Maike Hausen presents a transnational, multi-perspective review of strategic and security discussions among the former British white settler colonies Australia, Canada and New Zealand in the 1960s. Focusing on the foreign policy debate surrounding the British decision to withdraw their military 'East of Suez' from Southeast Asia, she reviews extensive source material to examine the transformation of political, diplomatic and strategic ties between Great Britain and Australia, Canada and New Zealand. By embedding the East of Suez discussion into a larger framework of long-term postcolonial transformations and developments of the Cold War and decolonization, the study traces how the British decision upset the traditional conduct of concerted foreign policy and led to notions of crisis and uncertainty as well as to reviews that would ultimately contribute to more independent national outlooks and policies.

This book examines Britain's decision to leave the Gulf and considers the interaction between British decision-making, and local responses and initiatives, in shaping the modern Gulf.

The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial rule and the context in which this took place. This publication is the first of three volumes which examine the years 1964 to 1971, during which period ten territories became independent and all but one (Aden) became new members of the Commonwealth. Issues considered include: the symbolic significance of the recall of British troops from East of Suez, and the circumstances of Britain's withdrawl from Aden; a reappraisal of British interests in South-East Asia in the context of Singapore's secession from Malaysia; the ending of confrontation with Indonesia; British views on the Vietnam conflict; the end of Britain's treaties of protection in the Persian Gulf and the creation of the UAE.

This book, based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a 'Pound-Defence' deal with the USA. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labour Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.

Discusses Anglo-American policy in the Middle East under Kennedy and Johnson, as well as under British Conservative and Labour governments. This title provides a historical background on the Anglo-American Middle East for the 1950s. It analyses Western policy toward Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and toward the Arabian Peninsula.

Exploring British naval policy during the first two governments of Harold Wilson (1964-70), this book analyses how the Navy Department of the Ministry of Defence and the Navy's professional leadership dealt with six years of defence reviews, retrenchment and strategic re-orientation. This period witnessed a dramatic blow to the service's self image and self confidence as a result of the cancellation of the large CVA-01 aircraft carrier, and a gradual process of realignment, reorientation and adaptation to the changed political environment, resulting in a recovery of self-confidence, a new strategy and the approval in principle of a class of small aircraft carriers. Taking advantage of the recently released official records, the study highlights for the first time just how in practice Mountbatten managed to dominate the Chiefs of Staff machinery, and how his power was undermined and diminished. It also demonstrates that, contrary to widespread historical opinion, Denis Healey was not necessarily set against carrier air power from his arrival in office and was willing to consider the procurement of a medium carrier for the navy. Furthermore, the work highlights the importance of the Mediterranean in the rehabilitation and renewal of self-confidence by the navy in the late 1960s. Although focusing primarily on policy and strategic matters, the book incorporates wider historical consideration, reviewing other factors that influenced policy-making such as foreign policy, financial resources, materiel, manpower and recruitment, in addition to the administrative machinery and the cultural environment of the time. In so doing, Dr Hampshire offers a vivid insight into the interactions of government and military at a critical juncture in the changing nature of Britain's global role.