A work which addresses the question: What constructive role can pragmatism play, either in structuring public debate or in dealing with life'. The contributors examine what pragmatism can offer in the way of a positive social programme in the field of law and political science.

Combining philosophical pargmatism with a methodological foundation, Tamanaha formulates a framework for a realistic approach to socio-legal theory. The strengths of this approach are contrasted with that of the major schools of socio-legal theory by application to core issues in this area.Thus Tamanaha explores the problematic state of socio-legal studies, the relationship between behaviour and meaning, the notion of legal ideology, the problem of indeterminacy in rule following and application, and the structure of judicial decision making. These issues are tackled in a clear andconcise fashion while articulating a social theory of law which draws equally from legal theory and socio-legal theory.

Pragmatism and Law provides a textual reading of the American legal discourse, as it unfolds through various genres of pragmatism, which evolve and transform during the twentieth century. The historical narrative, which the book weaves, traces the transformation of the pragmatic idea from the forefront of philosophical intellectual inquiries at the turn of the twentieth century to a common sense lawyers’ practical rule of action at the turn of the twenty-first century. During this sequence, a fresh look at American history and legal history in particular is offered through the emphasis on recurring discursive structures which assume incommensurable treatments of basic liberal notions like justice, politics, and truth. Underlying the writing is an interpretative mode of inquiry, based on European post-structural methodologies, while claiming to represent their next intellectual phase. This contemporary mode of inquiry is that of a reading which insists on healing through the paradoxes. It is the same mode that sets, in the author’s view, the updated interpretative model of dispute resolution studies.

In Legal Pragmatism, Michael Sullivan looks closely at the place of the individual and community in democratic society. After mapping out a brief history of American legal thinking regarding rights, from communitarianism to liberalism, Sullivan gives a rich and nuanced account of how pragmatism worked to resolve conflicts of self-interest and community well-being. Sullivan's view of pragmatism provides a comprehensive framework for understanding democracy, as well as issues such as health care, education, gay marriage, and illegal immigration that will determine its character in the future. Legal Pragmatism is a bold, carefully argued book that presents a unique understanding of contemporary society, law, and politics.

Pragmatism is experiencing a resurgence in law, philosophy and social science, with pragmatists seeking a consistent, comprehensive and productive understanding of social life. In its four sections Renascent Pragmatism aids the reinvigoration of pragmatism as an important intellectual tradition and contributor to inquiry and change in social life. The book is a first of its kind for combining essays on theory, method, public policy and empirical scholarship, presenting contributions from philosophers, legal scholars and social scientists. Throughout the book, the concrete linkage between policy, theory and method is emphasized, while recognizing the philosophical tradition in which the inquiries and prescriptions rest.

In Formalism and Pragmatism in American Law Thomas Grey gives a full account of each of these modes of legal thought, with particular attention to the versions of them promulgated by their influential exponents Christopher Columbus Langdell and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Grey argues that legal pragmatism as understood by Holmes is the best jurisprudential framework for a modern legal system. He enriches his theoretical account with treatments of central issues in three important areas of law in the United States: constitutional interpretation, property, and torts.

Pragmatism, Logic and Law offers a view of legal pragmatism consistent with pragmatism writ large, tracing it from origins in late 19th century America to the present, covering various issues, legal cases, personalities, and relevant intellectual movements within and outside law. It addresses pragmatism’s relation to legal liberalism, legal positivism, natural law, critical legal studies (CLS), and post-Rorty “neopragmatism.” It views legal pragmatism as an exemplar of pragmatism’s general contribution to logical theory, which bears two connections to the western philosophical tradition: first, it extends Francis Bacon’s empiricism into contemporary aspects of scientific and legal experience, and second, it is an explicitly social reconstruction of logical induction. Both notions were articulated by John Dewey, and both emphasize the social or corporate element of human inquiry. Empiricism is informed by social as well as individual experience (which includes the problems of conflict and consensus). Rather than following the Aristotelian model of induction as immediate inference from particulars to generals, a model that assumes a consensual objective viewpoint, pragmatism explores the actual, and extended, process of corporate inference from particular experience to generalization, in law as in science. This includes the necessary process of resolving disagreement and finding similarity among relevant particulars.

A liberal state is a representative democracy constrained by the rule of law. Richard Posner argues for a conception of the liberal state based on pragmatic theories of government. He views the actions of elected officials as guided by interests rather than by reason and the decisions of judges by discretion rather than by rules. He emphasizes the institutional and material, rather than moral and deliberative, factors in democratic decision making. Posner argues that democracy is best viewed as a competition for power by means of regular elections. Citizens should not be expected to play a significant role in making complex public policy regarding, say, taxes or missile defense. The great advantage of democracy is not that it is the rule of the wise or the good but that it enables stability and orderly succession in government and limits the tendency of rulers to enrich or empower themselves to the disadvantage of the public. Posner’s theory steers between political theorists’ concept of deliberative democracy on the left and economists’ public-choice theory on the right. It makes a significant contribution to the theory of democracy—and to the theory of law as well, by showing that the principles that inform Schumpeterian democratic theory also inform the theory and practice of adjudication. The book argues for law and democracy as twin halves of a pragmatic theory of American government.

This book is an innovative contribution to analytical jurisprudence. It is mainly based on the distinct premises of linguistic philosophy and Carnapian semantics, but also addresses the issues of institutional philosophy, social pragmatism, and legal principles as envisioned by Dworkin, among others. Wróblewski ́s three ideologies (bound/free/legal and rational) and Makkonen ́s three situations (isomorphic/semantically vague/normative gap) of judicial decision-making are further developed by means of 10 frames of legal analysis as discerned by the author. With the philosophical theories of truth serving as a reference, the frames of legal analysis include the isomorphic theory of law (Wittgenstein, Makkonen), the coherence theory of law (Alexy, Peczenik, Dworkin), the new rhetoric and legal argumentation theory (Perelman, Aarnio), social consequentialism (Posner), natural law theory (Fuller, Finnis), and the sequential model of legal reasoning by Neil MacCormick and the Bielefelder Kreis. At the end, some key issues of legal metaphysics are addressed, like the notion of legal systematics and the future potential of the analytical approach in jurisprudence.

This title was first published in 2001. After languishing for decades in the domains of rigid doctrinalism and confusing theory, the conflict of laws is increasingly being recognized as an important area of law to a global community. To demonstrate its importance, Michael Whincop and Mary Keyes transcend the divide between the English pragmatic tradition and the circularity of American policy-based theory. They argue that the law governing multistage conflicts can minimize the social costs of litigation, increase the extent of co-ordination, facilitate private ordering and limit regulatory monopolies and cross-border spillovers. Pragmatic in outlook and economic in methodology, they pursue these themes across a broad range of doctrinal issues and offer valuable links to parallel analyses in domestic contexts.