A study of the political economy of Soviet military power, examining Soviet Russian ideology and tradition, theory and practice of the military doctrine, the domestic aspect and new economic realism, technology and efficiency, and Perestroika and Glasnost from 1985-1987.

This book is designed for people who wish to increase their understanding of the political economy of nuclear weapon production and proliferation. It explains the role of military, political, and economic incentives in perpetuating the continued growth of worldwide nuclear arsenals.

The purpose of this book is to analyse world military expenditure at the end of the 1980s, and to discuss its political and economic implications. After a decade of unprecedented expansion of international military spending, its level is falling, though modestly. Political developments in Europe and the success of arms control negotiations raise hopes for further reductions. In addition, technological and economic structural disarmament is adding to the pressure for reductions. However, performance has not matched up to promises, and formidable obstacles to defence spending limitations still remain. Military Expenditure surveys recent events and describes the process of change that characterizes international military expenditure, and its determinants, at this time of transformation.

This book examines traditional balance of power theory from a political-economic perspective, using historical examples, to draw out distinctions between the liberal and realist approach and how this affects grand strategy. The realist view of the balance of power theory includes implicit assumptions that economic assets can be turned quickly into power, and that states always respond to threats quickly and only with a view to the 'short-run'. These assumptions drive many of the expectations generated from traditional balance-of-power theory, discouraging realists from looking at domestic sources of power, which in turn undermined their ability to frame strategic decisions properly. By thinking about how power must be managed over time, however, we can model the choices policy-makers confront when determining expenditures on defense, while keeping an eye on the impact of those costs on the economy. By emphasizing the role of the state, identifying different causal patterns in domestic politics, and demonstrating the importance of systemic competition, this book aims to establish why a neo-classical realist approach is not only different from a liberal approach, but also superior when addressing questions on grand strategy. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, international political economy, grand strategy and IR theory in general. Mark R. Brawley is Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. He is author of several books on International Relations, specialising in the connections between political economic issues and security.