An argument that logic is intrinsically psychological and human psychology is intrinsically logical, and that the connection between human rationality and logic is both constitutive and mutual. In Rationality and Logic, Robert Hanna argues that logic is intrinsically psychological and that human psychology is intrinsically logical. He claims that logic is cognitively constructed by rational animals (including humans) and that rational animals are essentially logical animals. In order to do so, he defends the broadly Kantian thesis that all (and only) rational animals possess an innate cognitive "logic faculty." Hanna's claims challenge the conventional philosophical wisdom that sees logic as a fully formal or "topic-neutral" science irreconcilably separate from the species- or individual-specific focus of empirical psychology.Logic and psychology went their separate ways after attacks by Frege and Husserl on logical psychologism—the explanatory reduction of logic to empirical psychology. Hanna argues, however, that—despite the fact that logical psychologism is false—there is an essential link between logic and psychology. Rational human animals constitute the basic class of cognizers or thinkers studied by cognitive psychology; given the connection between rationality and logic that Hanna claims, it follows that the nature of logic is significantly revealed to us by cognitive psychology. Hanna's proposed "logical cognitivism" has two important consequences: the recognition by logically oriented philosophers that psychologists are their colleagues in the metadiscipline of cognitive science; and radical changes in cognitive science itself. Cognitive science, Hanna argues, is not at bottom a natural science; it is both an objective or truth-oriented science and a normative human science, as is logic itself.

It is fast becoming a cliche that scientific discovery is being rediscovered. For two philosophical generations (that of the Founders and that of the Followers of the logical positivist and logical empiricist movements), discovery had been consigned to the domain of the intractable, the ineffable, the inscrutable. The philosophy of science was focused on the so-called context of justification as its proper domain. More recently, as the exclusivity of the logical reconstruc tion program in philosophy of science came under question, and as the critique of justification developed within the framework of logical and epistemological analysis, the old question of scientific discovery, which had been put on the back burner, began to emerge once again. Emphasis on the relation of the history of science to the philosophy of science, and attention to the question of theory change and theory replacement, also served to legitimate a new concern with the origins of scientific change to be found within discovery and invention. How welcome then to see what a wide range of issues and what a broad representation of philosophers and historians of science have been brought together in the present two volumes of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science! For what these volumes achieve, in effect, is the continuation of a tradition which had once been strong in the philosophy of science - namely, that tradition which addressed the question of scientific discovery as a central question in the understanding of science.

This book contains a selection of the papers presented at the Logic, Reasoning and Rationality 2010 conference (LRR10) in Ghent. The conference aimed at stimulating the use of formal frameworks to explicate concrete cases of human reasoning, and conversely, to challenge scholars in formal studies by presenting them with interesting new cases of actual reasoning. According to the members of the Wiener Kreis, there was a strong connection between logic, reasoning, and rationality and that human reasoning is rational in so far as it is based on (classical) logic. Later, this belief came under attack and logic was deemed inadequate to explicate actual cases of human reasoning. Today, there is a growing interest in reconnecting logic, reasoning and rationality. A central motor for this change was the development of non-classical logics and non-classical formal frameworks. The book contains contributions in various non-classical formal frameworks, case studies that enhance our apprehension of concrete reasoning patterns, and studies of the philosophical implications for our understanding of the notions of rationality.

This LNCS volume is part of FoLLI book serie and contains the papers presented at the 6th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction/ (LORI-VI), held in September 2017 in Sapporo, Japan. The focus of the workshop is on following topics: Agency, Argumentation and Agreement, Belief Revision and Belief Merging, Belief Representation, Cooperation, Decision making and Planning, Natural Language, Philosophy and Philosophical Logic, and Strategic Reasoning.

This LNCS book is part of the FOLLI book series and constitutes the proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2023, held in Jinan, China, in October 2023. The 15 full papers presented together with 7 short papers in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 40 submissions. The workshop covers a wide range on the following topics such as agency; argumentation and agreement; belief representation; probability and uncertainty; belief revision and belief merging; knowledge and action; dynamics of informational attitudes; intentions, plans, and goals; decision making and planning; preference and utility; cooperation; strategic reasoning and game theory; epistemology; social choice; social interaction; speech acts; knowledge representation; norms and normative systems; natural language; rationality; philosophical logic.

FoLLI-LNCS is the publication platform for the Association of Logic, Language and Information (FoLLI, www.folli.org). The Association was founded in 1991 to advance research and education on the interface between logic, linguistics, computer science, and cognitive science. The FoLLI Publications on Logic, Language and Information aim to disseminate results of cutting-edge research and tutorial materials in these interdisciplinary areas. This LNCS volume is part of FoLLi book serie and contains the papers presented at the 5th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction/ (LORI-V), held in October 2015 in Taipei, Taiwan. The topics covered in this program well represent the span and depth that hasby now become a trademark of the LORI workshop series, where logic interfaceswith disciplines as diverse as game theory and decision theory, philosophyand epistemology, linguistics, computer science and artificial intelligence.

Edited in collaboration with FoLLI, the Association of Logic, Language and Information, this book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2011, held in Guangzhou, China, in October 2011. The 25 revised full papers presented together with 12 posters were carefully reviewed and selected from 52 submissions. Among the topics covered are semantic models for knowledge, for belief, and for uncertainty; dynamic logics of knowledge, information flow, and action; logical analysis of the structure of games; belief revision, belief merging; logics and preferences, compact preference representation; logics of intentions, plans, and goals; logics of probability and uncertainty; logical approaches to decision making and planning; argument systems and their role in interaction; norms, normative interaction, and normative multiagent systems; and logical and computational approaches to social choice.

Edited in collaboration with FoLLI, the Association of Logic, Language and Information, this book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2009, held in Chongqing, China, in October 2009. The 24 revised full papers presented together with 8 posters were carefully reviewed and selected from a flood of submissions. The workshops topics include but are not limited to semantic models for knowledge, for belief, and for uncertainty, dynamic logics of knowledge, information flow, and action, logical analysis of the structure of games, belief revision, belief merging, logics for preferences and utilities, logics of intentions, plans, and goals, logics of probability and uncertainty, argument systems and their role in interaction, as well as norms, normative interaction, and normative multiagent systems.

This book collects the papers presented at the 4th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction/ (LORI-4), held in October 2013 at the /Center for the Study of Language and Cognition, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China. LORI is a series that brings together researchers from a variety of logic-related fields: Game and Decision Theory, Philosophy, Linguistics, Computer Science and AI. This year had a special emphasis on Norms and Argumentation. Out of 42 submissions, 23 full papers and 11 short contributions have been selected through peer-review for inclusion in the workshop program and in this volume. The quality and diversity of these contributions witnesses a lively, fast-growing, and interdisciplinary community working at the intersection of logic and rational interaction.

This updated edition is radically changed from the original and will be much appreciated by thinkers within economics. Boland is back.