This report provides an analysis of Russian combat in Chechnya beginning with the first modern Chechen war of 1994-1996 and comparing and contrasting it with the ongoing conflict that began in 1999. While the focus is on combat in urban areas, more general aspects of the Chechnya wars are also discussed. The research reported here was initiated with the goal of better understanding what Russia's urban experience in Chechnya indicates both about Russian capabilities and operations specifically and about urban warfare generally, with lessons to be drawn for other states, including, of course, the United States. This effort was undertaken as a component of a project on military operations on urbanized terrain. The project was co-sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army. The project was conducted jointly in the Force Development and Technology Program and the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program of RAND Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. It should be of interest to policymakers and analysts concerned with the operational aspects of modern urban conflict and to those who seek to better understand the military capabilities, strategy, and tactics of the Russian Federation.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin improvised a system of "asymmetric federalism" to help maintain its successor state, the Russian Federation. However, when sparks of independence flared up in Chechnya, Yeltsin and, later, Vladimir Putin chose military action to deal with a "brushfire" that they feared would spread to other regions and eventually destroy the federation. Matthew Evangelista examines the causes of the Chechen Wars of 1994 and 1999 and challenges Moscow's claims that the Russian Federation was too fragile to withstand the potential loss of one rebellious republic. He suggests that the danger for Russia lies less in a Soviet-style disintegration than in a misguided attempt at authoritarian recentralization, something that would jeopardize Russia's fledgling democratic institutions. He also contends that well-documented acts of terrorism by some Chechen fighters should not serve as an excuse for Russia to commit war crimes and atrocities. Evangelista urges emerging democracies like Russia to deal with violent internal conflict and terrorism without undermining the fundamental rights and freedoms of their citizens. He recommends that the United States and other democracies be more attentive to Moscow's violations of human rights and, in their own struggle against terrorism, provide a kind of role model.

Presented by Russian author and attorney Ilya Milyukov, Chronicles of the First and Second Chechen War presents the main events of the First (1994-1996) and Second (1999-2009) Wars in Chechnya, Russia's deadliest conflicts since World War II.The First War began in December 1994 and lasted for one year and nine months, ending in August 1996. There were two major urban battles - the Battle of the Chechen capital of Grozny from December 1994 to March 1995 and the Battle of Grozny in August 1996 - and two major battles in the rural areas, the Russian offensive in the Southern Chechnya in May and June 1995, and fighting in the foothills part of the Republic from February to May 1996.The Second War began in August 1999 and lasted much longer - until mid-April 2009, for almost ten years. It also included a major urban battle, and it again occurred in New Year's Eve - the Battle of Grozny in December 1999 - February 2000. There was also a major battle in the countryside - the Battle for the village of Komsomolskoye, located in Urus-Martanovsky District, in March 2000. And there were also two large attacks outside Chechnya -in Moscow in October 2002, and in the North Ossetian town of Beslan in September 2004. During these war, Russian federal troops took heavy losses, while the number of civilian deaths reached nearly 400,000 people.Milyukov's expert and meticulous chronicle lists the major events of these conflicts soberly and without editorial comment to document their events in all their brutality and horror.

An examination of the difficulties faced by the Russian military in planningand carrying out urban operations in Chechnya.Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city ofGrozny in the winters of 1994-1995 and 1999-2000, as well as clashing insmaller towns and villages. The author examines both Russian and rebeltactics and operations in those battles, focusing on how and why thecombatants' approaches changed over time. The study concludes that whilethe Russian military was able to significantly improve its ability to carryout a number of key tasks in the five-year interval between the wars, otherimportant missions--particularly in the urban realm--were ignored, largelyin the belief that the urban mission could be avoided. This consciousdecision not to prepare for a most stressful battlefield met withdevastating results, a lesson the United States would be well served tostudy.

Over 2,400 total pages ... Russian outrage following the September 2004 hostage disaster at North Ossetia’s Beslan Middle School No.1 was reflected in many ways throughout the country. The 52-hour debacle resulted in the death of some 344 civilians, including more than 170 children, in addition to unprecedented losses of elite Russian security forces and the dispatch of most Chechen/allied hostage-takers themselves. It quickly became clear, as well, that Russian authorities had been less than candid about the number of hostages held and the extent to which they were prepared to deal with the situation. Amid grief, calls for retaliation, and demands for reform, one of the more telling reactions in terms of hardening public perspectives appeared in a national poll taken several days after the event. Some 54% of citizens polled specifically judged the Russian security forces and the police to be corrupt and thus complicit in the failure to deal adequately with terrorism, while 44% thought that no lessons for the future would be learned from the tragedy. This pessimism was the consequence not just of the Beslan terrorism, but the accumulation of years of often spectacular failures by Russian special operations forces (SOF, in the apt US military acronym). A series of Russian SOF counterterrorism mishaps, misjudgments, and failures in the 1990s and continuing to the present have made the Kremlin’s special operations establishment in 2005 appear much like Russia’s old Mir space station—wired together, unpredictable, and subject to sudden, startling failures. But Russia continued to maintain and expand a large, variegated special operations establishment which had borne the brunt of combat actions in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other trouble spots, and was expected to serve as the nation’s principal shield against terrorism in all its forms. Known since Soviet days for tough personnel, personal bravery, demanding training, and a certain rough or brutal competence that not infrequently violated international human rights norms, it was supposed that Russian special operations forces—steeped in their world of “threats to the state” and associated with once-dreaded military and national intelligence services—could make valuable contributions to countering terrorism. The now widely perceived link between “corrupt” special forces on the one hand, and counterterrorism failures on the other, reflected the further erosion of Russia’s national security infrastructure in the eyes of both Russian citizens and international observers. There have been other, more ambiguous, but equally unsettling dimensions of Russian SOF activity as well, that have strong internal and external political aspects. These constitute the continuing assertions from Russian media, the judicial system, and other Federal agencies and officials that past and current members of the SOF establishment have organized to pursue interests other than those publicly declared by the state or allowed under law. This includes especially the alleged intent to punish by assassination those individuals and groups that they believe have betrayed Russia. The murky nature of these alleged activities has formed a backdrop to other problems in the special units.

This book is the first full-length study of a key security issue confronting the West in the 21st century: urban military operations, as undertaken by US and UK forces in Iraq. It relates operations in cities to the wider study of conflict and

This groundbreaking work examines the complex dynamics of Russia's relations with the Caucasus, revealing the profound effects that Caucasian forces have had upon Russia's development. Essays show how Georgian sparks ignited conflagrations in South Ossetia (1991-1992) and Abkhazia (1992-1993), spreading northward to conflicts in Ossetia and Ingushetia (1992) and Chechnya (1994-1996). Combined with jihadist influences that entered from the South and East by way of Dagestan, these events culminated in the second Russo-Chechen war (1999-2009). Chechnya transformed both the Russian military and the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Beginning in 2000, Putin's Chechenization strategy had unforeseen and controversial results for the entire Russian Federation. These ironies are elucidated in case studies of the Stavropol region, the Sochi Olympics, the Pussy Riot conviction, and Russia's efforts to reintegrate religion with politics against the backdrop of an emerging Islamic "inner abroad.†? Neither Russia nor the Caucasus can be understood without an appreciation of their uneasy interconnection and its explosive consequences.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Caucasus was wracked by ethnic and separatist violence as the peoples of the region struggled for self-determination. Vicken Cheterian, who spent many years as a reporter and analyst covering the region's conflicts, asks why nationalism emerged as a dominant political current, and why, of the many nationalist movements that emerged, some led to violence while others did not. He explains also why minority rebellions were victorious against larger armies, in mountainous Karabakh, Abkhazia, and in the first war of Chechnya, and discusses the ongoing instability and armed resistance in the North Caucasus. He concludes his book by examining chapters the great power competition between Russia, the US, and the EU over the oil and gas resources of the Caspian region.

Written by a leading expert on modern Russia, this is an illustrated introduction to the bitter campaigns in Chechnya. In this new edition of his popular 2014 work, Mark Galeotti traces the progress of the wars in Chechnya, from the initial Russian advance through to urban battles such as Grozny, and the prolonged guerrilla warfare in the mountainous regions. Bringing the book up to date, including a revised introduction and new content on the Kadyrovtsy's role in Russia's other conflicts, Galeotti assesses how the wars have torn apart the fabric of Chechen society and their impact on Russia itself. Featuring full-colour maps and 50 new images, and drawing upon a wide range of sources, this succinct account explains the origins, history and consequences of Russia's wars in Chechnya, shedding new light on the history – and prospects – of the troubled region.