One of the most contentious and high-profile aspects of European Community competition law and policy has been the regulation of what may be described as serious antitrust violations, typically involving large and powerful corporate producers and traders operating across Europe, if not also in awider international context. Such 'hard core' cartels characteristically engage in practices such as price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing and limiting production in order to ensure 'market stability' and maintain and increase profits. There is little doubt now in terms of competition theory andpolicy at both international and national levels about the damaging effect of such trading practices on public and consumer interests, and such cartels have been increasingly strongly condemned in the legal process of regulating and protecting competition. Indeed, a number of legal systems are nowfollowing the American lead in criminalizing such activity. This may therefore be seen as the 'hard end' of the enforcement of competition policy, requiring more confrontational and aggressive methods of regulation, yet also presenting considerable challenges to effective enforcement on account ofthe economic power, sophistication and determination of the typical participants in such cartels.The focus of this study is a critical evaluation of the way in which European-level regulation has evolved to deal with the problem of anti-competitive cartels. It traces the historical development of cartel regulation in Europe, comparing the pragmatic and empirical approach traditional in Europewith the more dogmatic and uncompromising American policy on cartels and asks whether a fully-fledged criminal proceeding (with its attendant level of legal safeguards) is the most appropriate approach to legal regulation .

One of the most contentious and high-profile aspects of EU competition law and policy has been the regulation of those serious competition or antitrust violations now often referred to as 'hard core cartels'. Such cartel activity typically involves large and powerful corporate producers and traders operating across Europe and beyond, and comprise practices such as price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing, and limiting production in order to ensure 'market stability' and maintain and increase profits. There is little disagreement now, in terms of competition theory and policy at both international and national levels, regarding the damaging effect of such trading practices on public and consumer interests, and such cartels have been subject to increasing condemnation in the legal process of regulating and protecting competition. Regulating Cartels in Europe provides critical evaluation of the way in which European-level regulation has evolved to deal with the activities of such anti-competitive business cartels. They trace the historical development of cartel regulation in Europe, comparing the more pragmatic and empirical approached favored in Europe with the more dogmatic and uncompromising American policy on cartels. In particular, the work considers critically the move towards the use of fully fledged criminal proceedings in this area of legal control, examining evolving aspects of enforcement policy such as the use of leniency programs and the deployment of a range of criminal law and other sanctions. This new edition of the work covers emerging themes and arguments in the discipline, including the judicial review of decisions against cartels, the criminological and legal basis of the criminalization of cartel conduct, and the range and effectiveness of sanctions used in response to cartel activity.

The Political Economy of International Commodity Cartels examines how international commodity cartels in the 1930s were impacted not only by commercial rivalry, but also by international trade political and diplomatic concerns. This work presents the rise and decline of the European Timber Exporters’ Convention (ETEC) and analyses how firms navigated through the cartel game under increasing international competition, pressures from the national governments, and the interventionist endeavours of the League of Nations. Cartels are often associated with, in the standard economic interpretation, business collusion. However, in using vast archive sources and historical methodology, the chapters in this book shed light onto how international relations shaped cartels. The rise of British protectionism, the emergence of the Soviet Union as an industrial power, and the economic rapprochement of the League of Nations in the early 1930s created a wave of political and diplomatic challenges in the timber trading countries and affected cartelisation. Timber firms in the biggest producer countries—Finland and Sweden—were uninterested in international cartel collaboration, but under pressure joined the ETEC nevertheless. This book makes a strong contribution to the fields of business history and cartel studies. It is an essential read for economic historians interested in how political pressure shaped international cartels and how cartels became avenues of diplomacy.

Document from the year 2017 in the subject Law - Civil / Private, Trade, Anti Trust Law, Business Law, grade: A, , language: English, abstract: The major problem associated with the regulation of transnational mergers, which affect several national markets, is the allocation of jurisdiction. Each country concerned may wish to exert jurisdiction and apply its national competition law to regulate the anti-competitive effects a merger may have in its territory. However, this approach may lead to risks of inconsistent decisions regarding the legality of mergers. Indeed, the national competition laws applied by the regulating authorities may diverge in several aspects, which raise the likelihood of inconsistency. The authors advocates the creation of an international merger control framework (IMCF) for the regulation of transnational mergers. This framework will rest on an informal and a formal pillar. The former includes non-legally binding competition principles. Consistency of these principles with the concepts of legitimacy and efficiency, as well as the presence of peer reviews and assistance programmes, should lower the risk of non-implementation. The formal pillar includes bilateral cooperation agreements which apply to merger affecting the countries which have concluded the agreements. As essential pre-condition for the application of bilateral agreements, the level of cooperation achieved by such agreements should be at least equal to that ensured by the informal pillar. The last part of the study addresses and examines the long and complex processes in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions. M&A arbitration faces certain difficulties during the transaction. Such difficulties the author seeks to underline. Two main problems of arbitration in M&A transactions, particullarly, have been covered. Firstly, the problem of consent in consolidation of parallel proceedings during M&A transactions, and, secondly parties' consent that validate arbitration agreements/clauses in “assignment” or “succession” after M&A transactions have been completed. The author also tries to clarify the content of consent of parties to a transaction. Finally, a criticism of parallel proceedings is enhanced.

Competition Policy in the European Union provides a comprehensive introduction to the European Union's policies on restrictive practices, mergers monopolies and state aid. The authors offer a wide ranging analysis of the evolution, operation and regulation of one of the EU's most important policies in a clear and accessible format.

Renowned industrial expert Geoffrey Owen analyses the complex reasons behind the delayed modernisation of British industry.

This massive 3-volume, hardcover examination of the history, design and enforcement of competition law is for judges, enforcement officials, lawyers, and economists-anyone who wishes to understand the jurisprudential, substantive, and methodological issues confronting modern competition law and policy. The authors of this book include policy makers, academics, economists, and lawyers from across the globe, ensuring a variety of perspectives and approaches on competition law and policy.