Peace and Power in Cold War Britain explores the ban the bomb and anti-Vietnam War movements from the perspective of media history, focusing in particular on the relationship between radicalism and the rise of television. In doing so, it addresses two questions, both of which seem to recur with each major breakthrough in communications technology: what do advances in communications media mean for democratic participation in politics and how do distinctive types of media condition the very nature of that participation itself? In answering these, the book views the ban the bomb and anti-Vietnam War movements in relation to communication power and media discourse. It highlights how these movements intersected with parts of public life that were being transformed by television themselves, shaping struggles for social change among activists and public intellectuals on the streets, in the Labour Party and in the law courts. The significance of this relationship between media and movements was complex and wide-ranging. Christopher R. Hill demonstrates that it contributed to the enrichment of democracy in Cold War Britain, with radicals serving to innovate and pioneer creative forms of political expression from both in and outside of media organisations. However, the movements increasingly succumbed to news coverage and values that revolved around human interest and violence, feeding into the revolutionary spectacle of 1968 and the turn towards identity politics.

This book shows that the connected histories of decolonization and globalization concern the practices of individuals and movements as much as they do the ideologies of states, institutions and organizations. Viewing decolonization through non-state activist practices, and setting anti-colonial solidarity in the context of the methods of contemporary global peace movements, it argues that seemingly marginal histories can illuminate aspects of the end of empire that are not readily apparent in studies centred on state diplomacy and nationalist movements. Focusing on a group of British and American activists, including the pacifist campaigner A.J. Muste, the anti-apartheid priest Michael Scott and the civil rights organiser Bayard Rustin, Skinner explores connected global histories of anti-nuclear peace campaigns, anti-colonialism and decolonization to illuminate new perspectives on the end of empire and the Cold War. Studying a failed attempt to infiltrate the French atom bomb test site in southern Algeria, and a mass march across the border between Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia that never took place, these stories provide valuable insights into the interactions between local and global scales of historical experience. In presenting these histories, this book demonstrates how global and transnational histories can challenge and disrupt, rather than reinforce hierarchies of power and privileges. In doing so, it also contributes to ongoing debates surrounding the nature of decolonization as a historical phenomenon by focusing on the practices of activism that shaped - and were shaped by – the political and intellectual structures of decolonization.

Intelligence services form an important but controversial part of the modern state. Drawing mainly on British and American examples, this book provides an analytic framework for understanding the 'intelligence community' and assessing its value. The author, a former senior British intelligence officer, describes intelligence activities, the purposes which the system serves, and the causes and effects of its secrecy. He considers 'intelligence failure' and how organisation and management can improve the chances of success. Using parallels with the information society and the current search for efficiency in public administration as a whole, the book explores the issues involved in deciding how much intelligence is needed and discusses the kinds of management necessary. In his conclusions Michael Herman discusses intelligence's national value in the post-Cold War world. He also argues that it has important contributions to make to international security, but that its threat-inducing activities should be kept in check.

This edited volume focuses on the use of ‘necessary condition counterfactuals’ in explaining two key events in twentieth century history, the origins of the First World War and the end of the Cold War. Containing essays by leading figures in the field, this book analyzes the causal logics of necessary and sufficient conditions, demonstrates the variety of different ways in which necessary condition counterfactuals are used to explain the causes of individual events, and identifies errors commonly made in applying this form of causal logic to individual events. It includes discussions of causal chains, contingency, critical junctures, and ‘powder keg’ explanations, and the role of necessary conditions in each. Explaining War and Peace will be of great interest to students of qualitative analysis, the First World War, the Cold War, international history and international relations theory in general.

"The notion that every state has an interest in the territorial integrity of every other state-no matter how distant they are and how slight their connections-is peculiar to the twentieth century. To be sure, poets and philosophers had perceived humanity's common interest in preventing wars, and statesmen had found that aggression from outside the community could be deterred by the mutual defense of those within it. But no one had ever tried to organize an all-embracing system that used the collective force of its members to prevent one of them from attacking another. It took the wide devastation of two world wars-and the failure of the balance-of-power systems that preceded them-to instigate the search for a more effective way to manage power. To the founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations there was nothing extravagant about the idea that peace is indivisible. Their countries had been drawn into wars that were largely not of their making: They had learned that to control their destinies they must act early, with others, to keep the peace. It is this core of national self-interest that drives collective security. If the system works at any moment in history, it is because its members believe they have enough stake in the existing order to warrant taking measures against any nation that threatens to destroy the fabric of that order. "

The third volume in a magisterial five-volume study of the political economy of American warfare.