Committee was set up "to make definite proposals for amalgamating as far as possible the common Services of the Navy, Army and Air Force, such as Intelligence, Supply, Transport, Education, Medical, Chaplains, and any other overlapping Departments, in order to reduce the cost of the present triplication."--Page 2

In a period that began with Britain controlling a world-wide empire and included two world wars, followed by the Cold War and massive expenditure on nuclear armaments, the relationship between the politicians and the generals has been central to British history. While it is correctly assumed that the Armed Forces have never threatened British political stability in modern times, the relationship between the military and their political masters is a major, if under-emphasised, theme of British history. While in theory the politicians decided strategy and the military implemented it, in practice decisions often depended on the personalities and experience of those involved. Asquith, the epitome of the civilian, left major strategic decisions in the hands of the military; while Churchill, an ex-soldier and ex-First Lord of the Admiralty, rode roughshod over professional military advice. In a period when arms before ever more technologically sophisticated, there was also the problem of how far politicians could decide on strategies proposed by the military other than by the crude yardstick of cost. The essays in Government and the Armed Forces in Britain, 1856-1990 provide a coherent account not only of the major decision-making of warfare but also of the changes in the organisation and control of the Armed Forces.

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond was "a unique phenomenon in the Victorian-Edwardian navy—a professionally competent and successful officer who was also an intellectual," writes the author. "This was enough to ensure that his progress would be stormy.'' This thoroughly documented biographical study of Richmond's professional career reveals a fully experienced, clear-thinking officer with a profound understanding of naval history, "a restless and uncompromising personality," and a passionate concern with naval strategy, the art of war, and the most effective training programme for officers. Richmond persistently challenged the accepted practices and prejudices of the naval profession. He and his small group of disciples, the "Young Turks," found themselves in the thick of the most crucial controversies in the British Navy. In spite of frequent official displeasure, however, Richmond became an influential naval historian and educator, responsible for the creation of the modern naval staff and the Imperial Defence College. The volume rests on extensive research in the official records and the private papers of Richmond and his close associates. It will interest not only naval historians, but also those with a general interest in the impact of one man's thought and actions on Britain's defence policy and the outcome of two World Wars.

The essays that comprise this collection examine the development and influence of the British General Staff from the late Victorian period until the eve of World War II. They trace the changes in the staff that influenced British military strategy and subsequent operations on the battlefield.