It is an obvious fact that human agency is constrained and structured by many kinds of rules: rules that are constitutive for communication, morality, persons, and society, and juridical rules. So the question is: what roles are played by social rules and the structural traits of human agency in rational decision making? What bearing does this have on the theory of practical rationality? These issues can only be discussed within an interdisciplinary setting, with researchers drawn from philosophy, decision theory and the economic and social sciences. The problem is of profound, fundamental concern to the social scientist and has attracted a great deal of intellectual effort. Contributors include distinguished researchers in their respective fields and the book thus presents state-of-the-art theory. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced philosophy, economics and social science classes.

In this book, the author shows that it is necessary to enrich the conceptual frame of the theory of rational choice beyond consequentialism. He argues that consequentialism as a general theory of rational action fails and that this does not force us into the dichotomy teleology vs deontology. The unity of practical reason can be saved without consequentialism. In the process, he presents insightful criticism of standard models of action and rational choice. This will help readers discover a new perspective on the theory of rationality. The approach is radical: It transcends the reductive narrowness of instrumental rationality without denying its practical impact. Actions do exist that are outlined in accordance to utility maximizing or even self-interest maximizing. Yet, not all actions are to be understood in these terms. Actions oriented around social roles, for example, cannot count as irrational only because there is no known underlying maximizing heuristic. The concept of bounded rationality tries to embed instrumental rationality into a form of life to highlight limits of our cognitive capabilities and selective perceptions. However, the agent is still left within the realm of cost-benefit-reasoning. The idea of social preferences or meta-preferences cannot encompass the plurality of human actions. According to the author they ignore the plurality of reasons that drive agency. Hence, they coerce agency in fitting into a theory that undermines humanity. His theory of structural rationality acknowledges lifeworld patterns of interaction and meaning.

Bernard Gert's moral theory is among the clearest and most comprehensive on the contemporary scene. It touches on elements of the dominant ethical orientations---utilitarianism, Kantianism, contractionism, and virtue ethics--without fitting neatly into any of those categories. For that reason, Gert's moral theory appeals to many ethicists dissatisfied with each of the dominant formulations. Rationality, Rules, and Ideals presents Gert's Morality, the reactions by a number of prominent scholars, and Gert's response. All told, it is a remarkably wide-ranging study of ethical theory. The work is broken down into six parts, making Rationality, Rules, and Ideals perfect for a broad-ranging course on ethical theory, following Gert's critiques of utilitariansim, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. Both students and professionals will find much material to work with in this volume. The papers contribute not only to the understanding of Gert's wide-ranging theory but to a number of important topics in ethic theory, the theory of rationality, and applied ethics.

Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. The book's theory of collective rationality explains how to evaluate collective acts. The people engaged in a game of strategy collectively produce an outcome, and the theory reveals what makes some outcomes solutions. It generates new equilibrium standards for solutions to cooperative games.

This book defines a logical system called the Protocol-theoretic Logic of Epistemic Norms (PLEN), it develops PLEN into a formal framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms, and it shows that PLEN is theoretically interesting and useful with regard to the aims of such a framework. In order to motivate the project, the author defends an account of epistemic norms called epistemic proceduralism. The core of this view is the idea that, in virtue of their indispensable, regulative role in cognitive life, epistemic norms are closely intertwined with procedural rules that restrict epistemic actions, procedures, and processes. The resulting organizing principle of the book is that epistemic norms are protocols for epistemic planning and control. The core of the book is developing PLEN, which is essentially a novel variant of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) distinguished by more or less elaborate revisions of PDL’s syntax and semantics. The syntax encodes the procedural content of epistemic norms by means of the well-known protocol or program constructions of dynamic and epistemic logics. It then provides a novel language of operators on protocols, including a range of unique protocol equivalence relations, syntactic operations on protocols, and various procedural relations among protocols in addition to the standard dynamic (modal) operators of PDL. The semantics of the system then interprets protocol expressions and expressions embedding protocols over a class of directed multigraph-like structures rather than the standard labeled transition systems or modal frames. The intent of the system is to better represent epistemic dynamics, build a logic of protocols atop it, and then show that the resulting logic of protocols is useful as a logical framework for epistemic norms. The resulting theory of epistemic norms centers on notions of norm equivalence derived from theories of process equivalence familiar from the study of dynamic and modal logics. The canonical account of protocol equivalence in PLEN turns out to possess a number of interesting formal features, including satisfaction of important conditions on hyperintensional equivalence, a matter of recently recognized importance in the logic of norms, generally. To show that the system is interesting and useful as a framework for representing and reasoning about epistemic norms, the author applies the logical system to the analysis of epistemic deontic operators, and, partly on the basis of this, establishes representation theorems linking protocols to the action-guiding content of epistemic norms. The protocol-theoretic logic of epistemic norms is then shown to almost immediately validate the main principles of epistemic proceduralism.

Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it has become increasingly popular to analyze such collective actions in terms of collective intentions. This volume brings together ten new philosophical essays that address issues such as how individuals succeed in maintaining coordination throughout the performance of a collective action, whether groups can actually believe propositions or whether they merely accept them, and what kind of evidence, if any, disciplines such as cognitive science and semantics provide in support of irreducibly collective states. The theories of the Big Four of collective intentionality -- Michael Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, John Searle, and Margaret Gilbert -- and the Big Five of Social Ontology -- which in addition to the Big Four includes Philip Pettit -- play a central role in almost all of these essays. Drawing on insights from a wide range of disciplines including dynamical systems theory, economics, and psychology, the contributors develop existing theories, criticize them, or provide alternatives to them. Several essays challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality, and explore the interplay between these levels in order to shed new light on the alleged discontinuities between them. These contributions make abundantly clear that it is no longer an option simply to juxtapose analyses of individual and collective level phenomena and maintain that there is a discrepancy. Some go as far as arguing that on closer inspection the alleged discontinuities dissolve

The creation of rules that govern processes or behavior is essential to any organization, but these rules are often maligned for creating inefficiencies. This book provides the first comprehensive portrait of rules in public organizations and seeks to find the balance between rules that create red tape and rules that help public organizations function effectively, what the author calls “green tape.” Drawing on a decade of original research and interdisciplinary scholarship, Leisha DeHart-Davis builds a framework of three perspectives on rules: the organizational perspective, which sees rules as a tool for achieving managerial goals and organizational functions; the individual perspective, which examines how rule design and implementation affect employees; and the behavioral perspective, which explores human responses to the intersection of the first two perspectives. The book then considers the effectiveness of rules, applying these perspectives to a case study of employee grievance policies in North Carolina local government. Finally, the book concludes by outlining five attributes of effective rules—green tape—to guide future rule creation in public organizations. It applies green tape principles to the Five-Second Rule, a crowd control policy Missouri police implemented in the wake of protests following the Michael Brown shooting. Government managers and scholars of public administration will benefit from DeHart-Davis’s investigation and guidance.

The first reference on rationality that integrates accounts from psychology and philosophy, covering descriptive and normative theories from both disciplines. Both analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology have made dramatic advances in understanding rationality, but there has been little interaction between the disciplines. This volume offers the first integrated overview of the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. Written by leading experts from both disciplines, The Handbook of Rationality covers the main normative and descriptive theories of rationality—how people ought to think, how they actually think, and why we often deviate from what we can call rational. It also offers insights from other fields such as artificial intelligence, economics, the social sciences, and cognitive neuroscience. The Handbook proposes a novel classification system for researchers in human rationality, and it creates new connections between rationality research in philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. Following the basic distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, the book first considers the theoretical side, including normative and descriptive theories of logical, probabilistic, causal, and defeasible reasoning. It then turns to the practical side, discussing topics such as decision making, bounded rationality, game theory, deontic and legal reasoning, and the relation between rationality and morality. Finally, it covers topics that arise in both theoretical and practical rationality, including visual and spatial thinking, scientific rationality, how children learn to reason rationally, and the connection between intelligence and rationality.

These essays focus on questions that arise when morality is considered from the perspective of rational choice and evolution. It links questions like ""is it rational to be moral?"" to the evolution of co-operation, and uses models from game theory, evolutionary biology and cognitive science.

Scholars of ethics, and of human behavior more generally, will find this book consistently stimulating and rewarding.