This book presents an account and defense of Wittgenstein's later philosophy emphasizing its therapeutic character. Peterman argues that any therapeutic philosophy must present an account of human health, a related account of the mechanisms of health and illness, and finally an account of how philosophy can bring someone from a state of illness to health. In light of this general model, he presents an interpretation of Wittgenstein's therapeutic project that emphasizes the continuity between it and the earlier ethical project of the Tractatus. The book confronts the problem of continuity by arguing that the earlier ethical goal of coming into agreement with the world as such is replaced in the later views by the therapeutic goal of coming into agreement with forms of life. In the course of the argument, Peterman challenges standard interpretations of Wittgenstein's project and standard modes of criticizing and defending it. The book also contributes to contemporary philosophical discussion by showing why we should take seriously the project of philosophical therapy.

In Philosophy's Role in Counseling and Psychotherapy, Peter Raabe argues that philosophy is an effective method in treating mental illness. Calling for a paradigm shift away from the standard belief that the brain and mind are identical Raabe argues that so-called “mental illnesses” such as depression and schizophrenia are not the actual causes of psychological misery. Instead, they are just labels for symptoms. For example, the word “depression” is merely a label attached to a collection of symptoms such as sadness, hopelessness, and low self-esteem. Raabe posits that distressing or painful life events can cause symptoms that are often clinically labeled as the mental illness of depression. The suffering brought on by painful life events can often be alleviated with helpful discussions, and without resorting to medications. Because philosophy is the foremost form of discussion, it means that the suffering that is labeled mental illness can be treated and even cured with philosophy. Raabe ultimately concludes that philosophy is beneficial in three ways: it can prevent the onset of a so-called mental illness in the person who studies it, it can be used to help individuals suffering from the distress that is labeled “mental illness,” and it will enhance the competence of the counselor or therapist who practices it.

This book challenges the unchallenged methods in medicine, such as "evidence-based medicine," which claim to be, but often are not, scientific. It completes medical care by adding the comprehensive humanistic perspectives and philosophy of medicine. No specific or absolute recommendations are given regarding medical treatment, moral approaches, or legal advice. Given rather is discussion about each issue involved and the strongest arguments indicated. Each argument is subject to further critical analysis. This is the same position as with any philosophical, medical or scientific view. The argument that decision-making in medicine is inadequate unless grounded on a philosophy of medicine is not meant to include all of philosophy and every philosopher. On the contrary, it includes only sound, practical and humanistic philosophy and philosophers who are creative and critical thinkers and who have concerned themselves with the topics relevant to medicine. These would be those philosophers who engage in practical philosophy, such as the pragmatists, humanists, naturalists, and ordinary-language philosophers. A new definition of our own philosophy of life emerges and it is necessary to have one. Good lifestyle no longer means just abstaining from cigarettes, alcohol and getting exercise. It also means living a holistic life, which includes all of one's thinking, personality and actions. This book also includes new ways of thinking. In this regard the "Metaphorical Method" is explained, used, and exemplified in depth, for example in the chapters on care, egoism and altruism, letting die, etc.

This exciting new edition of The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) demonstrates how techniques and concepts from Socratic philosophy, especially Stoicism, can be integrated into the practise of CBT and other forms of psychotherapy. What can we learn about psychological therapy from ancient philosophers? Psychotherapy and philosophy were not always separate disciplines. Here, Donald Robertson explores the relationship between ancient Greek philosophy and modern cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy. The founders of CBT described Stoicism as providing the "philosophical origins" of their approach and many parallels can be found between Stoicism and CBT, in terms of both theory and practise. Starting with hypnotism and early twentieth century rational psychotherapy and continuing through early behaviour therapy, rational-emotive behaviour therapy (REBT), and cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), the links between Stoic philosophy and modern psychotherapy are identified and explained. This book is the first detailed account of the influence of Stoic philosophy upon modern psychotherapy. It provides a fascinating insight into the revival of interest in ancient Western philosophy as a guide to modern living. It includes many concepts and techniques, which can be readily applied in modern psychotherapy or self-help. This new edition, covering the growth in third-wave CBT, including mindfulness and acceptance-based therapies, will appeal to any mental health practitioner working in this area, as well as students and scholars of these fields.

Can philosophy help ordinary people confront their personal or interpersonal problems of living? Can it help a couple whose marriage is on the rocks, or someone going through a midlife crisis, or someone depressed over the death of a significant other, or who suffers from anxiety about making a life change? These and many other behavioral and emotional problems are ordinarily referred to psychologists, psychiatrists, clinical social workers, or other mental health specialists. Less mainstream is the possibility of consulting a philosophical counselor or practitioner. Yet, there is presently a steadily increasing, world-wide movement among individuals with postgraduate credentials in philosophy to harness their philosophical training and skills in helping others to address their life problems. But is this channeling of philosophy outside the classroom into the arena of life a good idea? Are philosophers, as such, competent to handle all or any of the myriad emotional and behavioral problems that arise in the context of life; or should these matters best be left to those trained in psychological counseling or psychotherapy? Through a diverse and contrasting set of readings authored by prominent philosophers, philosophical counselors, and psychologists, this volume carefully explores the nature of philosophical counseling or practice and its relationship to psychological counseling and psychotherapy. Digging deeply into this relational question, this volume aims to spark more rational reflection, and greater sensitivity and openness to the potential contributions of philosophical practice. It is, accordingly, intended for students, teachers, scholars, and practitioners of philosophy, counseling, or psychotherapy; as well as those interested in knowing more about philosophical counseling or practice.

Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems about the mind and perception, and on thinkers including Locke, Berkeley and Ayer, the book demonstrates how such autonomous habits of thought systematically generate unsound intuitions and philosophical delusions.

This book shows that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophical methods can be fruitfully applied to several problems in contemporary moral philosophy. The author considers Wittgenstein’s ethical views and addresses such topics as meta-ethics, objectivity in ethics and moral perception. Readers will gain an insight into how Wittgenstein thought about philosophical problems and a new way of looking at moral questions. The book consists of three parts. In the first part, Wittgenstein’s later philosophical methods are discussed, including his comparison of philosophical methods to therapies. The book then goes on to explore how these methods give insight into Wittgenstein’s ethical views. Readers will see how these are better understood when read in the light of his later philosophical thought. In the third part, Wittgenstein’s later methods are applied to problems in contemporary moral philosophy, including a look at questions for moral advice. The author reviews and criticizes some of the secondary literature on Wittgenstein’s later philosophical methods and indicates how the topic of the book can be developed in future research. There is something of value for readers of all levels in this insightful and well written volume. It will particularly appeal to scholars and students of Wittgenstein, of philosophy, and of ethics.

Offering a fresh take on the purpose of social studies today, James A. Duplass positions philosophical counseling as a way for teachers to engage students in thinking deeply about what it means to be a citizen in a democratic society. The Idea of a Social Studies Education takes a uniquely humanistic approach to the idea of a social studies education to show how teachers can act as philosophical counselors in preparing students for active civic engagement. Duplass reminds the reader of the needs of students in modern society who seek to develop an identity worth living and the role social studies can play in students achieving that process. By focusing on the cultivation of students’ autonomy, authenticity, efficacy, and agency, Duplass’ approach avoids political biases and instead encourages critical thinking to decipher what a democratic ideology truly is.

In the last fifty years the field of Late Antiquity has advanced significantly. Today we have a picture of this period that is more precise and accurate than before. However, the study of one of the most significant texts of this age, Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy, has not benefited enough from these advances in scholarship. Antonio Donato aims to fill this gap by investigating how the study of the Consolation can profit from the knowledge of Boethius' cultural, political and social background that is available today. The book focuses on three topics: Boethius' social/political background, his notion of philosophy and its sources, and his understanding of the relation between Christianity and classical culture. These topics deal with issues that are of crucial importance for the exegesis of the Consolation. The study of Boethius' social/political background allows us to gain a better understanding of the identity of the character Boethius and to recognize his role in the Consolation. Examination of the possible sources of Boethius' notion of philosophy and of their influence on the Consolation offers valuable instruments to evaluate the role of the text's philosophical discussions and their relation to its literary features. Finally, the long-standing problem of the lack of overt Christian elements in the Consolation can be enlightened by considering how Boethius relies on a peculiar understanding of philosophy's goal and its relation to Christianity that was common among some of his predecessors and contemporaries.

An examination of the ways in which late medieval lyric poetry can be seen to engage with contemporary medical theory. This book argues that late medieval love poets, from Petrarch to Machaut and Charles d'Orléans, exploit scientific models as a broad framework within which to redefine the limits of the lyric subject and his body. Just as humoraltheory depends upon principles of likes and contraries in order to heal, poetry makes possible a parallel therapeutic system in which verbal oppositions and substitutions counter or rewrite received medical wisdom. The specific case of blindness, a disability that according to the theories of love that predominated in the late medieval West foreclosed the possibility of love, serves as a laboratory in which to explore poets' circumvention of the logical limits of contemporary medical theory. Reclaiming the power of remedy from physicians, these late medieval French and Italian poets prompt us to rethink not only the relationship between scientific and literary authority at the close of the middle ages, but, more broadly speaking, the very notion of therapy. Julie Singer is Assistant Professor of French at Washington University, St Louis.