Forfattere:Edward L. Warner III; Stephen M. Meyer; Michael Hobkirk; Catherine Mcardle Kelleher; Aharon Yariv; Amos Perlmutter; W. Harriet Critchley; Vincent Davis; William J. Lynn; Robert W. Komer; Samuel P. Huntington; James Schlesinger; William Y. Smith; David C. Jones; Edward C. Meyer III; Thor Hanson; Morton H. Halperin; David Halperin; Vincent Puritano; Philip Odeen; Jacques S. Gansler og Robert J. Art.

Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, several changes were instituted by Congress in an effort to reform the U.S. military. Title IV, Joint Officer Management, of the Act was aimed at reforming the officer development of the services in an effort to eliminate the parochial service dispositions that had previously plagued U.S. military efforts. Title IV instituted policies to provide officers with joint education and joint experience in an effort to develop officers with a multi-service or joint perspective. In an effort to provide senior officers with joint experience, all officers promoted to the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral (07) must have completed a joint duty assignment prior to promotion. This dissertation looks specifically at the joint duty promotion requirement instituted under Title IV in an effort to analyze the U.S. military's ability to implement a congressional mandate. The implementation of the joint duty assignment as a promotion requirement has been a source of concern for both the services and congressional policymakers.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is the most important legislation to affecting U.S. national defense in the last 50 years. This act resulted from frustration in Congress and among certain military officers concerning what they believed to be the poor quality of military advice available to civilian decision-makers. It also derived from the U.S. military's perceived inability to conduct successful joint or multi-service operations. The act, passes after four years of legislative debate, designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor to the President and sought to foster greater cooperation among the military services. Goldwater-Nichols marks the latest attempt to balance competing tendencies within the Department of Defense, namely centralization versus decentralization and geographic versus functional distributions of power. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has achieved prominence, but his assignment is somewhat contradictory: the spokesman and thus the advocate for the Commander in Chief, while simultaneously the provider of objective advice to the President. While the act did succeed in strengthening the CINCs' authority and in contributing to the dramatic U.S. achievements in the Gulf War, the air and ground campaigns revealed weaknesses in the CINCs' capability to plan joint operations. In addition, the increased role of the military in ad hoc peacekeeping operations has challenged the U.S. military's current organizational structure for the quick deployment of troops from the various services. Rapid technological advances and post-Cold War strategic uncertainty also complicate the U.S. military's organizational structure.

Issues of defence politics and policy have long been at the forefront of political agendas and defining of international affairs. However, the dramatic changes to the global system that have taken place since the end of the Cold War and parrticularly since the terror attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001 have amplified the world's attention toward political and policy issues of national, regional and global security. The focus of this volume is on examining the fundamental causes of, and defence policy responses to this new 'post-9/11' security environment. Edited by Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III and James J. F. Forest of the US Military Academy, West Point, USA, this volume is international in scope, with pieces written by experts in the field, offering a collection of up-to-date and balanced insights on key contemporary issues of concern to defence policymakers. The book will be an invaluable reference tool for academics and students, researchers in international relations, policymakers, media professionals and government officials.

That the end of the Cold War has resulted in a massive sea change in Europe's security environment is a fact. Notwithstanding the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appears to be as politically active and institutionally viable, if not more so, than it was before autumn 1989. Since 1990, the NATO Alliance has undertaken major reform initiatives that prepared it for the emerging European security landscape. For instance, at the London Summit of July 1990, the Alliance declared an end of the Cold War. At the Rome Summit (November 1991), NATO released the "Alliance's New Strategic Concept" to be implemented by the Alliance. More recently, at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, the heads of government and state announced, inter alia, the creation of the Partnership for Peace program and approved the concept for the subsequent creation of Alliance Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). Hence, contrary to the views of some critics, the Alliance has clearly demonstrated its intent to reform itself to meet the challenges of the new European security system.