First published in 1995. This series seeks to consolidate published material on a wide variety of public, private, and non-profit organizations including: (a) federal agencies, Congressional committees, the judicial branch, and international bodies; (b) corporations, interest groups, trade unions, and consulting firms; as well as (c) professional associations, scientific societies, and educational institutions. This text offers an organised volume of intelligence literature. Intelligence is the collection and analysis of information about threats at home and abroad for use by policymakers as they make key decisions-is widely recognized as the nation's first line of defense in protecting itself against dangers from overseas and subversive activities at home.

Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence; (3) Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a Model; (4) Proposed Joint Committee on Intelligence Characteristics: Methods of Establishment; Jurisdiction and Authority; Membership; Terms and Rotation; Leadership; Secrecy Controls; Pros and Cons; (5) Alternatives to a Joint Committee: Changing the Select Committees¿ Structure and Powers; Concerns about Restructuring the Intelligence Committees; Constraints on Coordination; Increasing the Use of Congressional Support Agencies; (6) Observations on Oversight of Intelligence: Obstacles to Oversight: Secrecy Constraints. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find publication.

"Foreseeing conflict between the legislative and executive branches over the proper functions of government, the Founders of the United States built into the U.S. Constitution the checks and balances that Edwin S. Corwin called "an invitation to struggle." Smist argues that congressional intelligence-oversight committees--such as Senator Church's 1975-76 committee--can, by taking up this struggle, not only handle sensitive information responsibly but help shape rational foreign policy. When Congress is shut out of the intelligence process-as in President Carter's abortive Iran rescue mission and Reagan's Iran-Contra affair-the results can be catastrophic. Smist's detailed analysis of congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence from Pearl Harbor through Iran-Contra is based largely on his interviews with participants, including senators, representatives, and executive-branch officials. The analysis is informed by Smist's dialectical model of "institutional" (conservative, supportive) versus "investigative" (radical, questioning) oversight, which allows him to uncover the frequently obscured historical value of previous Senate and House investigative committees. For example, the Pike committee, 1975-76, even though its final report was suppressed by the House, was able to elicit then Secretary of State Kissinger's admission of presidential control over covert actions, thus shattering the doctrine of "plausible deniability." Because these committees continue to wrestle with the principles underlying government, their unfolding drama is meaningful for the student of constitutional history. This book provides new conceptual tools for the study of intelligence oversight and gives the direct testimony of key participants, making it important not only as political science but as history." --

How terrorism is portrayed by the news media, and thus perceived by the public, is directly linked to government's foreign policy goals. Steven Livingston demonstrates the complex interactions among the press, the public, and political actors in illuminating a policymaking process that relies on image management as one strategy in achieving policy objectives–not just in combating terrorism but also in handling other foreign policy problems.

It is surprising that no one previous to John Prados attempted a biography of quintessential cold warrior William Colby, because his story is in many ways also the story of the CIA. From Italy to Vietnam, to the military coup in Indonesia, to Watergate, the prosecution of Richard Helms, investigations of CIA assassination plots, and the drugging and surveillance of unwitting Americans, Colby was there, on the ground or deeply involved at headquarters.—The Guardian William E. Colby was one of the most enigmatic figures of the Cold War and a central player in the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. While publicly appearing as a calm bureaucrat, behind the scenes Colby helped orchestrate some of CIA's most controversial operations. His mysterious death even added to the aura. In the wake of new questions relating to CIA activities since 9/11—which John Prados discusses in his new preface—Colby's story provides crucial lessons for a nation that still struggles to reconcile intelligence methods with democratic principles. Prados tracks Colby's life and career from early years in the OSS to his tumultuous tenure as Director of Central Intelligence in the 1970s. Reviled by many outside the CIA for his role in Vietnam-and inside it for his cooperation with probes of the agency—Colby was cast as a scapegoat by the Ford White House during the Church and Pike congressional investigations. In addition, Prados offers fresh insights and new perspectives on Colby's involvement in the notorious Phoenix program in Vietnam and in the bloody Indonesian coup of 1965 that overthrew President Sukarno and brought General Suharto to power, as well as on the CIA's role in the 1963 assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam and on the actions of high-level CIA officials during the final demise of South Vietnam in 1975. A masterful study of a master spy, William Colby and the CIA also offers a vital and timely history of the inner workings of "the Company" for which he worked. Originally published in a cloth edition under the title Lost Crusader and retitled for this first paperback edition, William Colby and the CIA explores dilemmas of intelligence that are of renewed importance today.

Academic research on state crime has focused on the illegal actions of individuals and organizations (i.e., syndicates and corporations). Interchangeably labeled governmental crime, delinquency, illegality, or lawlessness, official deviance and misconduct, crimes of obedience, and human rights violations, state crime has largely been considered in relation to insurgent violence or threats to national security. Generally, it has been seen as a phenomenon endemic to authoritarian countries in transitional and lesser developed contexts. We need look no further than today's headlines to see the evidence of state crime. Rwanda, where government troops massacred countless Hutus and Tutsis, governmental atrocities in Kosovo, at the hands of the Yugoslavian Army, and East Timor where both individuals and property have been decimated, largely perpetrated by the Indonesian military.The study of how to control state crime has been difficult. There are definitional, conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems, as well as difficulties in designing of practical methods to abolish, combat, control or resist this type of behavior. Jeffrey Ian Ross reviews these shortcomings, then develops a preliminary model of ways to control state crime. His intention is stimulating scholarly research and debate, but also encouraging progressive-minded policymakers and practitioners who work for governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The hope is that they will reflect upon the methods they advocate or use to minimize state transgressions. This new edition will be of compelling interest to students of political science and criminology, as well as general readers interested in human rights, state crime, and world affairs.

This book addresses the ambiguities of the growing use of private security contractors and provides guidance as to how our expectations about regulating this expanding ‘service’ industry will have to be adjusted. In the warzones of Iraq and Afghanistan many of those who carry weapons are not legally combatants, nor are they protected civilians. They are contracted by governments, businesses, and NGOs to provide armed security. Often mistaken as members of armed forces, they are instead part of a new protean proxy force that works alongside the military in a multitude of shifting roles, and overseen by a matrix of contracts and regulations. This book analyzes the growing industry of these private military and security companies (PMSCs) used in warzones and other high risk areas. PMSCs are the result of a unique combination of circumstances, including a change in the idea of soldiering, insurance industry analyses that require security contractors, and a need for governments to distance themselves from potentially criminal conduct. The book argues that PMSCs are a unique type of organization, combining attributes from worlds of the military, business, and humanitarian organizations. This makes them particularly resistant to oversight. The legal status of these companies and those they employ is also hard to ascertain, which weakens the multiple regulatory tools available. PMSCs also fall between the cracks in ethical debates about their use, seeming to be both justifiable and objectionable. This transformation in military operations is a seemingly irreversible product of more general changes in the relationship between the individual citizen and the state. This book will be of much interest to students of private security companies, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general. Kateri Carmola is the Christian A. Johnson Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College in Vermont. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley.