The paper examines progress with the external rebalancing of euro area deficit countries. Relative prices are adjusting at different pace across countries and with different compositions of wage cuts and labor shedding. There is so far limited evidence of resource re-allocation from non-tradable to tradable sectors, while improved export performance is still dependent on external demand from the rest of world. Current account adjustments have taken place, reflecting structural changes but also cyclical forces, suggesting that part of the improvements may unwind when cyclical conditions improve. Looking ahead, relying only on relative price adjustments (which adversely affects demand) to rebalance the euro area could prove very challenging. Structural reforms will play an important role in the reallocation of resources to the tradable sector and the associated relative price adjustment, while boosting non-price and price competitiveness.

After the 2003-2007 economic boom, European countries with large pre-crisis current account imbalances are undergoing adjustments. Countries are adjusting at different paces and ways reflecting the source and magnitude of imbalances, availability of financing, competitiveness of the tradable sector and external environment. While emerging European countries with large pre-crisis imbalances and a fixed exchange rate regime have seen sharp current account adjustments and a rebound in growth, adjustment in the euro zone periphery countries, which are also carrying a legacy of pre-crisis CA imbalances, has been gradual with difficulties bringing back growth. This paper is an empirical investigation of current account adjustment in Europe with a focus on these two groups, looking at contributions from cyclical and other factors, and seeking to draw policy conclusions.

This paper focuses on the corporate income tax (CIT) regime that features a high statutory rate but low revenue productivity, as well as a bias toward debt financing, ineffective size-dependent regimes, and inefficient tax incentives. Profit-insensitive taxes are comparatively high. Anti-tax-avoidance rules are strong, but risks to outbound profit shifting remain. Tax uncertainty is another concern. At the individual level, the system of taxing wealth and capital income is complex, with distortions from differential taxation across savings instruments. To address some of these issues and make the tax system more supportive of growth and job creation, the government plans to reduce the CIT rate, further cut the labor tax wedge, unify taxes on capital income, and narrow the wealth tax. Staff’s analysis suggests that complementing these reforms with measures to remove inefficient tax incentives, further reduce the debt bias, address disincentives to company growth, and streamline the taxation of long-term savings could enhance their impact on competitiveness, revenues, and growth.

The OECD Economic Outlook is the OECD’s twice-yearly analysis of the major economic trends and prospects for the next two years.

In the long aftermath of the acute global financial crisis of 2008/09, “rebalancing” the economy with new sources of growth and productivity remains a persistent necessity. This book addresses the resulting trade-offs and challenges. These needs, and the corresponding policy challenges, are especially prevalent in Europe, in particular Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. On this issue, this book contributes lessons learned from earlier balance sheet recessions. It also addresses the often overlooked link between macroeconomic imbalances and economic inequality. Further contributions focus on the interaction between monetary policy and financial stability, adding a regional perspective to these important issues.

This staff paper on euro area policy 2013 Article IV Consultation discusses economic development and policies. Severe market stresses have subsided, although private borrowing costs have remained too high in the periphery. In these economies, sovereign borrowing costs have declined from unsustainable levels. This has led to slightly lower private borrowing costs, spurring bond issuance among some banks, and firms. Capital flight has gradually eased, bank deposits have stabilized, and Target 2 imbalances have narrowed. This has contributed to some early repayment of official liquidity support by stronger banks, though largely from core countries. Still, periphery bank risks are significantly higher than in the core.

This report describes the world economic outlook as of April 2018, projecting that advanced economies will continue to expand above their potential growth rates before decelerating, while growth in emerging markets in developing economies will rise before leveling off. It details global prospects and policies, including risks to the forecast, and essential determinants of long-term economic growth: labor force participation in advanced economies, the declining share of manufacturing jobs globally and in advanced economies, and the process through which innovative activity and technological knowledge spread across national borders.

Imbalances within the euro area have been a defining feature of the crisis. This paper provides a critical analysis of the ongoing rebalancing of euro area “deficit economies” (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) that accumulated large current account deficits and external liability positions in the run-up to the crisis. It shows that relative price adjustments have been proceeding gradually. Real effective exchange rates have depreciated by 10-25 percent, driven largely by reductions in unit labor costs due to labor shedding. While exports have typically rebounded, subdued demand accounts for much of the reduction in current account deficits. Hence, the current account balance of the euro area as a whole has shifted into surplus. Internal rebalancing has come with subdued activity—notably very high unemployment in the deficit economies—and made continued adjustment more difficult. To advance rebalancing further, the paper emphasizes the need for: (1) macroeconomic policies that support demand and bring inflation in line with the ECB’s medium-term price stability objective; (2) continued EMU reforms (banking union) to ensure proper financial intermediation; and (3) structural reforms in product and labor markets to improve productivity and support the reallocation of resources to tradable sectors.

After strong growth in 2017 and early 2018, global economic activity slowed notably in the second half of last year, reflecting a confluence of factors affecting major economies. China’s growth declined following a combination of needed regulatory tightening to rein in shadow banking and an increase in trade tensions with the United States. The euro area economy lost more momentum than expected as consumer and business confidence weakened and car production in Germany was disrupted by the introduction of new emission standards; investment dropped in Italy as sovereign spreads widened; and external demand, especially from emerging Asia, softened. Elsewhere, natural disasters hurt activity in Japan. Trade tensions increasingly took a toll on business confidence and, so, financial market sentiment worsened, with financial conditions tightening for vulnerable emerging markets in the spring of 2018 and then in advanced economies later in the year, weighing on global demand. Conditions have eased in 2019 as the US Federal Reserve signaled a more accommodative monetary policy stance and markets became more optimistic about a US–China trade deal, but they remain slightly more restrictive than in the fall.

Global growth for 2018–19 is projected to remain steady at its 2017 level, but its pace is less vigorous than projected in April and it has become less balanced. Downside risks to global growth have risen in the past six months and the potential for upside surprises has receded. Global growth is projected at 3.7 percent for 2018–19—0.2 percentage point lower for both years than forecast in April. The downward revision reflects surprises that suppressed activity in early 2018 in some major advanced economies, the negative effects of the trade measures implemented or approved between April and mid-September, as well as a weaker outlook for some key emerging market and developing economies arising from country-specific factors, tighter financial conditions, geopolitical tensions, and higher oil import bills. The balance of risks to the global growth forecast has shifted to the downside in a context of elevated policy uncertainty. Several of the downside risks highlighted in the April 2018 World Economic Outlook (WEO)—such as rising trade barriers and a reversal of capital flows to emerging market economies with weaker fundamentals and higher political risk—have become more pronounced or have partially materialized. Meanwhile, the potential for upside surprises has receded, given the tightening of financial conditions in some parts of the world, higher trade costs, slow implementation of reforms recommended in the past, and waning growth momentum.