The contents of this volume are drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, and represent recent advances in the development of concepts and methods in political economy. Contributors include leading practitioners working on formal, applied, and historical approaches to the subject. The collection will interest scholars in the fields of political science and political sociology no less than economics. Part I outlines relevant concepts in political economy, including implementation, community, ideology, and institutions. Part II covers theory and applications of the spatial model of voting. Part III considers the different characteristics that govern the behaviour of institutions, while Part IV analyses competition between political representatives. Part V is concerned with the way in which government acquires information held by voters or advisors, and Part VI addresses government choice on monetary policy and taxation.

This one-volume distillation provides a comprehensive overview of the main branches of contemporary political science. It will serve as the reference book for political scientists and those following their work for years to come.

The 1950s in India were a crucial transition period where the legacy and institutions of British rule had to be transformed to fit the needs of a post-colonial state. This book analyses Indian policy-making from 1947 to 1964 under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

This publication reflects on the discussion on using chaos theory for the study of society. It explores the interface between chaos theory and the social sciences. A broad variety of fields (including Sociology, Anthropology, Economics, Political Science, Management, Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences) is represented in the book. The leading themes are: Conceptual and Methodological Issues, Social Connectionism and the Connectionist Mind, Social Institutions and Public Policy, and Social Simulations. The book includes the following topics: the relevance of the complexity-chaos paradigm for analyzing social systems, the usefulness of nonlinear dynamics for studying the formation and sustainability of social groups, the comparison between spontaneous social orders and spontaneous biological/natural orders, the building of Artificial Societies, and the contribution of the chaos paradigm to a better understanding and formulation of public policies.

The Australian community has become increasingly concerned about environmental issues, resulting in the Australian government placing a higher priority on global warming and climate change. This unique compilation, Water, Wind, Art and Debate highlights current research across a variety of Humanities and Science disciplines.

Politics and the Architecture of Choice draws on work in political science, economics, cognitive science, and psychology to offer an innovative theory of how people and organizations adapt to change and why these adaptations don't always work. Our decision-making capabilities, Jones argues, are both rational and adaptive. But because our rationality is bounded and our adaptability limited, our actions are not based simply on objective information from our environments. Instead, we overemphasize some factors and neglect others, and our inherited limitations—such as short-term memory capacity—all act to affect our judgment. Jones shows how we compensate for and replicate these limitations in groups by linking the behavioral foundations of human nature to the operation of large-scale organizations in modern society. Situating his argument within the current debate over the rational choice model of human behavior, Jones argues that we should begin with rationality as a standard and then study the uniquely human ways in which we deviate from it.

In many young democracies, local politics remain a bastion of nondemocratic practices, from corruption to clientelism to abuse of power. Focusing on the practice of clientelism in social policy in Argentina, this book argues that only the combination of a growing middle class and intense political competition leads local politicians to opt out of clientelism.

Could democracy do better? This book presents a vision on optimal democracies and a set of new rules to help achieve them. The monograph follows on the author’s successful book “Designing Democracy” from 2005 and further develops its ideas. While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely provoke great enthusiasm. Democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient outcomes and fair distributions of wealth. Moreover, many citizens take the democratic system for granted, simply because they have yet to experience an alternative. This book argues that the potential offered by democracies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should commit themselves to making a reality. Furthermore, the book suggests a number of insightful rules to improve the functioning of democracies. “We all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-elected after we have done it.” This famous quip by Jean-Claude Juncker perfectly encapsulates the challenge this book takes on: how to redesign our democratic institutions to overcome political short-termism and make our democracies more efficient. Several radical but highly relevant proposals are explored, ranging from long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets over the outcomes of the next election that could be useful for incentive purposes, minority voting, initiative group constitutions, and so on. All these highly innovative proposals are rigorously grounded in standard economic analysis. I highly recommend this book to anyone concerned about the state of our democracies and looking for constructive reforms. Patrick Bolton, Columbia University, USA In a time of reeling democracies, it is urgent to explore how to improve on the electoral system for the benefit of society. Hans Gersbach has developed a most innovative and thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice and mechanism design. He uncovers the potentially positive effects of political contracts between candidates and society, of new rules for agenda setting and of mechanisms compensating the minorities. Marc Fleurbaey, Princeton University, USA

This book offers a comprehensive assessment of Douglass North’s contribution to economics and the social sciences by examining the origins and structure of his New Institutionalist Economic History (NIEH). Informed by contemporary debates in the philosophy of economics, Krul describes the evolution of North’s theory from mainstream economics to an increasingly heterodox form of New Institutionalism. He also examines what North's original aims were in developing the NIEH research programme and how well it has achieved these aims. By exploring major themes in North's NIEH, with an emphasis on the final stage of his theory, Krul sheds new light on the strengths and weaknesses of North's work. He also discusses the implications of this critical interpretation for the New Institutionalism in economics and other fields of social science.

"Funded in part by The Heller-Hurwicz Economics Institute, University of Minnesota"--Title page.