In recent times a new dialogue has begun between the natural sciences and the humanities. This is particularly true of physics and philosophy, whose sphere of mutual interest expanded significantly with the advent of quantum mechanics. Among other topics, the discussion covers the evolution of theories, the role of mathematics in the physical sciences, the perception and cognition of nature and definitions of space and time. In contrast to the custom of the last two centuries, mathematics - the language of physics - is once again finding a respected place in the discourse of philosophers. The interdisciplinary communication between philosophers, mathematicians and physicists will be given new impetus by the thoughtful and wide-ranging contributions to this book.

In selecting the papers for this volume I have excluded all physics papers proper. I have further omitted all book rev.iews. Instead, I have included two papers not published previously; they are marked by an asterisk (*) in the table of contents. Since many of the papers were occasioned by Symposia or similar gatherings their chronological order is rather accidental. Hence I have tried to group the papers thematically into four parts. Within each part the order of sequence is from the more general to the more special, or from a more popular to a more technical treatment. The same principle has been applied to the sequential order of the parts. The foundational papers on quantum mechanics have been arranged in a somewhat dif ferent manner. Chapters XVI-XIX are concerned with the logic of complementarity while in Chapters XX-XXII a more radical recon ceptualization is carried out. Two of the older papers (Chapters VI and VIII) have been revised to bring them more into line with present terminology. Other papers have been corrected by additions and omissions. Additions are marked by square brackets [ ], while double square brackets [[ II signify omis sions or parts to be omitted. Hence [[A]] [B] means that 'A' should be replaced by 'B'. The heading of one paper (Chapter XX) has been changed to make it more descriptive.

How did early modern philosophy of space shape the modern concept of political universalism? In this book, Pablo Bustinduy persuasively argues that political universalism emerged from both the developments of Newtonian science and the formulation of the modern philosophy of the State. In the metaphysics of an open, empty, abstract and absolute space, Bustinduy suggests, the universalist project of modern politics found its logical model and foundation. There, the anxiety of a dislocated world was overcome, and the ontology of modern physics found a specific political expression that, despite being besieged by multiple crises, still animates our political imagination. By offering a political reading of early modern philosophy of space, Space and Political Universalism in Early Modern Physics and Philosophy reveals the connections between the logical development of early modern science, the contemporary elaborations of the philosophy of the State, and the historical articulations of the Westphalian system, early capitalist social formations, and the European colonial project. In doing so, it offers a powerful reflection on how we might detach democracy from the 'perilous metaphysics' of infinite space that has engendered political violence and domination, positing space as an emptiness that prevents the closure of the political itself.

Foundational questions in logic, mathematics, computer science and physics are constant sources of epistemological debate in contemporary philosophy. To what extent is the transfinite part of mathematics completely trustworthy? Why is there a general `malaise' concerning the logical approach to the foundations of mathematics? What is the role of symmetry in physics? Is it possible to build a coherent worldview compatible with a macroobjectivistic position and based on the quantum picture of the world? What account can be given of opinion change in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions discussed in this volume, which collects 14 lectures on the foundation of science given at the School of Philosophy of Science, Trieste, October 1989. The volume will be of particular interest to any student or scholar engaged in interdisciplinary research into the foundations of science in the context of contemporary debates.

Foundational questions in logic, mathematics, computer science and physics are constant sources of epistemological debate in contemporary philosophy. To what extent is the transfinite part of mathematics completely trustworthy? Why is there a general malaise' concerning the logical approach to the foundations of mathematics? What is the role of symmetry in physics? Is it possible to build a coherent worldview compatible with a macroobjectivistic position and based on the quantum picture of the world? What account can be given of opinion change in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions discussed in this volume, which collects 14 lectures on the foundation of science given at the School of Philosophy of Science, Trieste, October 1989. The volume will be of particular interest to any student or scholar engaged in interdisciplinary research into the foundations of science in the context of contemporary debates.

Using simple physical examples, this work by Erhard Scheibe presents an important and powerful approach to the reduction of physical theories. Novel to the approach is that it is not based, as usual, on a single reduction concept that is fixed once and for all, but on a series of recursively constructed reductions, with which all reductions appear as combinations of very specific elementary reductions. This leaves the general notion of theory reduction initially open and is beneficial for the treatment of the difficult cases of reduction from the fields of special and general relativity, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics,and quantum mechanics, which are treated in the second volume. The book is systematically organized and intended for readers interested in philosophy of science as well as physicists without deep philosophical knowledge.

How do mathematics, philosophy, and theology intersect? In Ideas at the Intersection of Mathematics, Philosophy, and Theology, Carlos Bovell proposes a wide range of possibilities. In a series of eleven thought-provoking essays, the author explores such topics as the place of mathematics in the work of Husserl and Heidegger, the importance of infinity for the Christian conception of God, and the impact of Gšdel's Theorem on the Westminster Confession of Faith. This book will appeal to readers with backgrounds in mathematics, philosophy, and theology and can be used in core, interdisciplinary modules that contain a math component.

In recent years, many philosophers of modern physics came to the conclusion that the problem of how objectivity is constituted (rather than merely given) can no longer be avoided, and therefore that a transcendental approach in the spirit of Kant is now philosophically relevant. The usual excuse for skipping this task is that the historical form given by Kant to transcendental epistemology has been challenged by Relativity and Quantum Physics. However, the true challenge is not to force modern physics into a rigidly construed static version of Kant’s philosophy, but to provide Kant’s method with flexibility and generality. In this book, the top specialists of the field pin down the methodological core of transcendental epistemology that must be used in order to throw light on the foundations of modern physics. First, the basic tools Kant used for his transcendental reading of Newtonian Mechanics are examined, and then early transcendental approaches of Relativistic and Quantum Physics are revisited. Transcendental procedures are also applied to contemporary physics, and this renewed transcendental interpretation is finally compared with structural realism and constructive empiricism. The book will be of interest to scientists, historians and philosophers who are involved in the foundational problems of modern physics.

Table of contents

Mary Leng defends a philosophical account of the nature of mathematics which views it as a kind of fiction (albeit an extremely useful fiction). On this view, the claims of our ordinary mathematical theories are more closely analogous to utterances made in the context of storytelling than to utterances whose aim is to assert literal truths.