrant a separate consideration in the realm of nuclear security. The yield of such weapons is generally lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons and may range from the relatively low 0.1 kiloton to a few kilotons. Pakistan’s quest to acquire tactical nuclear weapons has added a dangerous dimension to the already precarious strategic equation in South Asia. The security discourse in the subcontinent revolves around the perennial apprehension of a conventional or sub-conventional conflict triggering a chain reaction, eventually paving the way for a potential nuclear crisis haunting peace and stability in the region. Pakistan believes that the successful testing of the 60-km nuclear-capable short-range m issile Hatf-9 (Nasr) “adds deterrence value to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development programme at shorter ranges.” In paradox, the fact remains that this step has further lowered Pakistan’s nuclear threshold through the likely use of TNWs. The introduction of TNWs into the tactical battle area further exacerbates credibility of their control. Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear doctrine, but it is well known that nuclear weapons are its first line of defence. The use of TNWs in the India-Pakistan case will alter the strategic scenario completely as Pakistan would threaten India with the use of TNWs in the event of New Delhi responding against Islamabad with a conventional strike in reaction to a 26/11-style terrorist attack. Pakistan forgets that given its offensive strategic posture and continuing involvement in terror strikes in India, it is New Delhi which is confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to counter Pakistan’s “first-strike” and proxy war in the light of its declared “no-first-use” policy. This edited volume attempts to address and decipher complex issues, including aspects such as China’s WMD collaboration with Pakistan, nuclear command and control dynamics within Pakistan, overall rationale and implications of TNWs, safety and security of nuclear weapons, scenarios for nuclear usage, India’s potential response options and, more specifically, the technical aspects of the Nasr delivery system.

A fully revised and updated new edition of this leading introduction to the theory and conduct of warfare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The book combines analysis of key concepts, theory and military doctrine with reference to relevant examples from history, and integrates the land, sea and air environments.

This book explores how nuclear weapons influence conventional warfighting, through three case studies of countries not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Pakistan, India, and Israel. The author examines how decision makers choose a preferred pattern of war management, as well as how these choices affect conflicts, suggesting that nuclear weaponization constitutes a clear change in the relative power of countries. This distribution of power within the international system expands or reduces the selection of strategies or war management patterns available to members of the international community. However, historic traumatic events like military defeats, countries’ self-images, and images of enemies form the perceptions of decision makers regarding material power and change thereof, suggesting that choices of decision makers are not affected directly by changes in relative power relations, but rather through an intermediate level of strategic culture parameter.

This anthology argues that facing the diverse threats in the 'new world disorder' requires a new look and new approaches. The requirement is to establish that contemporary deterrence demands replacing the old 'nuclear theology' with new policy and strategy to deal with the myriad state, non-state, and trans-national nuclear and non-nuclear menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away.

"The chapters in the book have been discussed in two workshops devoted to a reexamination of Western security problems : the first was held in Ebenhausen near Munich in March, 1975, and organized by the Foundation for Science and Politics. The second took place in Copenhagen in September, 1975 and was organized by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs."--Editors' Preface.

This series started in 1981 with the Erice Seminars when the danger of a nuclear East-West confrontation was menacing the world. The volumes reproduce the crucial steps, from the Nuclear Winter to the Strategic Defense Initiative. After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., new emergencies are now to be faced such as the danger of proliferation of Weapons for Mass Destruction (WMD), the North-South confrontation on ecological problems and the new deal for Science and Technology to help developing countries in their struggle for a better standard of life. The Erice Seminars have attracted the attention of world leaders in Science, Technology and Culture.