This major work, written by prominent South African academics, is an introduction to the new constitutional order in South Africa. It does not aim to provide a detailed commentary on fundamental rights in South Africa, but instead seeks to place the rights affirmed in the constitution in a comparative and international context. In doing so the book focuses upon the principles that form the foundation of the new constitutional order: the supremacy of the Constitution, the notion of a democratic constitutional state, and the judicial protection of fundamental rights. This is a book which will be of interest to all lawyers and political scientists particularly those interested in constitutionalism and constitutional litigation.

Less noticed in the West than wars, terrorism and economic trends has been the historic development since World War II of constitutional government and law in Asia. Lawrence W. Beer has been a close observer of Asian linkages among law, politics, culture, and national security issues for over fifty years. His perspectives have been refined during long residence in Asia, especially Japan, by substantial friendly interactions with Asian legal scholars, judges and attorneys involved in the world of human rights constitutional law. This volume, which will be widely welcomed by students and researchers, brings together a selection of Beer’s many works previously published in diverse venue, but no longer easily accessible. The collection opens with a review of constitutionalism in Asia and the United States and concludes with a recent examination of Japan’s rejection of war: ‘Japan’s Constitutional Discourse and Performance’. By way of Afterword, the author offers an in-depth review of ‘Globalization of Human Rights in the 21st Century’.

This interdisciplinary volume highlights the crucial role of effective government in sustaining democratic constitutionalism. In each chapter, leaders in the fields of constitutional law and politics provide innovative analyses of the relationships between effective government and democratic constitutionalism, its principles, and its institutions.

There is persuasive evidence suggesting we are on the brink of human-induced ecological disaster that could change life on Earth as we know it. There is also a general consensus among scientists about the pace and extent of global ecological decay, including a realisation that humans are central to causing the global socio-ecological crisis. This new epoch has been called the Anthropocene. Considering the many benefits that constitutional environmental protection holds out in domestic legal orders, it is likely that a constitutionalised form of global environmental law and governance would be better able to counter the myriad exigencies of the Anthropocene. This book seeks to answer this central question: from the perspective of the Anthropocene, what is environmental constitutionalism and how could it be extrapolated to formulate a global framework? In answering this question, this book offers the first systematic conceptual framework for global environmental constitutionalism in the epoch of the Anthropocene.

This book analyses unamendability in democratic constitutionalism and engages critically and systematically with its perils, offering a much-needed corrective to existing understandings of this phenomenon. Whether formalized in the constitutional text or developed as part of judicial doctrines of implicit unamendability, eternity clauses raise fundamental questions about the core democratic commitments underpinning any given constitution. The book takes seriously the democratic challenge eternity clauses pose and argues that this goes beyond the old tension between constitutionalism and democracy. Instead, eternity clauses reveal themselves to be a far more ambivalent constitutional mechanism, one with greater and more insidious potential for abuse than has been recognized. The 'dark side' of unamendability includes its propensity to insulate majoritarian, exclusionary, and internally incoherent values, as well as its sometimes purely pragmatic role in elite bargaining. The book adopts a contextual approach and brings to the fore a variety of case studies from non-traditional jurisdictions. These insights from the periphery illuminate the prospects of unamendability fulfilling its intended aims - protecting constitutional democracy foremost among them. With its promise most appealing in transitional, post-conflict, and fragile democracies, unamendability reveals itself, counterintuitively, to be both less potent and potentially more dangerous in precisely these contexts. The book also places the rise of eternity clauses in the context of other significant trends in recent constitutional practice: the transnational embeddedness of constitution-making and of constitutional adjudication; the rise of popular participation in constitutional reform processes; and the ongoing crisis of democratic backsliding in liberal democracies.

This book compiles the papers and comments delivered at the Confârence on "European and American constitutionaism" which took place in Gèttingen in 2003. Through topics like freedom of speech, human dignity, the protective function of the state, adjudication and democracy and international influences, the conference papers identify salient features of the constitutional systems on both sides of the Atlantic and address recent developments following the end of the soviet era in eastern Europe and the terrorists attacks of 11 September 2001.

How should constitutional design respond to the opportunities and challenges raised by ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural differences, and do so in ways that promote democracy, social justice, peace and stability? This is one of the most difficult questions facing societies in the world today. There are two schools of thought on how to answer this question. Under the heading of accommodation, some have argued for the need to recognize, institutionalize and empower differences. There are a range of constitutional instruments available to achieve this goal, such as multinational federalism and administrative decentralization, legal pluralism (e.g. religious personal law), other forms of non-territorial minority rights (e.g. minority language and religious education rights), consociationalism, affirmative action, legislative quotas, etc. But others have countered that such practices may entrench, perpetuate and exacerbate the very divisions they are designed to manage. They propose a range of alternative strategies that fall under the rubric of integration that will blur, transcend and cross-cut differences. Such strategies include bills of rights enshrining universal human rights enforced by judicial review, policies of disestablishment (religious and ethnocultural), federalism and electoral systems designed specifically to include members of different groups within the same political unit and to disperse members of the same group across different units, are some examples. In this volume, leading scholars of constitutional law, comparative politics and political theory address the debate at a conceptual level, as well as through numerous country case-studies, through an interdisciplinary lens, but with a legal and institutional focus.

Cultural history and themendment : New York Times v. Sullivan and its times / Kermit L. Hall -- New directions in American constitutional history -- Words as hard as cannon-balls : women's rights agitation -- And liberty of speech in nineteenth-century America / Sandra F. VanBurkleo -- Race, state, market, and civil society in constitutional history / Mark Tushnet -- Constitutional history and the "cultural turn" : cross -- Examining the legal-reelist narratives of Henry Fonda / Norman L. Rosenberg -- Contributors

Judges, courts, and scholars in the United States agree that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, but there is much disagreement about its meaning. So what seems to be incontestable truth is riddled with disagreements about every day questions of decision making on matter such as whether people are entitled to government created programs, what rights are fundamental, the criteria for voting, the three branches of governments' several responsibilities, and even who should have the final say in defining the Constitution's meaning. Constitutional Ethos is a groundbreaking investigation into the fundamental principles of constitutional principle, meaning, and interpretation. It explores the core purposes of American representative democracy in light of historical sources, recent precedents, and contemporary debates. Alexander Tsesis argues that a central norm of U.S. law can be derived from the Declaration of Independence and Preamble. This book develops a theory of constitutional law structured on the public duty to protect individual rights for the general welfare. The maxim of constitutional governance synthesizes the protection of individual and public rights. The ideal is neither solely theoretical nor customary but tied to a firm foundation that the people then build upon by lobbying elected officials and petitioning appointed judges. Representative government has an interlinked obligation to the individual and the general welfare. This paradigm for responsible governance sets the baseline against which citizens can hold policy makers accountable to the structural and normative commitments of the Constitution. A pluralistic system must respect human dignity and govern for the betterment of the body politic. Those mandates set the terms for exercising legitimate power at the federal, state, and local levels to protect individual rights to achieve the common good of civil society. Tsesis demonstrates that ethos is binding on the conduct of all three branches of government and their officeholders. His argument challenges the more common U.S. perspective among academics and judges, who typically discount the existence of any objective constitutional value, regarding the document as a construct of social norms. To the contrary, Tsesis shows that the people established the terms of the nation's founding documents to protect universal, unalienable rights. The structure of government provides the mechanisms of those in a pluralistic state to set reasonable limitations for the betterment of society as a whole. Understanding the Constitution's special place in American legal culture is essential for resolving a host of contemporary issues; including, those involving marital, gender, and voting equalities. The state is a means of optimizing the well-being of individuals. Human productivity can best flourish in a society of equals, where talents can be brought to bear in the betterment of self and other members of the community. The Constitution does not create rights but protects those universal ideals of representative democracy first set out in the Declaration of Independence. It further grants authority to political institutions for the enforcement of policies and concrete laws for the betterment of society or some relevant segment of it. Many scholars with leanings in legal realism and process theory believe the authority of government is a social construct created by popular majorities; Tsesis convincingly demonstrates, to the contrary, that even those laws enacted by popular majorities are not authoritative unless they accord with a central maxim of constitutionalism, which is the protection of individual rights for the common good.

This book explores the relationship of mutual trust and fundamental rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of the European Union and asks whether there is any role for proportionality. Mutual trust among Member States has long been presumed by the Court in a manner that mutual recognition was prioritised in regard to, but to the detriment of, the protection of fundamental rights. After thoroughly reviewing this relationship, this book offers a comprehensive framework of proportionality and explores its impact on the protection of fundamental rights in a mutual trust environment. It applies a theoretical and a normative framework of proportionality to two case studies (EU criminal and asylum law) by reference to several fundamental rights, enabling a carefully constructed analysis with useful parallels. The book argues that such analysis, based on proportionality, is not always desirable and helpful for the protection of fundamental rights in this area and thoroughly explores its impact on the protection of fundamental rights vis-à-vis mutual trust.