This collection of papers stems originally from a conference on Property Theory, Type Theory and Semantics held in Amherst on March 13-16 1986. The conference brought together logicians, philosophers, com puter scientists and linguists who had been working on these issues (of ten in isolation from one another). Our intent was to boost debate and exchange of ideas on these fundamental issues at a time of rapid change in semantics and cognitive science. The papers published in this work have evolved substantially since their original presentation at the conference. Given their scope, we thought it convenient to divide the work into two volumes. The first deals primarily with logical and philosophical foundations, the second with more empirical semantic issues. While there is a common set of issues tying the two volumes together, they are both self-contained and can be read independently of one another. Two of the papers in the present collection (van Benthem in volume 1 and Chierchia in volume II) were not actually read at the conference. They are nevertheless included here for their direct relevance to the topics of the volumes. Regrettably, some of the papers that were presented (Feferman, Klein, and Plotkin) could not be included in the present work due to timing problems. We nevertheless thank the authors for their contribu tion in terms of ideas and participation in the debate.

This extended collection of papers is the result of putting recent ideas on quantification to work on a wide variety of languages. A central perspective of many of the papers follows the recognition of two broad types of quantificational strategies, one associated with nominal structures and determiners, the other with adverbial and other non-nominal expression (`D-quantifiers' and `A-quantifiers'). The papers demonstrate both the unity and the variety of natural language quantificational forms and meanings. Many of the papers also shed new light on questions of language typology and syntactic and morphological variation. The languages discussed include English, Dutch, Italian, American Sign Language, Hindi, and a number of languages of Australia, Greenland, and the Americas. These comparative studies provide initial data for a typology of quantificational structures in natural languages, with important implications for the study of universal grammar. The book consists of research papers aimed at linguists, philosophers, and psychologists interested in semantics and linguistic form. An introduction presents a sketch of the background of this research and some of the central issues discussed, with pointers toward the included papers.

This book provides an extensive account of perfect constructions in German, of its numerous meaning effects, and of its interaction with temporal adverbials and temporal subclauses. By doing this, it takes the semantics of the whole German tense system into account, provides analyses of several temporal adverbials and their intricate behavior, and offers new ideas concerning the semantics of temporal subclauses. Although one of the main goals of the book is to integrate the results of the study into a formal semantic framework, it also considers many pragmatic factors as well as aspects concerning German syntax. The book will be of interest to scholars and advanced students interested in issues regarding tense, aspect, temporal adverbials, and temporal subclauses.

The papers in this volume address two main topics: Q1: What is the nature, and especially the scope, of ellipsis in natural l- guage? Q2: What are the linguistic/philosophical implications of what one takes the nature/scope of ellipsis to be? As will emerge below, each of these main topics includes a large sub-part that deals speci?cally with nonsentential speech. Within the ?rst main topic, Q1, there arises the sub-issueofwhethernonsententialspeechfallswithinthescopeofellipsisornot;within the second main topic, Q2, there arises the sub-issue of what linguistic/philosophical implications follow, if nonsentential speech does/does not count as ellipsis. I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF ELLIPSIS A. General Issue: How Many Natural Kinds? There are many things to which the label ‘ellipsis’ can be readily applied. But it’s quite unclear whether all of them belong in a single natural kind. To explain, consider a view, assumed in Stainton (2000), Stainton (2004a), and elsewhere. It is the view that there are fundamentally (at least) three very different things that readily get called ‘ellipsis’, each belonging to a distinct kind. First, there is the very broad phenomenon of a speaker omitting information which the hearer is expected to make use of in interpreting an utterance. Included therein, possibly as a special case, is the use of an abbreviated form of speech, when one could have used a more explicit expression. (See Neale (2000) and Sellars (1954) for more on this idea.

In comparative syntax a general approach has been pursued over the past decade predicated on the notion that Universal Grammar allows of open parameters, and that part of the job of linguistic theory is to specify what values these parameters may have, and how they may be set, given primary linguistic data, to determine the grammars of particu lar languages. The papers presented in this volume are also concerned with language variation understood in this way. Their goals, however, do not strictly fall under the rubric of comparative syntax, but form part of what is more properly thought of as a comparative semantics. Semantics, in its broadest sense, is concerned with how linguistic structures are associated with their truth-conditions. A comparative semantics, therefore, is concerned with whether this association can vary from language to language, and if so, what is the cause of this variation. Taking comparative semantics in this way places certain inherent limitations on the search for the sources of variability. This is because the semantic notion of truth is universal, and does not vary from language to language: Sentences either do or do not accurately characterize what they purport to describe. ! The source of semantic variability, therefore, must be somehow located in the way a language is structured.

Formalization plays an important role in semantics. Doing semantics and following the literature requires considerable technical sophistica tion and acquaintance with quite advanced mathematical techniques and structures. But semantics isn't mathematics. These techniques and structures are tools that help us build semantic theories. Our real aim is to understand semantic phenomena and we need the technique to make our understanding of these phenomena precise. The problems in semantics are most often too hard and slippery, to completely trust our informal understanding of them. This should not be taken as an attack on informal reasoning in semantics. On the contrary, in my view, very often the essential insight in a diagnosis of what is going on in a certain semantic phenomenon takes place at the informal level. It is very easy, however, to be misled into thinking that a certain informal insight provides a satisfying analysis of a certain problem; it will often turn out that there is a fundamental unclarity about what the informal insight actually is. Formalization helps to sharpen those insights and put them to the test.