Philosophy, Science, and History: A Guide and Reader is a compact overview of the history and philosophy of science that aims to introduce students to the groundwork of the field, and to stimulate innovative research. The general introduction focuses on scientific theory change, assessment, discovery, and pursuit. Part I of the Reader begins with classic texts in the history of logical empiricism, including Reichenbach’s discovery-justification distinction. With careful reference to Kuhn’s analysis of scientific revolutions, the section provides key texts analyzing the relationship of HOPOS to the history of science, including texts by Santayana, Rudwick, and Shapin and Schaffer. Part II provides texts illuminating central debates in the history of science and its philosophy. These include the history of natural philosophy (Descartes, Newton, Leibniz, Kant, Hume, and du Châtelet in a new translation); induction and the logic of discovery (including the Mill-Whewell debate, Duhem, and Hanson); and catastrophism versus uniformitarianism in natural history (Playfair on Hutton and Lyell; de Buffon, Cuvier, and Darwin). The editor’s introductions to each section provide a broader perspective informed by contemporary research in each area, including related topics. Each introduction furnishes proposals, including thematic bibliographies, for innovative research questions and projects in the classroom and in the field.

The Evidence for God For approximately one hundred years, most secular scientists and the majority of the intelligentsia in the world have “preached” that God does not exist. Darwin’s book, The Origin of the Species, published in 1859, was the primary impetus for this change in our world’s viewpoint away from God. Today, many leaders in academia look at Christians (and others who believe in God) as bereft of intelligence. At the onset of the 20th century, there was very little scientific evidence to suggest that God was the Creator of the Universe. However, since 1917, amazing evidence has been discovered in the fields of cosmology and biology that a significant number of secular scientists admit points to an incredible Creative Force; most call this Force, God. The Philosophical, Scientific, and Historical Evidence for God presents this evidence in a detailed, yet understandable, manner. This book, Dr. Nichols’ eleventh on theology, provides well-researched information showing the ever-increasing evidence for an omnipotent Creator. He considers it to be the magnum opus of his writing career. The significance of the Big Bang theory and the many weaknesses now recognized in the theory of evolution will be thoroughly reviewed. Philosophical and historical evidence for God will also be presented. Dr. Nichols is convinced that an open-minded reader will come away with the realization that God does, indeed, exist, and that He is the God of the Holy Bible.

Scimat (science of human) is a new multidiscipline proposed by Lui Lam in 2007. Scimat treats all studies on human as a unified enterprise. In terms of content, Scimat = Humanities + Social Science + Medical Science. Scimat advocates the use of humanities-science synthesis in understanding humans, and collaboration between the humanists and natural scientists. The ultimate aim of Scimat is to better humanity by bettering the humanities.It has done so in the study of history, art, philosophy, and science, giving rise to some interesting and important results such as the appearance of a new discipline called Histophysics (physics of history), a new interpretation of art's origin and nature, a better understanding of the differences between the philosophies of the West and East, and a rigorous definition of science.Scimat Anthology collects 27 original articles in the humanities, published or unpublished from 2000 to 2024, with 26 by the founder of Scimat, ending with an in-depth analysis of Stephen Hawking and his legacy.Readership ranges from high school students and laypeople to professors of all disciplines, who are interested in what the humanities and science are about, as well as new ideas in bridging them.

This book explores the hypothesis that the types of inscription or text used by a given community of practitioners are designed in the very same process as the one producing concepts and results. The book sets out to show how, in exactly the same way as for the other outcomes of scientific activity, all kinds of factors, cognitive as well as cultural, technological, social or institutional, conjoin in shaping the various types of writings and texts used by the practitioners of the sciences. To make this point, the book opts for a genuinely multicultural approach to the texts produced in the context of practices of knowledge. It is predicated on the conviction that, in order to approach any topic in the history of science from a theoretical point of view, it may be fruitful to consider it from a global perspective. The book hence does not only gather papers dealing with geometrical papyri of antiquity, sixteenth century French books in algebra, seventeenth century scientific manuscripts and paintings, eighteenth and nineteenth century memoirs published by European academies or scientific journals, and Western Opera Omnia. It also considers the problems of interpretation relating to reading Babylonian clay tablets, Sanskrit oral scriptures and Chinese books and illustrations. Thus it enables the reader to explore the diversity of forms which texts have taken in history and the wide range of uses they have inspired. This volume will be of interest to historians, philosophers of science, linguists and anthropologists

1. 1. COLLINGWOOD'S RECEPTION Collingwood's scholarly reputation is a complicated and variegated affair. For one has not only to make a' distinction between his reputation during his life and after his premature death in 1943, but also between his reputation as a philosopher and as an archaeologist and historian. Collingwood himself considered philosophy as his primary occupation and his work in archaeology and history as that of an amateur. This work, however, reached the highest standards and his contributions to archaeology and history have always been appreciated accordingly. Though Collingwood's reputation as the main expert on Roman Britain in the period between the two wars remains unchallenged, modern developments in this field have inevitably superseded his contributions and made them primarily voices from a past period. Philosophy was the other half of Collingwood's scholarly life. In his own thinking there was always a close relationship between philosophy and archaeological and histor ical practice. His interpreters have not always recognized this connection. I have met archaeologists who were surprised to hear that Collingwood was a philosopher as well, who either did not know that he had been a practising and philosophers archaeologist and historian, or thought it no more than a private hobby. Collingwood's reputation as a philosopher was very different from the one he gained in archaeology and history. For in the philosophical climate at Oxford between the wars he was always an isolated figure.

Originally published in 1964. In four essays, Professor Mandelbaum challenges some of the most common assumptions of contemporary epistemology. Through historical analyses and critical argument, he attempts to show that one cannot successfully sever the connections between philosophic and scientific accounts of sense perception. While each essay is independent of the others, and the argument of each must therefore be judged on its own merits, one theme is common to all: that critical realism, as Mandelbaum calls it, is a viable epistemological position, even though some schools of thought hold it in low esteem.

The main reference source for questions of Islamic philosophy, science, and technology amongst Western engaged readers and academics in general and legal researchers in particular.

One of the most important and controversial themes in the contemporary dialogue among scientists and Christian theologians is the issue of "divine action" in the world. This volume brings together contributions from leading scholars on this topic, which emerged out of the Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action project, co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and Natural Science. This multi-year collaboration involved over 50 authors meeting at five international conferences. The essays collected here demonstrate the pervasive role of philosophy in this dialogue. Contributors include: Ian Barbour, Philip Clayton, George F. R. Ellis, Nancey Murphy, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Robert John Russell, F. LeRon Shults, William Stoeger, Thomas F. Tracy and Wesley Wildman.

In this book, Dr. Ben-Aharon demonstrates how the transformation of human consciousness in modern times is expressed in the fields of Science, History, Philosophy, and Art. He shows how creative concepts have been discovered and applied in physics, biology, genetics, and artificial intelligence. In the Philosophy chapter, Ben-Aharon traces the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Derrida, Badiou and Levinas and shows that this radical thinking is no longer abstract, theoretical reasoning or mere speculation. Rather, it is an exercise in generating real cognitive and moral substance, taking the human beyond the traditional boundaries of body, subjectivity, and identity. The chapter on Art demonstrates how contemporary artistic work joins together with science and thinking to create a new stream of real becoming and evolution. The historical decision of our time is then: Are we going to apply this new creativity in social life or will we reverse it into its destructive opposite?

More than 50 years after the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, this volume assesses the adequacy of the Kuhnian model in explaining certain aspects of science, particularly the social and epistemic aspects of science. One argument put forward is that there are no good reasons to accept Kunh’s incommensurability thesis, according to which scientific revolutions involve the replacement of theories with conceptually incompatible ones. Perhaps, therefore, it is time for another “decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed.” Only this time, the image of science that needs to be transformed is the Kuhnian one. Does the Kuhnian image of science provide an adequate model of scientific practice? If we abandon the Kuhnian picture of revolutionary change and incommensurability, what consequences would follow from that vis-à-vis our understanding of scientific knowledge as a social endeavour? The essays in this collection continue this debate, offering a critical examination of the arguments for and against the Kuhnian image of science as well as their implications for our understanding of science as a social and epistemic enterprise.