After 2000, there was a closeness in the relations of Syrian and Turkey. However, Turkey and Syria were in dispute about water, Hatay and terrorism. Especially there was an intense tension over terrorism. This tension brought the two countries to the brink of a war in 1998. We can say that the relations between Syria and Turkey normalized after Adana Agreement in 1998. When Bashar Al-Assad came to power in Syria and as did AKP in Turkey, the relations improved even further leading to the abolishment of visas in 2009. However, with the Arab Spring, the relations turned sour and reached to a point that can’t be normalized anymore. This book analyses the relations between Syria and Turkey between 1998 and 2018. CONTENT About the Author Acronyms Chapter One: Introduction Chapter Two: Turkey – Syria Relations in the Period from the End of the Cold War to the 1998 Syrıa Crisis Chapter Three: Turkey – Syria Relations in the Period from the 1998 Adana Agreement to the Election of Bashar Al-Asad as President in 2000 Chapter Four: Turkey – Syria Relations in the Period from 2000 Bashar Al-Assad’s Takiıng Office to the Abolition of Visas in 2009 Chapter Five: The Relations between Turkey And Syria after Arab Spring

The International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) has recently published a report named as“Turkish-Russian Relations in The Post-Cold War Period: Current Dynamics, Future Prospects”. This report can be evaluated from this perspective, as it is the first product of the Track II initiative that has started between International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) and Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS). The first meeting was held in Ankara in 19 February 2013 with participation of Turkish and Russian academicians, bureaucrats and decision makers. However, it is just the first step and should be taken to a next level by better coordination and planning in the future. One of the main outcomes of this meeting is that there are so many areas waiting to be addressed as here are so many commonalities in the historical and social contexts of the two countries. In this regard, the potential of cooperation in regional level has not been developed as much as the level of cooperation in the bilateral level. The report tries to cover these issues in three different chapters. In the first chapter, the report focuses on the political aspect of the relations and tries to answer the questions of “How the political relations developed in the last 20 years?”, “What were the main challenges and turning points that helped to establish a vThe report tries to cover these issues in three different chapters. In the first chapter, the report focuses on the political aspect of the relations and tries to answer the questions of “How the political relations developed in the last 20 years?”, “What were the main challenges and turning points that helped to establish a vibrant dialogue between the two states?” and “What are the areas that should be addressed in the near future?”

With the end of Cold War discipline the world has entered a new era. Parameters have changed; new handicaps as well as new opportunities have been created for countries. Turkey as a neighbor of former USSR, a member of NATO and located at the center of a sensitive region covered by Caucasus, Balkans and Middle East, has been affected by the end of Cold War radically. Turkey has lost some of her bargaining cards in the new era and therefore has needed new arguments. This need encouraged Turkey to take active steps in Post Cold War era. This book analyzes Turkey s relations with US, EU, Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia, China and Japan. At the same time, effects of economic crises and domestic developments on foreign policy, Turkish model in Turkish foreign policy, water conflict and Kurdish problem are analyzed as well. To conclude, it is possible to argue that although Turkey lost some of her bargaining cards in Post Cold War era, new developments pushed Turkey to the center of world politics rather then to periphery. Contributors: Meliha Benli Altunisik, Deniz Ülke Aribogan, Hüseyin Bagci, Idris Bal, Zeyno Baran, Fulya Kip Barnard, Erol Bulut, Ibrahim S. Canbolat, Saziye Gazioglu, Ramazan Gözen, Saban Kardas, H. Bülent Olcay, Cengiz Okman, Henry E. Paniev, Victor Panin, Dirk Rochtus, Faruk Sönmezoglu, Gül Turan, Ilter Turan, Mustafa Türkes, Nasuh Uslu.

In 1997 Turkey and Syria were on the brink of war, engaged in a very real power struggle. Turkey was aligned with Syria's main enemy, Israel, and there were seemingly intractable differences on the issues of borders, the sharing of river waters and trans-border communities. In less than a decade, relations were transformed from enmity to amity. Border issues and water sharing quarrels were moving towards amicable settlement and the two states' policies toward the Kurdish issue converging. Turkey undertook to mediate the Syrian-Israeli conflict and close political and economic relations were developing rapidly between the two states. Yet, with the Syrian Uprising, relations returned to enmity. What explains these remarkable changes? Given that Turkey and Syria are two pivotal states in the region, what are the implications of this changing relationship for the international politics of the Middle East, the balance of power and regional stability? In this internationally collaborative work, co-edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, British, Syrian and Turkish scholars address these questions and examine the various domestic and international drivers in this key regional relationship. They discuss what theories best help us understand these seismic realignments and explore the impact of economic interdependence, identity changes and power balances on the evolving relationship between these two key regional powers.

Examining the international dimensions of the Syrian conflict, this book studies external factors relating to the Uprising. It explores the involvement of outside powers and the events’ impact both on regional and international level. Syria was widely perceived to be essential to the regional power balance, hence it was a valued prize to be fought over. The book examines the impact of global and regional powers in propelling the conflict in Syria; looks at the motives and strategies of the key regional and international actors (Hizbollah, Palestinians, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, US, Russia, EU); and analyses the impact of the Syrian conflict on key relations between regional states (Turkey-Syria, Turkey-Iran, Iraq-Syria). Finally, several chapters treat the impact on Syria of international sanctions and the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine. This book follows on to The Syrian Uprising: Domestic Origins and Early Trajectory, edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Omar Imady (2018). Subsequent volumes will examine the later evolution of the conflict. Taking an innovative and interdisciplinary approach that seeks to capture the full complexity of the phenomenon, this book contributes significantly to our understanding of the Syrian conflict and will therefore be a valuable resource for anyone studying Middle Eastern Politics.

The framework of Turkish foreign policy -- The defense aspect of Turkish foreign policy -- The Western connection of Turkish foreign policy -- The Eastern connection of Turkish foreign policy -- The Middle Eastern connection of Turkish foreign policy -- The Greek and Balkan connection of Turkish foreign policy -- The general appraisal of Turkish foreign policy -- Conclusion : the direction of Turkish foreign policy.

This book explores the complexity of the Syrian question and its effects on the foreign policies of Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The Syrian crisis has had a major effect on the regional order in the Middle East. Syria has become a territory where the rivalry between Russia and Western powers is being played out, and with the West’s gradual withdrawal, the conflict will without a doubt have lasting effects locally and on the international order. This collection focuses on the effects of the Syrian crisis on the new governance of the Middle East region by three political regimes: Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Many articles and a number of books have been written on this conflict, which has lasted over ten years, but no publication has examined simultaneously and comparatively how these three states are participating in the shared management of the Syrian conflict.

The Syrian Civil War started in March 2011 and still continues. It causes death, turmoil, humanitarian crisis, and mass migration in the region. Numerous state and non-state actors are involved in this multi-sided armed conflict. On 24 November 2015, Turkey shoots down a Russian fighter jet on its border and this event becomes the turning point in Russo–Turkish relations. An economic and psychological war starts between Moscow and Ankara which damages their good relations existed before the crisis. Despite the crisis, the sides to the conflict understand that they need each other for their own benefits and look for reconciliation. Russia, a supporter of the Assad government in Syria, does not want to lose Turkey as a friend. Turkey, an energy partner of Russia, needs Russia to balance the power relations in the region. They are two neighboring countries with strong historical socio-economic ties that need to be restored. The reconciliation process is not easy and requires some third party role. The PYD/YPG-centered US policy in Syria affects Turkey’s strategies.

In 2011, the diplomatic and expert consensus was that Bashar al-Asads regime would fail, causing Syria to disintegrate into several ethnic enclaves or mini-states. A decade later and Bashar is still in control, having defeated the rebels and gained the support of Russia. The years of internal warfare have brought about changes in the spectrum of parties involved in the Syrian state, and the final outcome is inevitably going to be shaped by geo-politics. The Alawi minority still in large measure controls the Sunni-Muslim (Arab) majority. The other players are a gallery of ever changing allegiances: ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and many other radical Islamic groups; the Muslim Kurdish and Christian Arab communities; as well as Shii Lebanese Hizballah. External horizon players are Iran; Sunni Turkey and Saudi Arabia; Jewish Israel; the United States and Russia. This study aims to analyze the agendas, actions, and interrelations of these various actors from 2011 until the present. It will discuss their ongoing politics and assess forthcoming developments. Both Iran and Russia continue to support Bashar, but compete for political, military, and economic influence. The US has greatly reduced involvement, keeping only 900 troops in northeastern Syria, to protect its Kurdish allies and fight against ISIS. Turkey still occupies parts of northern Syria, with the aim of eliminating the Kurdish forces. Syrian and Russian military attempts to conquer this area continue sporadically. The Israeli air force has attacked Iranian and Hizballah positions with the tacit approval of Russia. However, Russias war on Ukraine in February 2022 may result in restricting Israeli interdictions and instead enhance cooperation with Tehran in order to counter the US and NATO. Both Russia and Iran have been incapable of reconstructing the massively destroyed Syrian infrastructure; the US and Europe are reluctant to contribute due to Bashars continued Alawi minority-based autocratic and corrupt rule.

TURKISH MIGRATION POLICY, edited by Ibrahim Sirkeci and Barbara Pusch, aims to shed light on changes in migration policy, determinants beneath these changes, and practical implications for movers and non-movers in Turkey. Nevertheless, one should note that Turkey has only recently faced mass immigration and the number of foreign born has more than doubled in less than five years. Such sudden change in population composition warrants policy adjustments and reviews. Policy shift from "exporting excess labour" in the 1960s and 1970s to immigrant integration today is a drastic but necessary one. Nevertheless, Turkish migration policy is still far from settled as several chapters in this book point out. Despite the exemplary humanitarian engagement in admitting Syrians, Turkey is still at the bottom of the league table of favourable integration policies with an overall score of 25 out of 100. Turkish migration policy is likely to be adjusted further in response to the continuing immigration.