A call for a new way to assess bioweapon threats—recognizing the importance of the sociopolitical context of technological threats. The horrifying terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the anthrax strikes that soon followed gave the United States new reason to fear unconventional enemies and atypical weapons. These fears have prompted extensive research, study, and planning within the U.S. military, intelligence, and policy communities regarding potential attacks involving biological weapons. In Phantom Menace or Looming Danger?, Kathleen M. Vogel argues for a major shift in how analysts assess bioweapons threats. She calls for an increased focus on the social and political context in which technological threats are developed. Vogel uses case studies to illustrate her theory: Soviet anthrax weapons development, the Iraqi mobile bioweapons labs, and two synthetic genomic experiments. She concludes with recommendations for analysts and policymakers to integrate sociopolitical analysis with data analysis, thereby making U.S. bioweapon assessments more accurate. Students of security policy will find her innovative framework appealing, her writing style accessible, and the many illustrations helpful. These features also make Phantom Menace or Looming Danger? a must-read for government policymakers and intelligence experts. “This is an engrossing book that exemplifies what STS can bring to broader issues of policymaking in the US and potentially beyond, and it is well worth reading.” —Carla Nappi, New Books in Science, Technology, and Society “Kathleen Vogel has authored one of the most important books written about biological weapons in recent years. . . . Vogel tackles head-on the conventional wisdom regarding the biological weapon (BW) threat, successfully, challenging assumptions that have gone largely unexamined by the broader biodefense community. . . . She also uncovers some deeper organizational and social forces that have shaped US intelligence and threat assessments since the end of international security, not just those with an interest in biodefense or intelligence. This, this book is a must-read for scholars and practitioners in the field of international security, not just those with an interest in biodefense or intelligence.” —Gregory D. Koblentz, Nonproliferation Review “Intriguing, original, and deeply informed. Focusing on potential threats, Vogel shows in engaging historical detail that technical problems are inherently social. She has made an important scholarly contribution to science and technology studies and to studies of intelligence. At the same time, she speaks directly to the policy world. The combination of depth of scholarship and practical implication is remarkable.” —Lynn Eden, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

In Feb. 2004 the Committee looked into issues surrounding a Dec. 2001 meeting in Rome, Italy between DoD officials, and current and former Iranian officials, and a related follow-up meeting in June 2003. The Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was a two person group created in Nov. 2001, after discussions on how to pursue the Rome meeting. While the information obtained at the Dec. 2001 Rome meeting was related to Iran instead of Iraq, senior personnel were directed to conduct the Rome meeting and were involved in the decision-making process on how to undertake the meeting. This report completes the Committee¿s inquiry and the issue of whether the OUSD(P) undertook inappropriate intelligence collection activities.

Gregory Gause's masterful book is the first to offer a comprehensive account of the international politics in the Persian Gulf across nearly four decades. The story begins in 1971 when Great Britain ended its protectorate relations with the smaller states of the lower Gulf. It traces developments in the region from the oil 'revolution' of 1973–4 through the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war of 1990–1 to the toppling of Saddam Hussein in the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, bringing the story of Gulf regional politics up to 2008. The book highlights transnational identity issues, regime security and the politics of the world oil market, and charts the changing mix of interests and ambitions driving American policy. The author brings his experience as a scholar and commentator on the Gulf to this riveting account of one of the most politically volatile regions on earth.

This book examines the decisions by Tony Blair and John Howard to take their nations into the 2003 Iraq War, and the questions these decisions raise about democratic governance. It also explores the significance of the US alliance in UK and Australian decision-making, and the process for taking a nation to war. Relying on primary government documents and interviews, and bringing together various strands of literature that have so far been discussed in isolation (including historical accounts, party politics, prime ministerial leadership and intelligence studies), the authors provide a comprehensive and original view on the various post-war inquiries conducted in the UK, Australia.

The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.