Challenging and rewarding in equal measure, Phenomenology of Perception is Merleau-Ponty's most famous work. Impressive in both scope and imagination, it uses the example of perception to return the body to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato. Drawing on case studies such as brain-damaged patients from the First World War, Merleau-Ponty brilliantly shows how the body plays a crucial role not only in perception but in speech, sexuality and our relation to others.

Phenomenology of Perception: Theories and Experimental Evidence reconstructs and reviews the phenomenological research of the Brentano School, Edgar Rubin, David Katz, Albert Michotte and Gestalt psychology. Phenomenology is commonly considered a philosophy of subjective experience, but this book presents it instead as a set of commitments for philosophy and science to discover the immanent grammar underlying the objective meaning of perception. Pioneering experimental results on the qualitative and quantitative structures of the perceptual world are collected to show that, contrary to the received assumption, phenomenology can be embedded in standard science. This book will therefore be of interest not only to phenomenologists but also to anyone concerned with epistemological and empirical issues in contemporary psychology and the cognitive sciences.

This is an advanced introduction to and original interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's greatest work, Phenomenology of Perception. Timothy Mooney provides a clear and compelling exposition of the theory of our projective being in the world, and demonstrates as never before the centrality of the body schema in the theory. Thanks to the schema's motor intentionality our bodies inhabit and appropriate space: our postures and perceptual fields are organised schematically when we move to realise our projects. Thus our lived bodies are ineliminably expressive in being both animated and outcome oriented through-and-through. Mooney also analyses the place of the work in the modern philosophical world, showing what Merleau-Ponty takes up from the Kantian and Phenomenological traditions and what he contributes to each. Casting a fresh light on his magnum opus, this book is essential reading for all those interested in the philosophy and phenomenology of the body.

This book aims to guide its reader through the notorious difficulties of Merleau-Pony's famous "Phenomenology of Perception". The author contextualizes, reconstructs, clarifies and, where necessary, completes Merleau-Ponty's analyses chapter by chapter.

In volume I, Kleinberg-Levin interprets five key words in Heidegger’s project. In this second volume, he illuminates their significance for Heidegger’s phenomenology of perception and his philosophy of history. At stake is the possibility of a new experience and understanding of being. Taking us beyond the metaphysical understanding of being, Heidegger proposes to introduce a new key word Seyn (beyng). Beyng is the Da-sein-appropriating event in which a clearing occurs as an open dimension for the time-space interplay of concealment and unconcealment, an interplay within which beings are experienced in regard to the various modes and inflections of presence and absence that the grammar of temporalities articulates. Concentrating on the appropriation of seeing and hearing as capacities and capabilities bearing promising potentialities that could be developed, Kleinberg-Levin examines seeing and hearing in the context of Heidegger’s critique of the history of metaphysics, wherein vision has served as paradigm for knowledge, truth, and reality. He shows that, in Heidegger’s philosophy of history, seeing and hearing are given a role in the transformation of the character of humanity, redeeming their own inherent potential. Perceptual experience has undergone accelerating processes of deformation and reification, encouraging a disposition that makes it serve technological and technocratic imperatives; but we might begin to redeem the promising potential in seeing and hearing, turning their damaged and dehumanized character, and their violence, towards the creation of a new planetary existence—what Heidegger imagines through the topology of the fourfold: earth and sky, mortals and the gods who embody our ideals. In this project, we are put in question by a responsibility that summons us, in our seeing and hearing, to the response-abilities most befitting our historically shared sense of an achieved humanity.

This book aims to guide its reader through the notorious difficulties of Merleau-Pony's famous "Phenomenology of Perception". The author contextualizes, reconstructs, clarifies and, where necessary, completes Merleau-Ponty's analyses chapter by chapter.

In the philosophical literature, it is customary to think of perception as being assessable with respect to epistemic norms. E.g., the whole discussion around disjunctivism, which is now often considered to be the dominant, if not the default position in philosophy of perception, is, by and large, framed and motivated by epistemological concerns about truth and falsity. This book argues that perception is normative in another, more fundamental sense. Perception is governed by norms that Doyon calls perceptual, that is, immanent to its own structure. This does not mean that perceptual norms are cut-off from external facts; it rather means that they are constitutive moments of our experience of these facts. Perceptual norms are, in that sense, constitutive or enabling norms in that they establish what perception is. To articulate this view, he draws in the repertoire of the phenomenological tradition, in the work of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in particular. Like Kant, both phenomenologists were concerned with the question of the unity of experience and sought to identify the conditions of possibility for having a perception, which they conceive not as a mere sensible experience of the outer world, but as a continuous and meaningful experience of reality. Unlike Kant, however, neither phenomenologist immediately identified these conditions with cognition or epistemic criteria. For both phenomenologists, perception has its own standards, its own conditions of possibility. Perception obtains when it unfolds concordantly or coherently; and when the perceptual progression corresponds to or is in harmony with one's goal or interest, perception can also be said to be optimal. From the phenomenological point of view, concordance (Einstimmigkeit) and optimality (Optimalit?t) are the two basic perceptual norms governing over perceptual experience, and much of the book is devoted to clarifying their meaning and to address the philosophical consequences that follow from this insight.

This collection of essays by scholars from Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America offers new perspectives of the phenomenological investigation of experiential life on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology. Not only well-known works of Husserl are interpreted from new angles, but also the latest volumes of the Husserliana are closely examined. In a variety of ways, the contributors explore the emergence of reason in experience that is disclosed in the very regions that are traditionally considered to be “irrational” or “pre-rational.” The leading idea of such explorations is Husserl’s view that perception, affectivity, and volition are regarded as the three aspects of reason. Without affectivity, which is supposedly irrational, no rationality can be established in the spheres of representation and volition, whereas volitional and representational acts consistently structure the process of affective experience. In such a framework, it is also shown that theoretical and practical reason are inseparably intertwined. Thus, the papers collected here can be regarded as a collaborative phenomenological investigation into the entanglement and mutual dependency of the supposedly “rational” and the “irrational” as well as that of the “practical” and the “theoretical.”

This Oxford Handbook offers a broad critical survey of the development of phenomenology, one of the main streams of philosophy since the nineteenth century. It comprises thirty-seven specially written chapters by leading figures in the field, which highlight historical influences, connections and developments, and offer a better comprehension and assessment of the continuity as well as diversity of the phenomenological tradition. The handbook is divided into three distinct parts. The first part addresses the way phenomenology has been influenced by earlier periods or figures in the history of philosophy. The second part contains chapters targeting prominent phenomenologists: How was their work affected by earlier figures, how did their own views change over time, and what kind of influence did they exert on subsequent thinkers? The contributions in the third part trace various core topics such as subjectivity, intersubjectivity, embodiment, spatiality, imagination etc. in the work of different phenomenologists, in order to explore how the notions were transformed, enriched, and expanded up through the century. This volume will be a source of insight for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the phenomenological tradition. It is an authoritative guide to how phenomenology started, how it developed, and where it is heading.

Finding Grace with God: A Phenomenological Reading of the Annunciation engages in an interweaving of phenomenology, mystical theology, and feminist philosophy to unfold a theopoetic interpretation of the narrative of the Annunciation in the Gospel of Luke. It begins with a discussion of the foundational phenomenologies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and then moves to the more recent work of several French phenomenologists, including Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Louis Chretien, and Michel Henry. The interpretation is then expanded through the philosophies of Luce Irigaray, Jean-Luc Marion, and Jacques Derrida. Finally, the phenomenologies of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger provide a means to interpret the Annunciation through theopoetics, as a text that is infused with possibility. Mary, filled with grace, is beckoned by the divine into possibility; responding in grace, she in turn beckons the divine into possibility. Transgressing the limits of language, this possibility slips into apophasis--into a moment of Gelassenheit, a mutual "letting-be" or releasement of Mary and the divine into a mystical union of love, a love that becomes manifest through a gift of life.