Drawing on classical Husserlian resources as well as existentialist and hermeneutical approaches, this book argues that critique is largely a question of method. It demonstrates that phenomenological discussions of acute social and political problems draw from a rich tradition of radically critical investigations in epistemology, social ontology, political theory, and ethics. The contributions show that contemporary phenomenological investigations of various forms of oppression and domination develop new critical-analytical tools that complement those of competing theoretical approaches, such as analytics of power, critical theory, and liberal philosophy of justice. More specifically, the chapters pay close attention to the following methodological themes: the conditions for the possibility of phenomenology as critique; critique as radical reflection and free thinking; eidetic analysis and reflection of transcendental facticity and contingency of the self, of others, of the world; phenomenology and immanent critique; the self-reflective dimensions of phenomenology; and phenomenological analysis and self-transfermation and world transformation. All in all, the book explicates the multiple critical resources phenomenology has to offer, precisely in virtue of its distinctive methods and methodological commitments, and thus shows its power in tackling timely issues of social injustice. Phenomenology as Critique: Why Method Matters will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in phenomenology, Continental philosophy, and critical theory.

​This edited collection discusses phenomenological critiques of formalism and their relevance to the problem of responsibility and the life-world. The book deals with themes of formalization of knowledge in connection to the life-world, the natural world, the history of science and our responsibility for both our epistemic claims and the world in which we live. Readers will discover critiques of formalization, the life-world and responsibility, and a collation and comparison of Patočka’s and Husserl’s work on these themes. Considerable literature on Husserl is presented here and the two themes of epistemic responsibility and the life-world are discussed together. This work specifically emphasizes the interrelatedness of these existential aspects of his work – self-responsibility and the crisis – as not only epistemological, but also related to human life. This volume also introduces Jan Patočka to English-speaking readers as a phenomenologist in his own right. Patočka shows us, in particular, the significance of the modern abyss between our thinking and the world. Readers will discover that this abyss is of concern for our everyday experience because it leads to a rupture in our understanding of the world: between the world of our living and its scientific construct. We see that Patočka continually emphasized the relevance of Husserl’s work to existential questions relating to human responsibility and the life-world, which he admits is left largely implicit in Husserl’s work. This edited collection will spark discussion on the question of responsibility against the backdrop of formalized knowledge which is increasingly inaccessible to human understanding. Despite the complexity of some of the analyzed ideas, this book discusses these themes in a clear and readable way. This work is scholarly, exact in its discussion and authoritative in its reading, but at the same time accessible to anyone motivated to understand these debates.

"[A] magnificent work... that will definitely shape the discussion on Derrida for years to come." -- Rodolphe Gasché What is the nature of the relationship of Jacques Derrida and deconstruction to Edmund Husserl and phenomenology? Is deconstruction a radical departure from phenomenology or does it trace its origins to the phenomenological project? In Derrida and Husserl, Leonard Lawlor illuminates Husserl's influence on the French philosophical tradition that inspired Derrida's thought. Beginning with Eugen Fink's pivotal essay on Husserl's philosophy, Lawlor carefully reconstructs the conceptual context in which Derrida developed his interpretation of Husserl. Lawlor's investigations of the work of Jean Cavaillà ̈s, Tran-Duc-Thao, and Jean Hyppolite, as well as recent texts by Derrida, reveal the depth of Derrida's relationship to Husserl's phenomenology. Along the way, Lawlor revisits and sheds light on the origin of many important Derridean concepts, such as deconstruction, the metaphysics of presence, différance, intentionality, the trace, and spectrality.

Previously considered two different strands within continental thought, this book compares and contrasts Hegel's 'phenomenology' and Foucault's 'genealogy', contending that in spite of their differences, these approaches share important commonalities, most notably in the manner in which they dispense with distinctions between subject and object, theory and praxis, mind and body, and reason and nature, thus pointing the way to a form of social and political theorizing without presuppositions. Considering the possibility of developing a dialectical approach of 'phenomenology' and 'genealogy', this volume develops our understanding of critical theory, whilst engaging in debates concerning truth and knowledge in the philosophy of the social sciences. A rich exploration of the significance and implications of Hegel's 'phenomenology' and Foucault's 'genealogy' for the social sciences, it will be of interest to philosophers, as well as to social and political theorists.

The relationship between these two central theoretical and philosophical approaches, which we thought we knew, is more complex and interesting than our standard story might suggest. It is not always clear how hermeneutics-that is, post-Heideggerian hermeneutics as articulated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and a large number of thinkers working under their influence-regards the phenomenological tradition, be it in its Husserlian or various post-Husserlian formulations. This volume inquires into this issue both in general, conceptual terms and through specific analyses into questions of ontology and metaphysics, science, language, theology, and imagination. With a substantial editors' introduction, the volume contains 15 chapters, from some of the most significant scholars in this field covering the essential questions about the history, present and future of these two disciplines. The volume will be of interest to any philosopher or student with an interest in developing a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of contemporary hermeneutics and phenomenology.

The following is neither exclusively the study of a philosopher nor a problem, and yet is both as well. Alfred Schutz is now recogniz ed to have been a profoundly insightful philosopher who explor ed the nature of social reality and the social sciences. His works are exercising a great influence in a wide range of problems and disciplines, the latter including the social sciences themselves. All of this is testimony to the sagacity and penetrating character of his analyses as well as the fruitfulness and soundness of his con cepts. Philosophy proceeds, however, by not merely accepting the work of great philosophers, but by engaging them in critical philosophic dialogue. It is time for this interchange to begin with respect to Schutz's work. To some extent, then, this work is di rected to that task. It does not undertake a systematic treat ment of the whole of Schutz's philosophy, for much more work in many aspects of his thought is yet to be done before such a pro ject can reasonably be undertaken. Yet, the issue of concern in this study is, I now believe, the philosophic center of the whole of Schutz's work.

3 same lecture he characterizes the phenomenology of knowledge, more specifically, as the "theory of the essence of the pure phenomenon of knowing" (see below, p. 36). Such a phenomenology would advance the "critique of knowledge," in which the problem of knowledge is clearly formulated and the possibility of knowledge rigorously secured. It is important to realize, however, that in these lectures Husserl will not enact, pursue, or develop a phenomenological critique of knowledge, even though he opens with a trenchant statement of the problem of knowledge that such a critique would solve. Rather, he seeks here only to secure the possibility of a phe nomenological critique of knowledge; that is, he attempts to secure the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge, not the possibil ity of knowledge in general (see below, pp. 37-39). Thus the work before us is not phenomenological in the straightforward sense, but pre phenomenological: it sets out to identify and satisfy the epistemic require ments of the phenomenological critique of knowledge, not to carry out that critique itself. To keep these two levels of theoretical inquiry distinct, I will call the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of knowledge the "critical level"; the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge the "meta-criticallevel.

Religious and atheistic belief are presented anew in a volume of essays from leading phenomenologists in both France and the UK. Atheism, often presented as the negation of religious belief, is here engaged with from a phenomenologically informed notion of experience. The focus on experience, sparks new debates in readings of belief, faith and atheism as they relate to and complicate each other. What unites the contributors is their relationship to phenomenology as it has developed in France in the wake of Heidegger and Husserl. Leading French intellectuals from this context, Jean-Luc Nancy, Quentin Meillassoux, and Catherine Malabou, amongst others, contribute arresting ideas on atheistic faith, the death of God, and anarchic faith, opening up new areas of understanding in a field whose parameters and core concepts are ever shifting. Revealing the extent to which religious and atheistic belief must be seen to influence, and on a fundamental level, to co-create one another, the pluralistic society in which religious belief is counted as one option amongst many is given primacy. The fact that religious faith has become not only optional but also, in many contexts, strangely alienated from society, deeply modifies the experience of the believer as much as that of the non-believer. A focus on 'experience', over and above 'belief', moves us towards a mode of experiential knowledge which refuses to privilege the atheistic believer and deride the reality of religious belief.

The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.

Phenomenology is one of the leading movements in twentieth-century philosophy and continues to exert a strong influence on many contemporary philosophical traditions and investigations. In recent years, phenomenological insights have been increasingly developed in relation to philosophy of illness, disability, race, gender, sexuality, and politics, leading to the emergence of critical phenomenology as a new, prominent field for interdisciplinary research. Magrì and McQueen's Critical Phenomenology: An Introduction is the first book of its kind, addressing the critical questions at the core of both classical and contemporary phenomenology. This book provides a concise, accessible introduction to key areas of phenomenological research, such as intersubjectivity, bodily experience, race, gender, social experience, and political action. In doing so, it demonstrates both the rich history of phenomenology and its continuing philosophical and ethical importance. This textbook will be essential reading for undergraduate philosophy students and academics interested in critical phenomenology.