Winner of the Pulitzer Prize With deft portraits of many world figures, Dean Acheson analyzes the processes of policy making, the necessity for decision, and the role of power and initiative in matters of state. Acheson (1893–1971) was not only present at the creation of the postwar world, he was one of its chief architects. He joined the Department of State in 1941 as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and, with brief intermissions, was continuously involved until 1953, when he left office as Secretary of State at the end of the Truman years. Throughout that time Acheson's was one of the most influential minds and strongest wills at work. It was a period that included World War II, the reconstruction of Europe, the Korean War, the development of nuclear power, the formation of the United Nations and NATO. It involved him at close quarters with a cast that starred Truman, Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Attlee, Eden Bevin, Schuman, Dulles, de Gasperi, Adenauer, Yoshida, Vishinsky, and Molotov.

Many accounts of British development since 1945 have attempted to discover why Britain experienced slower rates of economic growth than other Western European countries. In many cases, the explanation for this phenomenon has been attributed to the high level of defence spending that successive British post-war governments adhered to. Yet is it fair to assume that Britain's relative economic decline could have been prevented if policy makers had not spent so much on defence? Examining aspects of the political economy and economic impact of British defence expenditure in the period of the first cold war (1945-1955), this book challenges these widespread assumptions, looking in detail at the link between defence spending and economic decline. In contrast to earlier studies, Till Geiger not only analyses the British effort within the framework of Anglo-American relations, but also places it within the wider context of European integration. By reconsidering the previously accepted explanation of the economic impact of the British defence effort during the immediate post-war period, this book convincingly suggests that British foreign policy-makers retained a large defence budget to offset a sense of increased national vulnerability, brought about by a reduction in Britain's economic strength due to her war effort. Furthermore, it is shown that although this level of military spending may have slightly hampered post-war recovery, it was not in itself responsible for the decline of the British economy.

George F. Kennan’s first volume of memoirs is Memoirs 1925-1950. In the second volume of his memoirs, George Kennan resumes the narrative of his remarkable career, re-creating his development as a historian and analyzing the crucial issues of the twentieth century. “I don’t see how a memoir could be better; even if you aren’t interested in the subject at hand, the language carries you along. And the story here told — with all action subject to the finest Kennan introspection — is both important and absorbing... All of it is graced by the Kennan style; all is stamped with the Kennan foreign‐policy trademark [which] consists of an ability to think clearly about complicated matters with an utter independence of mind. He draws on a superb stock of historical knowledge... Most of the conclusions that George Kennan has reached over the years involve, in one way or another, the Soviet Union, and they emerge with admirable clarity from this book... [Kennan is the] most brilliant and civilized of students of the public scene.” — John Kenneth Galbraith, The New York Times “Delightfully written and appallingly frank... Mr. Kennan writes with a freedom and a sensitivity which carry the reader easily into a much deeper understanding of the difficulties of foreign policy-making in a mass democracy of the American model.” — D.C. Watt, New Statesman “[An] engrossing volume... this volume and its predecessor form one of the outstanding memoirs of our time.” — Richard W. Leopold, The American Historical Review “[T]his second volume of his memoirs can be read with as much speed and pleasure as a novel... This book is frank, honest, and introspective, and it therefore reveals a great deal about Kennan as a person... Kennan is obviously a complex, fascinating character — intelligent, proud, articulate, independent-minded, dedicated to serving his country, concerned over the fate of the world, generous in giving of his time to others, and yet suffering the pangs of frustration, loneliness, and alienation from his native land.” — Thomas T. Hammond, The Russian Review “As scholar and diplomatist, policymaker and critic of policy, George F. Kennan possesses a rare combination of expertise and experience... This book is notable for its lucid style and for the verbal portraits which it presents of such persons as Acheson, Dulles, Truman, Eisenhower, Stalin, and Tito... this volume ranks as an important contribution to our understanding of American postwar foreign policy.” — Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science “[T]here is much here worth any serious student’s time, indeed close attention... Kennan should and will be read” — Kirkus “Kennan writes so well it is no doubt his intention that, though he shows himself plainly as a public figure, as a private person he remains elusive — a sort of Marquand character: gentlemanly, conservative (in the best sense), urbane, direct and honest; yet to any but his friends very private. I’m glad. There are so few celebrated men who refuse to become celebrities.” — Richard J. Walton, The Washington Post

A necessary and unprecedented account of America's changing relationship with Israel When it comes to Israel, U.S. policy has always emphasized the unbreakable bond between the two countries and our ironclad commitment to Israel's security. Today our ties to Israel are close—so close that when there are differences, they tend to make the news. But it was not always this way. Dennis Ross has been a direct participant in shaping U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and Israel specifically, for nearly thirty years. He served in senior roles, including as Bill Clinton's envoy for Arab-Israeli peace, and was an active player in the debates over how Israel fit into the region and what should guide our policies. In Doomed to Succeed, he takes us through every administration from Truman to Obama, throwing into dramatic relief each president's attitudes toward Israel and the region, the often tumultuous debates between key advisers, and the events that drove the policies and at times led to a shift in approach. Ross points out how rarely lessons were learned and how distancing the United States from Israel in the Eisenhower, Nixon, Bush, and Obama administrations never yielded any benefits and why that lesson has never been learned. Doomed to Succeed offers compelling advice for how to understand the priorities of Arab leaders and how future administrations might best shape U.S. policy in that light.

"During the war Miller was a member of the mission to Saigon and to the Paris peace negotiations. As one involved in the events of those years, he provides us with fascinating and informative observations of such luminaries as Maxwell Taylor, Henry Cabot Lodge, Philip Habib, William Bundy, David Bruce, Robert Komer, and the South Vietnamese leadership and offers new insights into the conduct of diplomacy during the war.

This book, first published in 1987, examines the defence forces of Western Europe and assesses Europe’s capacity to defend itself as the 1980s saw the Cold War balance of power shift towards the Soviet Union. Soviet forces were greatly superior to NATO’s in terms of tanks, artillery and combat divisions, and this book analyses the NATO response and capabilities.

This book assesses and evaluates the decision-making behavior of United States presidents and their chief advisers from Roosevelt to Kennedy pertaining to China. Seeking to dispel with the notion that each administration sought policy outcomes on the basis of a rational decision-making model, Bartley highlights the contradictions of adopted presidential decision-making processes and the nature of domestic politics as playing prejudicial and debilitating roles. The book demonstrates that elite decision-making processes interacted with assumptions made about Chinese behavior, interests, and attitudes only superficially and in some cases not at all. Misinformation and misperception were the natural outcomes. Reinforced by the politics of McCarthyism at home, intellectual debate on China policy was squashed, parochialism and nuance were shunned, and information was closed off. Ultimately, a divorce between the norm of behavior and the search for rational policy was registered in each administration. The net result was a lasting and destructive cognitive dissonance: to fit expectations of a China reality constructed, information was ignored, overlooked, and distorted. Offering new insights into the China policies of consecutive administrations from 1941 to 1963, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.

The final volume comprises articles which take a look at the political movement for the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish people. The twenty one articles cover subjects such as the historical emergence of Zionism, attitudes towards the Zionist and Anti-Zionist movements in America, and the developments of trusteeship for the Palestine.